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Cover
e cover reproduces  Admiral Porter’s 
Fleet Running the Rebel Blockade of 
the Mississippi at Vicksburg, April 16th 
1863, a lithograph published by Currier 
& Ives, New York, in 1863. In “eories 
of Naval Blockades and eir Applica-
tion in the Twenty-First Century,” Adam 
Biggs, Dan Xu, Joshua Roaf, and Tatana 
Olson reappraise as to both theory 
and practice the utility and continuing 
relevance of the classic strategy of the 
naval blockade for gaining sea control 
or imposing sea denial, given technolog-
ical advancements in weapon systems, 
platforms, and communications.
Source: U.S. Naval Academy Museum, 
U.S. Naval History and Heritage  
Command photograph
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FROM THE EDITORS
This issue begins with a four-essay commemoration of the passing of Colin S� 
Gray (1943–2020), who has a strong claim to being considered the greatest stra-
tegic theorist of his generation� Although an Englishman who was educated at 
Oxford and concluded his career as director of the Centre for Strategic Studies 
at the University of Reading, Gray lived and worked for decades in the United 
States and was a major contributor to the debates on nuclear strategy and arms 
control that roiled the American security community during the endgame of 
the Cold War� He was thoroughly at home in this country and extraordinarily 
well connected in the senior leadership ranks of the American armed forces� 
Gray’s views always were somewhat out of step with the academic and policy 
establishment of the day, but he was respected and liked universally as a gentle-
man as well as a scholar�
Gray’s many books covered virtually every aspect of military power, but at 
the core of his thought was the idea of strategy; Clausewitz was his lodestar� 
He was, as Lawrence Freedman puts it, truly an “evangelist” of strategy, and he 
returned repeatedly to this subject in a number of his books over the years in an 
effort to deepen and refine his thoughts and to meditate especially on what he 
conceived as the (deeply problematic) issue of the relationship between strate-
gic theory and practice� Among navalists, Gray is best known for his Leverage of 
Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War (1992)� Geoffrey Till offers 
a brief appreciation of this work, arguably the best single study of the subject 
in the twentieth century� Gray’s former colleague Keith Payne then reviews 
Gray’s profoundly considered views of nuclear strategy and arms control, and 
in particular his virtually single-handed effort to make the (moral as well as the 
military) case for defense against nuclear weapons� Finally, John Klein assesses 
Gray’s contribution to space as an emerging arena of strategic interest� Klein, a 
former student of Gray’s at Reading (as well as a graduate of this College), also 
testifies to Gray’s talents as a teacher and his commitment to the development 
of strategy as a full-fledged academic discipline� RIP�
The world’s oceans always have been places where it is very easy to disap-
pear� The rapid development of remote-sensing technologies in recent years 
promises to alter this situation fundamentally� In “From Orbit to Ocean: Fix-
ing Southeast Asia’s Remote-Sensing Blind Spots,” Gregory B� Poling offers a 
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detailed survey of the array of (primarily space-based) remote-sensing systems 
currently in existence or under development in the private sector, and argues 
that the availability as well as the increasing affordability of these systems soon 
will make it possible for smaller states radically to improve their ability to 
monitor their own territorial waters and to counter more effectively criminal 
activities that range from illegal fishing to piracy, human trafficking, and ter-
rorism� Focusing on Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Viet-
nam, he argues that these nations to varying degrees are beginning to cope with 
the gross deficiencies in their current maritime monitoring capabilities, and 
that the United States has a key role to play in facilitating access to appropriate 
private-sector resources� Gregory Poling is a senior fellow for Southeast Asia at 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies�
Naval blockades have been an important if somewhat neglected aspect of 
maritime warfare since at least the eighteenth century, when advances in ship 
construction provided the station-keeping features critical for successful block-
ading operations in the age of sail� Close blockades of French naval bases by 
the Royal Navy during the Napoleonic Wars represented a major and expensive 
commitment of Britain’s ships of the line� The Union naval blockade of the 
Confederacy in the American Civil War was a key strategic contributor to the 
eventual triumph of the North� In “Theories of Naval Blockades and Their Ap-
plication in the Twenty-First Century,” Adam Biggs, Dan Xu, Joshua Roaf, and 
Tatana Olson revisit the issue of naval blockades today, with special attention 
to the international legal context of blockading operations and the extent to 
which recent developments in weaponry and technology have affected the way 
blockading is or should be conceived and applied� They conclude by focusing 
briefly on case studies of potential blockades of the Spratly Islands in the South 
China Sea and of North Korea� The authors are officers on active duty in the 
United States Navy�
Bureaucratic ossification is a challenge for any large organization but par-
ticularly for military organizations, owing to their innately hierarchical com-
mand structures� In “Transformational Leadership in the Navy: Cultivating 
a Learning-Organization Culture,” Brenda Oppermann and William Nault 
provide a case study of the multiyear project of transforming Pearl Harbor 
Naval Shipyard from a problem-plagued and underperforming organization 
into a high-performing one, using the “learning organization” model originally 
developed by Peter Senge� Brenda Oppermann is a professor in the College of 
Leadership and Ethics at the Naval War College, of which Captain William 
Nault, USN (Ret�), is the deputy dean�
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING world-class education to our 
students through tailored in-resident, nonresident, and 
focused short courses, the Naval War College also serves as a source of 
unbiased and independent expertise in areas of interest to leaders of the 
Navy, the Department of Defense, and the operating forces� Our network of 
interconnected colleges, centers, and subject-specific study groups routinely 
provides analysis, commentary, and subject-matter expertise to individuals 
and organizations across the entire national-security apparatus� Examples 
include the following: 
• At the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, the director of the College’s 
Arctic Studies Group (ASG), Dr� Walter A� Berbrick, currently is leading 
the development of the Department of the Navy’s first Arctic Strategy—a 
forward-thinking and forward-leaning strategy that charts a new course for 
American naval power in the Arctic in the decades ahead� In October 2020, 
the ASG sponsored the Newport Arctic Scholars Initiative and wrapped up 
its ten-month collaborative research project with a report, “Conflict Pre-
vention and Security Cooperation in the Arctic Region: Frameworks of the 
Future�” Led by Professor Berbrick and Rear Admiral Lars Saunes, former 
chief of the Royal Norwegian Navy, eighteen sailors and scholars from Arctic 
nations presented and discussed virtually the findings and recommenda-
tions of their work with regional heads of navies and defense leaders� In late 
October 2020, the College hosted James P� DeHart, the State Department’s 
coordinator for the Arctic region, for a virtual lecture of opportunity entitled 
“U�S� National Security Interests and Priorities in the Arctic Region�”
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• Our College of Maritime Operational Warfare (CMOW) has adapted its di-
rect fleet support as a result of the ongoing pandemic� Recent activities have 
included the following:
• Five Maritime Staff Operators Course, one International Maritime Staff  
Operators Course, and one Maritime Operational Planners Course classes 
have been completed in socially distanced face-to-face sessions, graduat-
ing more than 160 students, since the Navy-wide pandemic stop move-
ment order was lifted in July 2020�
• A virtual senior leader seminar was conducted for the Navy’s Fifth Fleet 
in October 2020, as a way to stay engaged with our partner-nation flag of-
ficers on items of mutual interest�
• A virtual flag-tailored education program has been provided to twelve flag 
officers since March 2020, using both unclassified and classified systems 
to ensure that these flag officers could have meaningful discussions with 
the College’s leading faculty to prepare them for their future positions�
• A team recently traveled to Bahrain for the Fifth Fleet maritime opera-
tions center (MOC) certification, the first such certification to be per-
formed since the pandemic halted military travel�
• The Humanitarian Response Program conducted a virtual Civilian-
Military Humanitarian Response Seminar in partnership with Brown 
University, bringing together experts from around the globe for a variety 
of discussions�
• The first virtual Executive Level Operational Level of War course for 
senior officers hosted more than twenty-five participants from around the 
world for classified discussions on leading at the operational level of war�
• At the direct request of the executive director for the Navy’s surgeon 
general, CMOW faculty members have been consulting with leaders of 
the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) as they consider 
adapting maritime headquarters / maritime operations center (MHQ/
MOC) structures, processes, and procedures to increase the efficiency 
and effectiveness of their organization and the BUMED enterprise as a 
whole�
• CMOW’s deputy dean, Professor Sean Henseler, continues to consult with 
the leaders of the Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps as they implement 
recommendations from a comprehensive review committee� His efforts 
have included discussions with the judge advocate general of the Navy, his 
deputy, and a handpicked O-6-level planning team�
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• Despite the challenges imposed by the pandemic, the Strategic and Opera-
tional Research Department (SORD) has been engaged actively on numer-
ous analytical fronts in support of the Navy and the Department of Defense� 
SORD was the only outside actor the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) 
brought in for the Future Naval Force study, a major, time-sensitive research 
effort co-chaired by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program 
Evaluation office, and the Joint Staff� SORD helped design and execute two 
weeklong tabletop exercises (TTXs) for more than twenty Navy and Marine 
Corps flag officers in Quantico� The results of the TTXs directly informed 
SECDEF’s recently unveiled Battle Force 2045 and the forthcoming thirty-
year shipbuilding plan�
• The China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) published four China 
Maritime Reports on subjects as varied as the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) Navy (PLAN) Type 055 cruiser; the PLA base in Djibouti; China’s 
port project in Gwadar, Pakistan; and the PLAN’s growing role in naval 
diplomacy� CMSI also has translated and published a dozen articles of 
interest from Chinese primary sources on strategic/maritime issues as well 
as providing advisory support to the National Security Council; OSD; the 
Joint Staff; OPNAV; the Office of Naval Intelligence; Commander, Pacific 
Fleet; and others�
• The Advanced Research Programs (ARPs)—Halsey A, Halsey B, and  
the Holloway Group—have continued their focused research and war 
gaming with the help of a select cohort of students� For each of their  
respective geographies, the ARPs have directly informed fleet and  
OPNAV planning for great-power competition and high-end war-fighting 
contingencies� Their reputation for analytical rigor and unmatched insti-
tutional knowledge has made them the go-to source for Navy analysis on 
numerous operational and strategic problems in the Pacific, Europe, and 
the Middle East�
• The Cyber and Innovation Policy Institute (CIPI) has published peer-
reviewed research in scholarly journals and several essays in the highly 
regarded War on the Rocks blog and on the Defense One website� While 
conducting ongoing research and teaching, CIPI faculty also have co-led the 
OPNAV N7 working group on emerging technology and the working group 
on adversary education� Their research has provided input to the Navy 
Strategy Division (N50/72) on the “Advantage at Sea” strategy, has provided 
red-team subject-matter expertise for OSD and the Office of Net Assess-
ment on alternative future strategies, and was briefed to the Deputy Chief of 
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Naval Operations for Warfare Dominance (N2/N6) and the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency�
• As the executive agent for the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Professional 
Reading Program, Professor John Jackson led a team of Naval War College 
faculty and staff members in developing a major revision to one of the CNO’s 
primary professional-development initiatives� After gathering input from the 
Naval Academy, the Naval Postgraduate School, the office of the master chief 
petty officer of the Navy, and the 21st Century Sailor office, a slate of seventy-
three titles was approved in October 2020� These books soon will be available 
for digital download as e-books from the MWR Digital Library� Additional 
information about the revised program can be found in the Reflections on 
Reading article at the end of this issue of the Review�
The initiatives and actions mentioned above represent only a small portion of the 
vitally important work being done throughout the College� Recaps of other efforts 
will be reported in future issues of the Review� The takeaway is that the Naval War 
College continues to be a respected and valued resource that is accessed frequently 
by warfighters, leaders, and decision makers across our federal government and 
by our maritime partners who are dealing with the most important issues of our 
times� We stand ever ready to answer their call�
SHOSHANA S� CHATFIELD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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I was not an exact contemporary of Colin Gray and our careers were not quite 
parallel, yet it was pretty close on both counts� He was five years older, but we were 
both undergraduates at Manchester University and did doctorates at Oxford� He 
began his career working on arms races and nuclear strategy but then branched 
out to write much more broadly on strategy, and so did I� We overlapped very 
briefly at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the autumn of 1975 
until he had a spectacular falling-out with the director, Christoph Bertram, over, 
I believe, some biting criticism Colin had written of U�S� Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger’s readiness to do deals with the Soviet Union� Colin then went off to 
work with Herman Kahn and Donald Brennan at the Hudson Institute before 
setting up the National Institute for Public Policy with Keith Payne� For the next 
few years I was the dove on arms control and Colin was the hawk, and so began 
a relationship that lasted until his death�
We regularly sparred, often disagreed, but treated each other with mutual 
respect� One of the most refreshing things about Colin was that disagreement 
was never complete� Even if you were wrongheaded on one issue it was perfectly 
possible that you had something worthwhile to say on another� Thus his tough-
minded realism was far removed from the more optimistic ideas of Ken Booth, 
yet Colin regularly cited Ken’s book on ethnocentrism in strategy, and Ken was 
an influence on the way Colin thought about the 
impact of culture on strategy�1 Another refresh-
ing aspect of any engagement with Colin was that 
the dialogue was never concluded� He was out to 
persuade, but he also could be persuaded� This was 
as true in his writing as in conversation; indeed, 
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his books were almost a form of conversation� I realized to my embarrassment 
when preparing this essay that he had sent me copies of most of his main works 
with a charming personal note, and I really had not reciprocated� In the note for 
The Strategy Bridge he wrote that he feared he “may have achieved the deserved 
fate of Icarus�” But he did not fall from the sky with melting wings; instead, this 
book—perhaps more than any other—cemented his reputation as one of the most 
profound and stimulating strategic thinkers of this century�
In each book—and there were many—the reader was joining Colin on a jour-
ney� As each volume concluded there was little more than a pause before he was 
off again� He never seemed truly confident that he had reached his destination, 
which is perhaps why he returned regularly to the same themes, looking for a new 
and better way to convey his distinctive views� His arguments were refreshed each 
time� He anticipated likely objections, acknowledging their potential force before 
explaining why they were not conclusive, offering a choice historical example, 
quoting approvingly from a helpful authority, or adding a neat aphorism� And then 
the argument would continue unabated in long footnotes, in which more examples 
and quotes could be found� In the next book the argument would be refined and 
at times amended, with different examples and many new insights� This was the 
subject he never could let go and to which he kept returning� He opened the pref-
ace of Strategy Bridge by reporting that every decade he tried to write a “fairly bold 
book�”2 This one, published in 2010, was the third in the series after War, Peace, 
and Victory in 1990 and Modern Strategy in 1999�3 In the following years he pub-
lished new books, working over the same themes, on an extraordinarily regular 
basis, until his last book, Theory of Strategy, was published in 2018�4 
Colin’s discursive and often dense style meant that he never could be accused 
of oversimplification� “Poetry, this is not,” he wrote in his preface to Strategy 
Bridge. You had to read carefully, but if you did there always would be pleasant 
discoveries, whether snippets of unexpected history, telling quotes, or satisfying 
conjunctions of ideas� Behind everything he wrote was an extraordinary level of 
erudition� Colin could discuss, with equal facility, centuries of military history, 
the nuances of contemporary security debates, and the character of modern 
weaponry� Although he had important things to say about nuclear arms control, 
geopolitics, and the role of navies, underlying everything was his view of the 
importance of strategy�
Colin’s writings were prescriptive� His aim was not simply to explain historical 
events or explore recurring features of international affairs but to improve the 
practice of strategy� He turned naturally to history as the master discipline for 
strategy and was wary about the value of quantitative social science�5 Yet he knew 
his way around the social sciences and he engaged directly when it came, for 
example, to the question of the impact of culture on strategic practice�6 At the 
20
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/1
 F R E E D M A N  1 5
same time he was not a historian� Unlike many of the great strategists he admired, 
including Clausewitz, he did not immerse himself in the detail of particular cam-
paigns to hone his theories through case studies� He was not trying to sort out 
the past but the present� He studied strategy, and strategic issues, to produce bet-
ter policy� He acknowledged that he was not averse to “lobbying for programs in 
which I believe or writing the occasional polemic to make a case that I believe in,” 
but in his most important works he insisted that his aim was to understand what 
strategy was about rather than to make a case for specific strategies and their as-
sociated budgets�7 He did not wish to be described as an advocate, because he was 
not making his case to meet the demands of a particular brief� But he nonetheless 
was something of an evangelist on behalf of strategy, pointing to the calamities 
that had befallen those who had failed to grasp the essentials of sound strategic 
thinking and the achievements of those who had paid attention� His writings on 
strategy were intended not only to elucidate the concept but to get people in re-
sponsible positions to think in ways that would produce better strategies� “Strate-
gists cannot be trained,” he observed, “but they can be educated�”8 
Colin’s starting point was that the phenomena he was addressing were time-
less� The context changed because of political events, new technologies, or even 
tactical fashions, but at the heart of any discussion of strategy were military 
power and the purposes for which it could be used� “Strategy is ever varying in 
character, but not in its nature, which is unchanging�”9 This was certainly true at 
one level, since conflict is a constant, as is force as the ultimate means by which 
conflicts are resolved� At any stage in history commanders seeking to use force 
effectively to get the desired result might be confronted with sets of issues that 
their predecessors or successors could recognize easily� They might be consider-
ing the virtues of a frontal assault versus trying to catch the enemy by surprise or 
laying siege� They would be taking into account climate and terrain; looking to 
the balance of forces, both quantitatively and qualitatively; wondering whether 
innovations in weapons and tactics might make a difference; remaining con-
scious of intangibles such as the state of morale; and so on�
But strategy also has changed a lot� It has become increasingly rare for the 
same person to set both political objectives and military means, and those at the 
top are likely to be positioned well away from the front� They rely on large staffs 
and elaborate chains of command even to manage quite routine military activi-
ties� The means at their disposal are many and varied and, for a number of pow-
ers, now include nuclear weapons� Those weapons’ huge destructive potential 
has reduced dramatically the attraction of war as an instrument of policy and has 
led to a search for ways of achieving political objectives short of war�10 Early in 
his career Colin had thought that nuclear weapons did not challenge traditional 
concepts of strategy, but by the end of his life he was not so sure�11 
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The challenge for Colin was to develop a unified theory of strategy that could 
be timeless in its application yet take account of all these changes� His approach 
followed naturally from the presumption of timelessness and was based on the 
conviction that it was hard to improve on the thoughts of those who first had the 
chance to reflect on military power� In his Fighting Talk he asserted provocatively 
that “If Thucydides, Sun-tzu, and Clausewitz Did Not Say It, It Probably Is Not 
Worth Saying�” He followed this up with the assertion that “[t]here are no new ideas 
in strategy� Instead there is a stock of concepts of great antiquity, whose exact prov-
enance is unknown and unknowable�”12 Those theorists in each generation who try 
to update the classics (I presume he included himself) are “invariably disappoint-
ing�” By the time of Strategy Bridge he was slightly more cautious in his claims, 
at that point listing ten books in the canon (the contemporary additions were all 
Western), now classed according to merit (Clausewitz was in a class by himself)�13 
It is possible to recognize that these works constitute a sort of canon—and all 
do repay careful reading—while still finding the sentiment disturbing� The view 
that there is nothing new under the sun was popular in the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries, when officers were obliged to read the classics of antiquity such 
as Polybius, Frontinus, and Vegetius� In the nineteenth century it was a common 
view, encouraged by Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini, that strategic principles 
were unchanging� Therefore, to understand strategy it was mainly necessary to 
study the campaigns of the great generals�14 Once this view became part of military 
education the effect was to encourage a stultifying orthodoxy� Only as new wars 
came along that did not fit the models of the past—in particular, that were not 
resolved through decisive battles—did strategic thought begin to open up to other 
possibilities� Even when this happened it was possible to scour the canon to legiti-
mize an otherwise heretical new thought, just as communists would do with Marx, 
Engels, and Lenin, to find a sentence or two to justify a change in the party line�
As with the assertion on timelessness, there is a point to be made about the 
persistence of core ideas, but after a point it becomes a bit of a game, of the same 
sort that philosophers can play with Plato and Aristotle� If reversion to the clas-
sics becomes a habit, then at least it is necessary to understand the intellectual 
life around these key thinkers� To understand Clausewitz, for example, is it also 
necessary to understand Hegel? These were men of their time, and times do 
change� The intellectual influences on contemporary strategic thought—whether 
nuclear physics or cognitive psychology, the claims of totalitarians or hostility 
to empires—produce different ideas� That is what makes the study of strategic 
thought productive�
Colin even considered whether it was possible to rely solely on Clausewitz� 
The Prussian was the one who best had grasped the essentials of modern warfare 
and who still provided the most valuable framework through which thoughts on 
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war could be organized� “Whether I have been studying nuclear targeting, the 
leverage of seapower, or the strategic utility of special operations,” Colin wrote, 
“Clausewitz’s On War has been my constant companion and by far the most heav-
ily used book in my library�”15 He understood that the great man was not always 
easy to follow and did not get everything right (for example, regarding the im-
portance of intelligence), but Colin placed himself firmly within a Clausewitzian 
tradition of strategic inquiry�
This meant, above all, that war without policy was mindless violence� The vital 
role of strategy was to show how military means could serve political ends� The 
challenge of strategy was that this was difficult� Colin discussed many different 
definitions in his publications, tending to dismiss those that were too long-
winded or failed to make the link with policy (for example, Martin van Creveld’s 
“the method by which � � � armed forces wage war”)�16 He liked Wylie’s definition 
of strategy as a “plan of action designed to achieve some end; a purpose together 
with a system of measures for its accomplishment�”17 But he kept coming back to 
Clausewitz’s (“the use of engagements for the objective of war”) because it had the 
virtue not only of concision but of providing a sharp distinction from tactics (“the 
use of armed forces in the engagement”)�18 He did not accept that the definition 
was too narrowly operational, although he acknowledged that it might be seen 
that way� He also broadened the scope much more when he got to grand strategy, 
in which he included all the potential instruments of power�
In the opening to Modern Strategy Colin introduced strategy as “the bridge 
that relates military power to political purpose�”19 Here he adopted the strong 
metaphor with which he is now so closely associated� By the time he got to put-
ting it in the title, with The Strategy Bridge, this provided an overall theme� So he 
returned to the issue of definitions� He acknowledged that over the years he had 
favored a number of them, although each one risked being too exclusive (as with 
Clausewitz) or too inclusive (so that any focus was lost)� He doubted a perfect 
definition could be found; strategy was “an idea, a function, a behaviour that 
almost begs to be abused as a consequence of misapprehension�”20 He settled on 
the following: “The direction and use made of means by chosen ways in order to 
achieve desired ends�” This had the advantage of fitting in with the ends, ways, 
and means formulation that the U�S� and U�K� armed forces favored�21 
By his final book, Colin was convinced that this was by far the best formula 
and was surprised that he had not appreciated it earlier� “While I have long 
suspected that the theory of strategy was obedient to no limits traceable either 
to history or geography,” he remarked, “the true ubiquity, universality, and in-
deed eternity—for want of a better concept—of strategy did not dawn on me 
for many years�” Now, after fifty years, he was convinced that “there was no 
alternative framework for the theory of strategy�” Ends, means, and ways would 
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be “functioning regardless of our skill�” It was a framework that could “apply in 
all times and in all geographies� Shifts in technology, geographical context, and 
ideational preferences should not trouble it all�” However, while the framework 
could help order thoughts, it could not generate the actual thoughts�22 
More important than a precise definition was that strategy was part of a wider 
and coherent conceptual framework, with policy as the source of political objec-
tives and tactics as actual military behavior� The issue for Colin in his efforts to 
build a unified theory was how to capture the holistic character of strategy, bring-
ing together activities that otherwise might be treated as autonomous realms� 
Policy, strategy, and tactics had to be seen as interdependent—they all needed 
each other� Tactics without strategy could achieve nothing, yet without the avail-
able means some objectives never could be achieved� The problem of the need to 
change objectives if they were beyond reach was not quite captured in his own 
definition, probably because he wished to stress the hierarchy that began with 
policy and then descended down to tactics�23 This hierarchy led to an ideal type 
describing how all the different levels of strategy should come together� “I insist 
that a vision of a politically desirable condition should inspire policy choices 
which should be supported by a strategy which makes proper use of an opera-
tional competence founded upon tactical excellence�”24 
The problem was that it was unusual for this ideal to be reached� At each 
level, guidance, competence, and excellence might be lacking� The point about a 
holistic approach, however, was that it “captures or corrals the whole; it does not 
assume a perfect coordination of the whole�” Perfect coordination simply might 
be impossible for reasons beyond the control of the strategist, and even when 
attainable it still would be extremely hard to achieve� The whole point about 
strategy was that it involved opponents who also would be acting strategically; as 
he put it in another of his maxims, “the enemy has a vote�”
The restlessness in Colin’s investigations into strategy flowed from this deter-
mination to develop a holistic approach, to cover what T� E� Lawrence had called 
the “whole house�”25 The framework captured the timelessness, but something 
was needed to take account of the timely. What did strategists need to consider 
to make the right policy choices? He took as a starting point “The Forgotten 
Dimensions of Strategy,” Michael Howard’s 1979 essay on the dimensions of strat-
egy—except that, in contrast to Howard’s four dimensions, Colin came up with 
seventeen�26 These were as follows: people, society, culture, politics, ethics, eco-
nomics and logistics, organization, administration, information and intelligence, 
strategic theory and doctrine, technology, operations, command, geography, 
friction/chance/uncertainty, adversary, and time� Proper strategy required that 
these be considered holistically—that is, both individually and in context with 
the others� They were grouped together under three broad headings: “People 
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and Politics,” then “Preparation for War,” and “War Proper�”27 The dimensions 
as an organizing device were not carried forward into Strategy Bridge, although 
in an appendix they could be found as “21 Dicta of Strategy,” backed up by “14 
Skeleton Keys of Theory�” Before the dimensions there had been the “40 Maxims” 
and in Theory of Strategy there were “23 Principles�” If these lists were assumed 
to be part of Colin’s core theory, then all this was confusing� One day a graduate 
student might try to chart the inclusions and exclusions and identify the common 
themes, but a better explanation for the varying lists is that at any particular time 
they simply helped Colin organize his thoughts�28 
This constant striving to improve and develop his theories reflected a problem 
he had set for himself at the start of his career that never could be solved fully� Co-
lin’s aim was to produce a theory of strategy that would result in better strategy� It 
thus tended toward the development of an ideal type of strategist who might be 
more capable of producing an ideal type of strategy� Colin wanted to push up the 
standard, and in the high-stakes situations that truly interested him—when mat-
ters of war and peace were being decided—we should expect the appropriate level 
of professionalism from those making policy and those advising them� Inevitably, 
as he fully recognized, practice would fall short of the ideal type� The question 
he continued to pose was what difference good theory and a good theorist could 
make to the practice�
When preparing this piece, I found a critique I wrote in 1983 of two of Colin’s 
early books on strategy�29 His authorial voice already was well established� I noted 
his “iconoclasm, refusal to bow to the conventional wisdom, willingness to ask 
awkward questions and to offer uncompromising and sometimes outrageous 
answers” and remarked on his “restless pen, which can rarely resist a tangent and 
happily allows substantial insights to get lost in asides�” The basic issue behind 
my review, however, concerned the role of the strategic theorist� Colin then was 
working in a think tank in the United States, and he labeled himself as a “civilian 
defense professional�” He described with admirable candor how this role could 
push the scholar (and he was adamant that it was vital to stay in touch with the 
world of scholarship) into the cut and thrust of political debate� Although gov-
ernments had managed perfectly well without civilian strategists for centuries, 
the Cold War had created a novel situation, especially with regard to nuclear 
weapons� Although highly critical of the actual performance of the strategic 
studies community—not least in its uncritical support of arms control but also in 
its hubristic embrace of doubtful theories of counterinsurgency in Vietnam—he 
believed that it could and must do better�30 Out of these pages a code of conduct 
emerged: stay close to empirical material; keep in touch with technology, but 
never neglect the study of history or fail to recognize the importance of political 
and cultural factors; remember to consider how military forces might be operated 
25
Naval War College: Winter 2021 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 2 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
in wartime, as well as how they look in peacetime; and keep the first-order ques-
tion of the role of military power in international affairs to the fore�31 
This was a code that Colin followed throughout his life� In my review I noted 
that this was not necessarily a way to attract the attention or approval of policy 
makers� Indeed, at issue was how the specialist, focused on a specific issue, could 
address the generalist, distracted by many issues� I suggested that it was as useful 
to contribute to policy debate as to get closeted with officialdom� In addition, 
Colin had written that “the strategist is licensed to analyze and often to propose, 
not to dispose�”32 This seemed to me to get it the wrong way ’round� To be sure, 
those with the best methodologies and conceptual grasp and the cleverest pro-
posals should be listened to and could influence policy, but in the end the only 
true strategists were those who had to take responsibility for the consequences 
of their decisions, measured in lives, values, and even the fate of whole societies�
In retrospect, part of my critique was quite unfair� Colin never shirked his 
role as an active debater, let alone as an educator, and contributed throughout his 
career to public discourse, including by being unafraid to take positions that chal-
lenged the mainstream� With regard to the second point, I think there remained 
a tension� It may be that in the 1980s he hoped that governments might consult 
strategists in the same way they did economists, allowing them to bring a real 
expertise to bear that policy makers would welcome and embrace� He would not 
have been alone in that view� At the very least, the academic strategist could help 
the policy maker think his way through the perplexing issues of national secu-
rity� Especially in the nuclear age, a political leader not well versed in the arcana 
of weapons systems and deterrence theory might well rely on such an informed 
civilian as much as on a general�
Colin opened one of his last books with the following statement: “I am a strat-
egist� For fifty years I have spoken, written, and sought to advise governments 
about strategy�”33 It is hard to begrudge him the title, yet how much could a theo-
rist and adviser be an actual strategist? In French there is a distinction between 
the label stratégiste for the nonpractitioner and stratège for the practitioner�34 
My view—in that review, and still today—was and remains that the only true 
strategists are those with executive responsibility—the stratège. I think that Co-
lin basically agreed� In Strategy Bridge and elsewhere, he highlighted “executive 
strategists” as the key actors, as opposed to the adviser or educator, and stressed 
the importance of command as the means by which they executed strategy�
In this book Colin’s concluding chapter provides an excellent, straightforward 
description of what executive strategy in practice is all about� The strategist seeks 
control over the course of events, and that requires thinking about causation and 
consequences� This is difficult� The effort to achieve strategic effects can be frus-
trated not only by the enemy but by dysfunctional policy-making processes� It is 
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necessary to “influence enemies, allies, and neutrals, which means minds and ac-
tions, foreign and domestic�” So the “would-be controller of history is ever locked 
into a struggle against severe odds�” By way of consolation, the need is to be “good 
enough,” for the challenge is to be better than the strategist on the other side� Of 
course, it is possible that the strategist will fail, but some failures are worse than 
others, and at least good strategy in bad conditions will avoid the worst conse-
quences� In this chapter the strategic theorist appears as one engaged in educating 
“executive strategists that they are mentally equipped to tackle their historically 
unique problems as well as they can be enabled�”35 
The difficulty here was that the ideal-type strategist that emerged from Colin’s 
many books was much more likely to be stratégiste, with the time for proper study 
and contemplation, than stratège, rushed and distracted while making the execu-
tive decisions� The final chapter of Strategy Bridge was subtitled the “Strategist 
as Hero�” Colin explained: “The subject truly is challenging and the strategist’s 
role, properly understood, should be recognized as heroic� To be performed well, 
its multiple demands require extraordinary natural gifts, advantages that need 
nurturing by education and experience�”36 
The strategist had to be properly educated into this role� “Only the educated 
strategist can be trusted to develop the multilevel body of doctrine that must 
serve to staple together synergistically efforts in performance at every level of 
warfare�” In Modern Strategy he had described a strategist as someone rather 
special, with an “exceedingly demanding” job description, able to see the “big 
picture” and familiar with all of war’s dimensions�37 
It seemed to me that Colin had an overexalted view of the strategist as a rather 
special person, able to appreciate sets of complex interdependencies and to grasp 
the numerous factors at play in a conflict so as to identify where effort could be 
applied most profitably� In practice they would do the best they could, but how-
ever many lectures they had attended or books they had read or whatever the 
quality of the advisers at hand, they would not be able to organize their thoughts 
and action in ways close to those of the ideal strategist Colin identified� In my 
own book on strategy, which came out in 2013, I included a chapter entitled “The 
Myth of the Master Strategist�” My main target in this was not so much Colin as 
Harry Yarger, who had picked up on the seventeen dimensions and taken them 
a stage further, by describing strategic thinking as being “about thoroughness 
and holistic thinking�” It required a “comprehensive knowledge of what else is 
happening within the strategic environment and the potential first-, second-, 
and third-order effects of its own choices on the efforts of those above, below, 
and on the strategist’s own level�” Yarger wanted the strategist to be a student of 
the present who must be aware of the past, sensitive to the possibilities of the 
future, conscious of the danger of bias, alert to ambiguity, alive to chaos, ready 
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to think through the consequences of alternative courses of action, and then 
able to articulate all this with sufficient precision for those who must execute its 
prescriptions�38 Even Colin had worried that this “appeared to encourage, even 
demand, an impossibility�”39 But I included him in the end as subscribing to this 
myth of a master strategist�
It is fair to say that Colin took exception to this characterization� In his review 
of my book, which actually was quite generous, he argued that the chapter should 
have been retitled “The Myth of the Myth of the Master Strategist�” His objection 
was that master strategists were rare but feasible� “If the idea is understood sensi-
bly as requiring demonstrated good enough mastery on the dimensions of strategy 
that are most essential to the context of time and place, my argument is readily 
supportable�”40 The examples he gave from the Second World War—Air Chief 
Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding and Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke—to some extent 
reinforced my point, because my concern was the belief that the master strategist 
was set to operate within the military sphere; whereas, as far as I was concerned, 
“[t]he only people who could be master strategists were political leaders, because 
they were the ones who had to cope with the immediate and often competing 
demands of disparate actors, diplomats as well as generals, ministers along with 
technical experts, close allies and possible supporters�”41 I was not arguing that 
masterful strategists at times did not come up with exceptional strategies that 
achieved their objectives, but instead (as I explained in an exchange with Daniel 
Steed) that the truly masterful strategic person required exceptionally demanding 
qualities, which might be no more than good judgment, and then needed appro-
priate circumstances before those qualities could come into play, and that these 
circumstances would pass� “Consistently high strategic performance is extremely 
hard� Even those who perform well for a while rarely sustain their performance 
over time� Great strategists emerge in relationship to great situations�”42 
I wish I had had a proper conversation with Colin about this� My view of where 
a master strategist might be found—as he would put it, at the level of policy—was 
actually close to his own view of strategy’s proper hierarchy� My characterization 
of his views risked caricature� Yet there was a real difference between us� Colin 
regretted the migration of strategy as a concept from the military sphere into 
many others, including business, whereas I found this intriguing, so I broadened 
my studies accordingly� When it came to the military sphere, we agreed on the 
importance of strategies; on the value of concepts in making sense of them; and 
that, in essence, it was all about the relationship between military means and po-
litical ends� My approach was more skeptical� An ideal strategist working with an 
ideal strategic theory, founded on the classics of the field, was going to be a very 
rare beast who as likely as not would struggle with forms of conflict other than 
major war, for which the theories were not necessarily appropriate� I could see 
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how intuition as much as educated deliberation (for which there may not be time) 
still could produce good results� I took it for granted that strategies were going 
to be suboptimal, produced by fallible people relying on imperfect organization 
and inadequate information�
And yet, what would we have done without Colin telling us what good stra-
tegic theory and practice should look like? The suboptimal offended Colin� He 
was an evangelist for strategy, demanding that people take the subject seriously, 
and encouraging those professionally engaged with war and conflict to join him 
in his quest to improve both our understanding of what it entailed and strategic 
performance in practice� He was well aware that a life spent worrying about how 
wars should be deterred, fought, and concluded might be seen as representing an 
odd career choice� We should be grateful that it is the one he took�
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COLIN GRAY AND MARITIME STRATEGY—AN APPRECIATION
Geoffrey Till
Colin Gray’s ideas about maritime strategy—that element of strategy that relates 
to the sea—were enunciated most clearly in his widely read 1992 book The Lever-
age of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War. They also emerged in 
his masterly editorial work of 1996 on the writings of Charles E� Callwell—spe-
cifically, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance: Their Relations and In-
terdependence, the original of which appeared in 1905� The historical significance 
of sea power and its continued relevance in contemporary conditions also were 
addressed in Gray’s The Navy in the Post–Cold War World: The Uses and Value 
of Strategic Sea Power, published in 1994� His conclusions about Mahan “being 
(mainly) right” appear in his Modern Strategy, published in 1999� As a policy ana-
lyst, a defense adviser, and (from 1982 to 1987) an employee of the U�S� govern-
ment, Colin Gray also had the opportunity to see his ideas translated into policy�
THE LESSONS OF THE PAST
Gray’s approach was that of a historian commenting on the past, the present, 
and the future, but not the kind of historian who devotes all his time to delving 
in dusty archives; instead, his was a work of constructive synthesis, putting to-
gether and developing a corpus of ideas about maritime strategy that was based 
on innumerable secondary works read voraciously� He did indeed demonstrate a 
“heroic mastery of the relevant literature�”1 He was, above all, the kind of historian 
who was intent on finding recurring patterns in the behavior of states, rather 
than one solely concerned with exploring the unique and unrepeatable event� 
Echoing Mahan in believing that “[h]istorical instances, by their concrete force, 
are worth reams of dissertation,” Gray’s version of history is not an antiquarian 
retelling of events but an analysis of why things turned out the way they did and 
what this might mean for the present and the future�2 The leitmotif in his work 
is the connected propositions that “superior sea 
power has provided leverage critical for success in 
strategy and statecraft” and that this remains the 
case in the conditions of today and the likely ones 
of tomorrow�3 
By sea power (or maritime power, for he tended 
to use the two phrases interchangeably) Gray 
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Naval War College Review, Winter 2021, Vol. 74, No. 1
31
Naval War College: Winter 2021 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 2 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
meant the capacity to deliver strategic effect by what one does at or from the 
sea� He was clear that this is not an absolute quality but instead a relative one 
that countries or coalitions have to a greater or smaller degree in comparison 
with other countries or coalitions� Sea power is not the polar opposite of land, 
or continental, power but instead its complement� In their preparations to fight 
(or, one hopes, to deter) major conflicts, countries need to acknowledge that 
their overall strategy will be a mixture of land and sea elements� This is because 
the desired strategic effect has to be delivered on land, since that is where people 
live and the destinies of nations ultimately are decided� In this, as in much else, 
Gray adhered strongly to the approach of Sir Julian Corbett, who famously had 
made the essential point in 1911� “Since men live upon the land and not upon 
the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided—except 
in the rarest cases—either by what armies can do against your enemy’s territory 
and national life, or else by fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army 
to do�”4 
Accordingly, sea power was rarely if ever executive, or capable of deciding 
strategic outcomes on its own; instead, its critical leverage came from its enabling 
capacity� To a greater or smaller degree, power at sea privileged the countries that 
had it in their attempts to determine strategic outcomes; without it, countries 
were correspondingly disadvantaged� It was as simple as that�
In his Leverage of Sea Power, Gray showed how this had worked in the past—
and was likely to do so in the future� He focused only on what he called ten “ma-
jor wars,” ranging from that between Persia and the Greeks (of 480–479 BC) to 
the Cold War� He was particularly interested in wars between powers that were 
(mainly) sea or land powers; he accepted from the start that nearly all states are 
mixtures of the two, but thought its geography and cultural proclivities to be the 
best distinguishing marks of the state that is a Sea Power—with capital letters� 
“There is ample ground,” he admitted, however, “for dispute as to where the do-
mains of sea power and land power should be judged to meet�”5 
Echoing Corbett in worrying about people focusing too much on simply win-
ning battles at sea, Gray argued that, once sufficiently secure there, maritime 
powers had to stay on the offensive to be strategically effective in war� Typically, 
they resorted to one or more of six sea-based strategies against their (more) con-
tinental adversaries to prevail� (1) They could seek to exhaust their enemies fi-
nancially, or blockade them from the supplies they needed� (2) They could engage 
in large-scale operations on land, or (3) support allies in doing so, or both� (4) 
They could launch peripheral attacks from the sea, (5) conquer their adversaries’ 
overseas territory, or (6) forge a continental alliance� Gray provides examples of 
all these strategies�6 
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He does the same for the six strategies that continental or land powers can 
employ against (more) maritime adversaries� (1) Land powers could exploit their 
continental hegemony to develop their own forms of sea power� (2) They could 
use this power at sea for direct amphibious assaults on their maritime adversary’s 
home territory, or (3) try to whittle away at the adversary’s dominance at sea by a 
strategy of ambush on sections of its main fleet� (4) Most likely they would resort 
to what Gray called the classic strategy of attacking their enemy’s seaborne com-
merce� (5) They also could seek to close continental markets to the sea power’s 
trade� (6) Finally, they could seek sea power allies�7 
The rest of The Leverage of Sea Power is devoted to a discussion of how 
all this theory has played out in practice in the ten major wars mentioned 
earlier� The critical area is where both land and sea powers are fighting out of 
their natural elements, as they need to if they seek a strategic decision� This is 
because “sea power cannot be defeated on land, just as land power cannot be 
defeated at sea�”8 Accordingly, for either contender to prevail it has to develop 
at least some of the strategic characteristics of its adversary, and its success in 
doing so is likely to be critical in shaping the outcome� Gray is skeptical about 
the geostrategist Halford Mackinder’s claim that “it is easier for landpower to 
take to the sea than for sea power to take to the land,” concluding in fact that, 
despite the great costs of sea power and the practical problems of generating 
it, experience showed that maritime powers generally had prevailed�9 “[T]he 
cumulative dramatic increase in the absolute strategic power of the land has 
been more than offset by the increase in the absolute power of the sea� � � � 
[L]and-oriented aspirants for continental, and eventually global, hegemony 
have enduring strategic problems that may not be resolvable in the face of 
competently managed sea power (and air power)�”10 
Gray avoided the trap of basing this conclusion solely on the experience of 
the British and then the Americans, although he did think that the first was par-
ticularly “relevant” because it “yields a rich haul of strategic history for careful 
exploitation by theorists�”11 Accordingly, he also made extensive use of Greek, 
Roman, Turkish, Venetian, French, and German experience in balancing what 
was a frankly Eurocentric approach; there was, though, a little treatment of the 
Arab world and Japan and the sea�
However, the fate of Carthage at the hands of Rome showed that historically 
the success of maritime powers was conditional and far from automatic� Sea 
powers had strategic vulnerabilities that land powers with sufficient sea power 
of their own could exploit, not least their absolute dependence on supplies arriv-
ing by sea� Producing first-class battle fleets was uniquely expensive, preparing 
them took a lot longer than did preparing armies, and the practical problems 
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of exploiting fleets fully were legion�12 Above all, everything could go wrong for 
maritime powers if, in Clausewitz’s words, they did not “understand the kind of 
war on which they are embarking” and failed to settle on an appropriate grand 
strategy and the necessary statecraft to deliver it�13 In particular, their natural an-
timilitarist or “commercialist” outlook could endanger them, as it had Carthage, 
by resulting in their making inadequate preparations for their own defense, even 
at sea�14 
SIGNIFICANCE FOR TODAY AND TOMORROW
As a pattern-seeking historian, Colin Gray was keen to seek out the implications 
of all this for the twenty-first century, especially as “history suggests that a new 
menace to the balance of power in Europe and Asia will arise, and the traditional 
pattern of maritime-continental conflict is too marked to be dismissed, without 
evidence, as conveniently passé�”15 Gray was too modest to issue them as explicit 
commandments, but at least three conclusions and recommendations seem natu-
rally to emerge from his work�
The first recommendation is that we should reject the naysayers and accept 
the continuing strategic importance of sea power� Gray traced the declinist nar-
rative about the reducing importance of sea power back to the Western experi-
ence of the First World War, and to some extent to common misinterpretations 
of what Mackinder actually had written about the changing relationship between 
land and sea power� To some extent, also, it probably was linked to the relative 
strategic decline of Britain—for Mahan and Corbett, the quintessential maritime 
power—as had been dissected powerfully in Paul M� Kennedy’s seminal work of 
1976, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery.16 It was all too easy to misinter-
pret Kennedy’s work and confuse the perceived decline of a sea power with that of 
sea power in general, and so “sea power has not attracted the balanced approach it 
deserves�”17 Instead, the importance of sea power was more likely to increase than 
decrease, especially in a period when full-scale war between the great powers was 
less likely and maritime characteristics so suited the special needs of the United 
States as the only superpower of the time�18 
To some extent, though, sailors were the authors of their own misfortune in 
the fashionable underrating of the importance of sea power� Gray echoes Corbett 
in providing an evergreen and often much-needed warning for naval planners 
that they should not be so preoccupied with the business of securing, maintain-
ing, and exploiting sea control against their adversaries at sea that they neglect 
the essential enabling characteristic of sea power and the strategic effect it should 
aim to deliver� At the beginning of the first chapter of his Leverage of Sea Power 
he approvingly quotes Dudley W� Knox� “The supreme test of the naval strategist 
is the depth of his comprehension of the intimate relation between sea power and 
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land power, and of the truth that basically all effort afloat should be directed at 
an effect ashore�”19 
Arguably it was because they paid less attention to this than they should have 
done that Cold War sailors in the West encountered periods of real turbulence 
in which the contribution of sea power to the achievement of strategic objec-
tives was neglected� This was perhaps especially true of the United Kingdom, 
Gray’s own country� Instead of emphasizing the contribution they could make 
to strategic success, too many sailors focused simply on dealing with an appar-
ently ever-more-powerful Soviet navy, operationally and tactically� The apparent 
result was that NATO’s SACLANT seemed to be intent on fighting a war different 
from the one that dominated SACEUR’s thinking—and it was the latter that re-
ally mattered�20 Such naval preoccupations included the prospect of an early and 
sustained Soviet attack on reinforcement and resupply shipping coming across 
the Atlantic� We now know that the skeptics of the time actually were right in 
suspecting that the Soviets accorded this mission a much lower priority than did 
their prospective victims� Such naval preoccupations often seemed much less 
pressing than either holding back the Soviet Third Shock Army on the central 
front or responding appropriately to the nuclear threat that the Soviet Union’s 
bombers and missiles posed� Illustrating the point, the British defense white 
paper of March 1957 fatally declared that the role of the navy in a total war was 
“somewhat uncertain�”21 
It was, though, nothing like as difficult for navies to present a good case for 
themselves in conditions short of full-scale war with the Soviet Union, when 
the first question to be asked often was, “Where are the carriers?” The problem 
was that such out-of-area commitments seemed nothing like as important to 
many politicians, strategists, and—significantly—the people with the money� 
The result of all this uncertainty for the Royal Navy was a period of continual 
downward budgetary pressure� The trend applied more generally to other West-
ern navies too� This in turn led to the wounding but telling joke of the time, in 
which one Soviet field marshal drinking his celebratory vodkas in the smoking 
ruins of NATO headquarters at Mons asks the others, “Oh, by the way, what 
happened at sea?”
It was accordingly with some relief that Western navies welcomed the ap-
pearance of a sufficiently convincing narrative for the role of navies in a general 
war, in the shape first of some kind of substrategic and limited engagement on 
Europe’s northern flank through the 1970s, and then of the U�S� Navy’s Maritime 
Strategy of the early 1980s� This also effectively was adopted as NATO’s concept 
of maritime operations�22 With the successful conclusion of the Cold War, the 
essential naval narrative switched back to the intellectually easier, because more 
obvious, enabling role of sea power in conditions well short of all-out war� Here 
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the response was to “go expeditionary,” limited only by residual expectations of a 
peace dividend and the competing requirements of the other services� The U�S� 
Navy again, eventually, supplied the basic narrative in its original 2007 version 
of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, although in this case Colin 
Gray’s work provided much less guidance, since preparing for less-than-major-
war contingencies was not its major focus�23 
The appearance of the much-amended second version of the Cooperative 
Strategy in 2015, however, reflected a major shift in thinking back toward great-
power competition�24 Because of this, Gray’s ideas about the strategic effects that 
sea power can enable and deliver have come into prominence once more� Their 
contemporary value lies not so much in the answers that Gray came up with but 
more in the questions that he asked and the emphasis he gave to the need to focus 
attention on what sea power actually was for� Above all, he thought sailors and 
navalists needed to be clear about the strategic effect that preponderance at sea 
could deliver, rather than just the immediate operational and tactical require-
ments of maintaining or securing it� In a period when so much intellectual effort, 
perhaps understandably, is devoted instead to military-technical (to use an old 
Soviet term) and operational/tactical issues—such as how to deal with “carrier-
killing ballistic missiles,” cyber attack, hypersonics, and the role of artificial intel-
ligence—Gray’s emphasis on the need to focus on the endgame in all its facets 
hardly could be more relevant�
The same is true of the second and closely related recommendation that 
emerges from his work—namely, given the need to focus on the effects of 
maritime preponderance on the land, that sailors should remind themselves 
constantly that sea power is, with very few exceptions, no more than part of an 
overall package� True, its ubiquity, adaptability, flexibility, and mobility make it 
a particularly valuable one, but without synergistic integration with all the other 
levers of power its strategic effect often is much less than total� Gray emphasized 
what he called the “unity of warfare” and the need for a combined-arms and joint 
approach in which there is true mutual support among the several dimensions 
of military power�25 His review of Callwell’s work underlined the point that land 
power and sea power usually had proved of mutual benefit to each other, and that 
land power well could contribute to the achievement of higher levels of maritime 
preponderance�26 The same was, and remains, true of air power too� Far from 
leading to a decline in the relative importance of sea power, air power—in the 
shape of aircraft and missiles (and now unmanned systems?)—“paradoxically 
ha[s] made great navies greater still,” because air power enhances their effective-
ness at sea and against the shore�27 The same might well be true of space power 
and, nowadays, of cyber power too� Gray echoes Corbett again in his stress on 
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the need to ensure that naval strategy properly reflects and clearly supports the 
country’s strategic aims and is integrated efficiently with all the other, nonkinetic 
instruments of national power that can be used to achieve them� Gray’s overall 
emphasis on a rounded and comprehensive approach to statecraft and to the 
preparation for and conduct of war has a special salience now in an age of mul-
tidomain operations�
Colin Gray’s concluding recommendation is perhaps less obvious and is 
particularly aimed at the United States—in effect, his adoptive country for sev-
eral decades� Quite simply, it is that great sea powers need allies to become and 
remain great� Historically, this was especially obvious in their need for allies 
capable of helping to deliver the military power on land that was necessary for 
a sea power to come to grips with, and ultimately defeat, a major continental 
adversary� The bulk of Colin Gray’s maritime writing came when the United 
States was about to enter its unipolar moment in world history, but things have 
changed since then�28 Now what he called the day “after tomorrow” has arrived, 
and so has the salience of the question he raised of “how might the current naval 
hegemony of the United States be challenged effectively and perhaps eroded or 
offset?”—and, by extension, what should be done about it? Clearly, American 
naval planners should not assume “that the contemporary preeminence of U�S� 
naval and air power is permanent and irreversible�”29 Gray emphasized the dan-
gers of the kind of strategic complacence that led to the downfall of Carthage and 
the unwisdom of the United States neglecting its naval defenses� Now, with the 
rise in the maritime power of an increasingly self-confident China alongside the 
reemergence of a truculent Russia, the capacity of the United States to maintain 
its interests at sea and globally is under great challenge; accordingly, it will need 
its allies (both maritime and continental in their outlook) more than ever� To win 
and retain those allies surely will be as important a focus for conscious, sophis-
ticated, and rounded statecraft for the United States as history has shown it was 
for Britain and other sea powers in the past� The problem is, as Gray observed, 
that “[d]emocracies are not in the habit of thinking strategically” and need all the 
help they can get in trying to do so�30 
Whether or not one agrees with everything that Colin Gray wrote or the conclu-
sions to which he came, there can be little doubt that his various explorations of 
maritime strategy made—and, importantly, continue to make—a huge contribu-
tion to our understanding of sea power� Since the rest of the twenty-first century 
is touted widely as being a maritime one, Colin Gray’s work, and the proper 
appreciation of the nature and importance of sea power that it promotes, hardly 
could be more relevant to our current and future concerns�
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For five decades, Professor Colin Gray’s scholarly writings contributed tremen-
dously to our understanding of strategy, and his wise counsel benefited U�S� 
security policies enormously� His intellectual depth, rigor, curiosity, and wit 
were unparalleled, as were the time, energy, and stamina he devoted to writing 
and lecturing� To say that Colin was prolific is a profound understatement� His 
scholarly published canon includes more than thirty books and three hundred 
articles� He also authored or contributed to scores of unpublished reports for 
various U�S� government offices� To achieve such a record, Colin often would 
work on multiple texts simultaneously� As a consequence, two substantial books 
he authored occasionally would be published in the same year—once, I believe, 
in roughly the same month�1
Equally important, colleagues and students of all views and backgrounds 
greatly enjoyed and appreciated Colin’s unassuming affability and easy charm� 
While frequently involved in the back and forth of strategic policy debates, he 
typically remained a gentleman—reflecting a genuine civility that seems rare to-
day� In one extended press interview, Colin referred to a prominent Washington 
politician in a mildly unflattering way� When the article was published subse-
quently and Colin saw his comment in print, he mailed a personal apology to the 
politician� The latter responded to Colin that he had been called much worse but 
never before had received an apology�
The scope and breadth of Colin’s curiosity and writing far transcended any 
single topic� This brief discussion focuses on only three areas of his enduring 
scholarly interest: deterrence, missile defense, and arms control� To summarize 
the scope and nuance of Colin’s views on strategic deterrence and related issues 
would require a sizable book—which undoubtedly will be written� The much 
more modest goal here, however, is to provide a readable and select synopsis of his 
basic points and positions, which were driven by his philosophical realism and a 
relentless dedication to logic and evidence—wher-
ever that led�
THE INNOVATIVE REALIST
Colin’s work typically was highly innovative, 
and inevitably it provided added value� It may 
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be helpful to offer a few select examples of the unique creativity and insight he 
brought to the field of strategic studies� In a 1981 article appearing in the journal 
International Security, Colin essentially introduced the now-thriving study of 
strategic culture as a critical subfield of strategic studies�2 He reintroduced the 
study of geopolitics in a 1977 book, The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era, and sub-
sequently authored several innovative texts on the subject, including Maritime 
Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West (1986) and The Geopolitics of 
Super Power (1988)�
Colin coined the title “second nuclear age” to identify the post–Cold War 
era—nomenclature that subsequently was adopted internationally� More than 
just a new name, this descriptor reflected his countercultural view that nuclear 
weapons would not lose their salience after the Cold War—that is, the emerging 
era would be different, but nuclear weapons would continue to cast a long shadow 
over international security concerns� Recent history demonstrates that Colin was, 
of course, correct in this regard�
Colin’s books entitled The Second Nuclear Age (1999) and Another Bloody Cen-
tury (2005) presented the harsh realities he deemed more likely than the then-
prevailing near-utopian expectations of great-power comity and a cooperative 
“new world order�” In 1999, for example, Colin dissented from the accepted wis-
dom of the day that terrorism and rogue states were the only remaining threats, 
pointed to “the strong possibility that world politics two to three decades hence 
will be increasingly organized around the rival poles of U�S� and Chinese power,” 
and predicted that China “would menace Japan�” He also then observed that the 
return of Russia as a political-military challenge to the West (which he fully ex-
pected) “immediately would threaten independent Ukraine [and] the Baltics�”3 
Colin expected that the immediate post–Cold War period was a (likely brief) 
interlude before another cycle of sharp great-power competition and potential 
conflict� History demonstrates that Colin again was prescient�
Colin’s contrarian expectations, of course, did not reflect his preferences� 
They followed from his observations and realist philosophical roots, and his cor-
responding view that history provides the best guide for our expectations of the 
future� As noted, his expectations were far removed from the accepted wisdom of 
the day (i�e�, that the arising new world order would see the dwindling salience of 
nuclear weapons, and that great-power cooperation and amity would replace cy-
cles of crises and conflict)� Colin did not believe that the exhaustion of the Soviet 
Union and the rise of China meant the dawn of a peaceful new age; to the contrary, 
he expected new security challenges to arise and old challenges to return� Again, 
recent history has shown that Colin’s projections were correct, if unfashionable�
Beginning in the 1970s, Colin’s work played an increasingly significant role in 
the evolution of U�S� thinking, particularly within the Department of Defense� 
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Very few scholars have affected U�S� policies so directly� When Secretary of De-
fense James N� Mattis introduced the 2018 National Defense Strategy, he quoted 
Colin and referred to him as “the most near-faultless strategist alive today,” and 
Colin is the only academic with highlighted quotes in both the 2018 Nuclear 
Posture Review and the 2019 Missile Defense Review�4
THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE
An overarching theme and goal of Colin’s writings and lectures was identifying 
the most effective approach to deterring war, particularly nuclear war—that is, 
war prevention� He also recognized the possibility that deterrence could fail 
and nuclear war could ensue despite the best preventive efforts� Correspond-
ingly, he reasoned that because nuclear war is possible, the United States should 
think prudently through “what to do” in the event� He considered an officially 
declared U�S� response of the 1960s and early 1970s—including a large-scale 
nuclear strike against Soviet society—to be complete, immoral folly and a faulty 
guide for measuring the adequacy of U�S� nuclear forces� His basic proposition 
was simple but not simplistic: the West must seek unceasingly to deter war� 
Colin had no confidence in the notion that nuclear employment, once initi-
ated, would remain limited or that nuclear war could serve a political goal�5 
But, if deterrence failed nevertheless and war ensued, U�S� actions should not 
be impromptu by default or a spasmodic nuclear response that consciously 
abandoned any purposeful goal beyond revenge and societal destruction� 
Rather, they should be guided by thoughtful planning to deter further nuclear 
escalation and minimize societal destruction to the extent feasible—with full 
recognition that, while neither goal was certain, rejecting measures that might 
help limit escalation and destruction would be grossly irresponsible� That is 
hardly a radical proposition�6
But openly discussing what to do if deterrence fails was outside the norms of 
most academic discourse� Doing so was then and continues to be criticized as 
reflecting a sympathy for “nuclear war fighting” as opposed to deterrence� Colin 
ran afoul of the reigning wisdom that the “stable” balance of terror, properly 
tended, would not fail short of irrationality, and that nuclear war was “unthink-
able”—and certainly not to be discussed publicly, other than by some, occasion-
ally, as a political tool for rousing popular opposition to U�S� nuclear arms� But 
that was not Colin’s purpose�
Because Colin pointed to the need to plan as prudently as possible for deter-
rence failure and his publications occasionally included the word victory (in one 
case, in an article’s provocative title created without the authors’ permission, or 
even knowledge), some critics asserted that his goal was not deterrence but rather 
planning to fight and win a nuclear war� This is a wholly mistaken interpretation 
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of his work and intent, including his occasional use of the word victory� As noted, 
he was highly skeptical of any notion that the employment of nuclear weapons 
would remain limited and thus could serve a political goal� Indeed, he viewed 
nuclear war as a potentially unparalleled horror to be prevented, if possible, 
through diplomacy and deterrence� These were the goals of his scholarship on the 
subject� In at least some cases the mischaracterization of his work as sympathetic 
to nuclear war fighting obviously was contrived for the purpose of creating a 
provocative nuclear straw man against which to argue�
In short, Colin’s highest scholarly priority was to understand how best to pre-
vent nuclear war, and he was convinced that seeking to think through the ques-
tion of what to do in the event of deterrence failure both was prudent and could 
improve the prospects for deterring war� There was no trade-off�
ARMS CONTROL: A “HOUSE OF CARDS”
A prominent academic argument of the 1960s and 1970s was that the U�S�-Soviet 
nuclear arms race of the time was a result of “action-reaction” cycles initiated by 
the United States� Critics of U�S� nuclear forces typically argued that it was the 
United States that instigated and propelled the U�S�-Soviet arms race, because 
U�S� deployment of nuclear arms (the initial “action”) compelled the Soviet 
Union to respond with a nuclear buildup (the inevitable “reaction”)� This U�S�-led 
action-reaction dynamic supposedly explained the U�S�-Soviet arms race�7
The policy argument that accompanied this action-reaction thesis, of course, 
was that if only the United States would cease or curtail its nuclear-weapons pro-
grams, the Soviet Union could and would do likewise� Consequently, ending the 
arms race was a U�S� opportunity and responsibility; if the United States curtailed 
its nuclear armaments, the action-reaction arms-race dynamic would be replaced 
by a U�S�-led inaction-inaction dynamic—bringing the arms race to a close� 
However, if the United States continued to pursue nuclear programs, it would 
continue to propel the arms race as well� This prevalent argument posited an 
arms race continually led by the United States and its “first moves”—opponents 
being reactive and largely benign cogs in this mechanistic process� The same 
action-reaction contention, with U�S� culpability, has been on display since the 
1960s and remains prominent in contemporary arguments against U�S� nuclear 
arms and missile defense�
One of the earliest targets of Colin’s demand for logic and evidence was this 
fashionable, U�S�-led, action-reaction/inaction-inaction thesis� His 1976 book 
The Soviet-American Arms Race demolished this reductionist explanation of the 
arms race, along with the corresponding assertion that U�S� inaction would pro-
duce Soviet inaction—that is, a “peace race�”8 He argued instead from evidence 
that a variety of interactive and noninteractive behaviors and motivations, not 
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the action-reaction dynamic, explained U�S� and Soviet nuclear-arms programs� 
The bottom line of Colin’s work was that policies derived from the politically 
powerful action-reaction thesis—that U�S� actions drove the arms race and U�S� 
inaction would lead to Soviet inaction and an end to the arms race—were sure 
to be frustrated, because the Soviet Union’s motives for its nuclear arms were far 
more complex than the reductionist action-reaction thesis� Multiple later seri-
ous studies came to the same conclusion�9 In 1979, the Carter administration’s 
Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, very publicly dismissed the action-reaction 
thesis, noting that the Soviet Union “has shown no restraint—when we build, 
they build, when we cut, they build�”10
Colin continued to challenge pervasive, fawning academic and government 
expressions regarding nuclear-arms control� The title of his most comprehen-
sive book on the subject, House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail (1992), 
clearly signaled his conclusion, as do the titles of chapters 1 and 7, “The Magi-
cal Kingdom of Arms Control” and “To Bury Arms Control, Not to Praise It,” 
respectively� On the basis of nearly a century of arms-control history (e�g�, the 
extensive arms-control record of the 1920s and 1930s and the U�S�-Soviet SALT/
START experience), he challenged the central, widely accepted claims for the 
U�S�-Soviet strategic arms-control process: that it could move the superpowers’ 
strategic doctrines and force postures in mutually benign directions, and that the 
dialogue on nuclear arms itself could be the dynamic for the transformation of 
U�S�-Soviet relations away from hostility�
In stark contrast, Colin essentially explained that the character of political 
relations among countries and their respective “strategic cultures” drive their 
armament programs, and correspondingly the possibilities of arms control, and 
that those political relations and cultures typically reflect both centuries of his-
torical experience and contemporary issues� They ultimately govern countries’ 
armaments incentives and goals and set the boundaries for arms control� “The 
political antagonism that generates the objective need for alleviation via arms 
control—always assuming, again fallaciously, that arms control could control—is 
the very reason why arms control must fail�”11 The fundamental resolution of 
hostile political relations could lead naturally to significant relaxation of military 
requirements and to arms control, but the reverse is not true� And, of course, if 
previously hostile relations have become truly cordial, arms-control agreements 
lose much of their significance�
Colin’s conclusion—that, despite all the fanfare and attention, the arms- 
control process is incapable of transformative effects among hostile states because 
it is limited by their hostility—again was wholly contrarian� However, given the 
Cold War history of actual arms-control practice, his general conclusion increas-
ingly became mainstream� Secretary Brown recognized the same nexus: “The 
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[U�S�-Soviet] political relationship drove the success or failure of arms control 
much more than the other way around�”12
From this foundation, Colin concluded that arms control “is either impos-
sible or unimportant�” He referred to this as the “arms control paradox” and, 
calling on historical evidence, demonstrated how it was reflected in “virtually 
all twentieth-century experience with arms control or its absence�”13 Indeed, 
the U�S� strategic arms-control aspiration to move Russian nuclear arms toward 
“stability” (as understood in the West) largely was frustrated until political rela-
tions improved dramatically with the collapse of the Soviet Union—which had 
little or nothing to do with the arms-control process�14 Since then that aspiration 
has been frustrated, once again, with the return of stridently hostile U�S�-Russian 
political relations�
ON DETERRENCE
In 1960, Herman Kahn observed the following about U�S� deterrence: “In spite 
of our reliance on the idea that deterrence will work, we usually do not analyze 
carefully the basic concepts behind such a policy�”15 But Colin did just that, 
methodically identifying the logical contradictions and lack of evidence behind 
accepted wisdom and fashionable Cold War thinking about nuclear deterrence� 
When he began publishing on strategic deterrence and nuclear policy in the early 
1970s, he was highly critical of most U�S� government expressions and academic 
commentary on the subject� By the 1980s, however, U�S� policies, on a bipartisan 
basis, had come to reflect much of Colin’s earlier thought�
Many of Colin’s basic points about strategic deterrence and missile defense 
built on Kahn’s writings from the 1960s, particularly the latter’s On Thermo-
nuclear War and Thinking about the Unthinkable� These two remarkable scholars 
often reached the same conclusions, but their routes differed� Whereas Kahn’s 
work manifestly was that of a physicist addressing issues of international politics 
and power, Colin’s approach to the same subjects came from political science, 
military history, and anthropology� Indeed, he focused on how the unique his-
tory, culture, and political context of nations could drive considerable variation in 
different leaderships’ decision-making pertinent to the functioning of deterrence� 
And, perhaps because of his British origins, he focused on America’s extended 
deterrence relationship with allies�
Colin’s views on deterrence challenged conventional wisdom� He dismissed 
notions widely accepted in the West that a reliably “stable balance of terror” could 
be expected, given the Soviet adoption of U�S� views regarding nuclear weapons 
(i�e�, “convergence”)� Because Soviet calculations generally were believed to mir-
ror those of U�S� leaders, Soviet behavior was expected to follow familiar pat-
terns, and deterrence therefore was expected to play out predictably and reliably� 
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This assumption regarding the predictability of Soviet behavior led some senior 
figures in U�S� national security to conclude that mutual nuclear deterrence was 
so stable that it functioned nearly automatically (i�e�, “existential deterrence”)� 
“The terrible and unavoidable uncertainties in any recourse to nuclear war create 
what could be called ‘existential’ deterrence, where the function of the adjective 
is to distinguish this phenomenon from anything based on strategic theories or 
declared policies� � � � As long as each side has thermonuclear weapons that could 
be used against the opponent, even after the strongest possible preemptive attack 
[a “second-strike capability”], existential deterrence is strong�”16
Colin considered such notions of a balance of terror built on “mirror imaging” 
to be a lamentable reflection of enduring traits of the American elite’s strategic 
culture: tenacious groupthink and a “trait of machine-mindedness” that reduces 
“the difficulties created by politics and opposed national policies to problems of 
administration, management, and engineering�”17 He expanded on Kahn’s and 
Albert J� Wohlstetter’s general contention that deterrence should not be expected 
to function easily, reliably, and predictably� In 1958, Wohlstetter famously de-
scribed the balance of terror as “fragile�”18 Colin concurred and emphasized that 
an assumption of much Western Cold War thinking about deterrence “stabil-
ity”—that Soviet and U�S� leaders perceived and calculated deterrence and the 
balance of terror similarly—very likely was dangerously mistaken�
On the basis of his reading of available historical evidence, Colin rejected this 
key presumption of similar U�S� and Soviet deterrence perceptions and calcula-
tions� He concluded instead that “assessments of deterrence stability err because 
they do not take into account” differences in political will�19 For example, the 
great differences distinguishing U�S� and Soviet strategic cultures would render 
Soviet decision-making and the functioning of deterrence unpredictable: “Sen-
sitivity to human loss has not been a prominent feature of Soviet (or Russian) 
political culture� Anyone who believes that nuclear war should mean the same to 
Americans and to Great Russians should reflect deeply on the contrasting histo-
ries of the two societies�” Thus, “there is massive uncertainty over ‘what deters’ 
(who? on what issue? when?)�”20
In short, given the potential for variation often witnessed in political-military 
history, Colin rejected the comforting and convenient mirror imaging that 
undergirded expectations of a reliably stable balance of terror and existential 
deterrence� He insisted that there is no relevant universal definition of rational 
behavior, no nondescript countries A and B, and no Homo strategicus leadership 
making predictably sensible decisions� Rather, leaderships with a wide range of 
strategic cultures, perceptions, beliefs, goals, and passions can arrive at very dif-
ferent conclusions about what constitutes the most sensible deterrence-related 
decision-making and behavior� Consequently, Colin emphasized—decades 
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before the point would become widely accepted as pertinent to U�S� deterrence 
policy—that the great variation in national histories, perceptions, cultures, goals, 
values, and so on likely will impact decision-making and behavior in unexpected 
ways and render the functioning of deterrence inherently uncertain�
Some U�S� leaders during the Cold War expected the strategic arms-control 
process to provide the opportunity to bring Soviet thinking in line with U�S� 
balance-of-terror thought—that is, into the “real world” of nuclear weapons and 
the inevitable logic of a stable balance of terror�21 If necessary, American tutorials 
on deterrence could “educate” the Soviet political and military leadership into 
“convergence” with U�S� thinking� Colin dismissed this notion as ethnocentric 
folly, given the tremendous differences in the American and Russian histories, 
perceptions, goals, and strategic cultures�22
Colin rebelled against the comforting notions that the balance of terror could 
be made predictably stable and that strategic forces could be delineated neatly as 
“stabilizing” or “destabilizing,” according to formula� His willingness to express 
this view, along with considering what to do if deterrence fails, was viewed as 
heretical by most of the nuclear deterrence “priesthood” of the time—as indeed it 
was� Doing so challenged the most cherished presumptions regarding the domi-
nant balance-of-terror deterrence formula: that it would be predictably stable as 
long as the contenders played according to the rules of stability—which, by defi-
nition, they ultimately would do, because they were presumed to be comparably 
sensible (per American sensibilities) and convergence would align Soviet views 
with American logic�
Colin’s rejection of this fundamental presumption of reigning deterrence 
theory significantly shaped his views about deterrence policy and strategic de-
fenses� For example, he insisted that deterrence policy must be adjusted to take 
into account the variability in an opponent’s perceptions, tolerances, values, and 
goals—that is, deterrence planning must be done “with reference to the unique 
details of the case in hand�”23 Correspondingly, he often explained that no such 
thing as “the deterrent” exists, because no single approach or narrowly defined 
force structure can be expected to deter� Rather, Colin concluded that U�S� deter-
rence planning and forces must be flexible and diverse to deter as effectively as 
possible, given the great variations possible among opponents and contexts� His 
iconoclastic views in this regard preceded by more than a decade their wholesale, 
bipartisan acceptance—as is reflected in numerous contemporary open U�S� poli-
cy documents and the now-ubiquitous observation by civilian and military lead-
ers that deterrence must be “tailored” to opponents because no “one size fits all�”
Colin was not iconoclastic by nature; it was not a role to which he aspired or 
seemed to enjoy� Rather, the inadequacies he saw in the dominant strategic think-
ing of the mid–Cold War period left him little choice but to accept the role� By 
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1980, however, the general outlines of U�S� strategic policy, including President 
Carter’s “countervailing strategy,” were moving considerably closer to the posi-
tions Colin had articulated�
Finally, Colin did not prefer that the United States and the West rely on nuclear 
deterrence for their security� He fully recognized its dangers� In fact, he believed 
reliance on nuclear deterrence to be “foolish” if there were a realistic alternative�24 
However, in line with realism, he foresaw no plausible alternative: “There is no 
alternative, benign international political system� � � � Any rational person, one 
might think, should be able to design a very much more reasonable and safer 
global security system than we have today� I suspect that this is true but, alas, 
entirely beside the historical point� Our current security and insecurity context is 
the unplanned, certainly unintended, product of centuries of political history�”25
ON STRATEGIC MISSILE DEFENSE
Colin’s conclusion that the functioning of deterrence is inherently uncertain and 
unpredictable also was key to his position regarding U�S� strategic defensive ca-
pabilities (i�e�, homeland defense)� He was well aware that limiting damage might 
not be feasible in many possible nuclear scenarios, but believed that it could be 
in others� Correspondingly, in contrast to basic balance-of-terror desiderata, 
he considered irresponsible a policy by which the U�S� government consciously 
would choose to forgo protecting society where possible� Such a policy contrib-
uted to the potential for unmitigated destruction should deterrence fail� “Nuclear 
war is possible, and the U�S� government owes it to generations of Americans—
past, present, and future—to make prudent defense preparations to limit damage 
to domestic American values to the extent feasible in the event of nuclear war�”26
Consequently, Colin emphasized that missile defense to limit the potential 
for societal destruction should be a policy priority, not anathema� This emphasis 
went fully against the grain of Western deterrence thinking that unmitigated mu-
tual vulnerability is stabilizing and should be preserved and codified� From the 
American perspective, the 1972 U�S�-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 
served precisely this purpose by limiting strategic-missile-defense development 
and deployment significantly�
Colin’s support for strategic missile defense, however, was a logical extension 
of his basic points�
1� Given the variability in decision-making, deterrence is uncertain and can 
fail�
2� The United States should consider prudently what to do in the event of 
deterrence failure�
3� In the event of war, society should be defended to the extent feasible�
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Colin’s support for strategic missile defense also followed from his attention 
to U�S� extended deterrence for allies� He contended that unmitigated U�S� so-
cietal vulnerability to attack undermined the credibility of America’s extended-
deterrent threat on behalf of allies� In fact, he believed that the credibility of 
U�S� extended deterrence “is very low so long as the United States makes no 
noteworthy provision for the protection of its homeland against inevitable So-
viet retaliation�”27 His logic was clear: the Soviet Union was not likely to believe 
America’s extended-deterrent threat to employ nuclear weapons on behalf of 
allies if it could not survive the certain Soviet retaliation� He feared that an unbe-
lievable extended deterrent provided little or no protection for allies and instead 
might encourage Russian aggression�
Consequently, Colin advanced two basic reasons for U�S� strategic missile 
defense: to protect American society in the event deterrence fails, to the ex-
tent possible; and to provide credibility for U�S� extended-deterrent commit-
ments to allies� He did not believe that strategic defense was likely to provide 
flawless protection against a determined nuclear attack, but argued that even 
plausible imperfect defense capabilities could strengthen the credibility of 
extended deterrence and save lives that otherwise would be lost in the event 
of deterrence failure� He consistently endorsed U�S� strategic missile defense 
for these reasons�28
For a time, Colin was fairly isolated in his views on strategic missile defense� 
They were wholly contrary to the intent and purpose of the ABM Treaty, which 
received overwhelming support in the U�S� Senate and in general� However, once 
again U�S� policy, on a bipartisan basis, eventually caught up with much of Colin’s 
thinking� In 2002, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty for the pur-
pose of deploying strategic missile defense to protect the U�S� homeland against 
the limited strategic-missile threats that rogue states could pose�29 U�S� policy had 
come to recognize that missile defense that would not be effective against a great 
power’s attack still could have great value� In 2010, the Obama administration 
listed as first priority defending “the homeland against the threat of limited ballis-
tic missile attack�”30 This policy priority attributed to strategic missile defense by 
the Obama administration is repeated in the Department of Defense’s 2019 Mis-
sile Defense Review, along with a discussion of its value for deterrence purposes�31 
The Missile Defense Review also includes the following quote from Colin: “U�S� 
missile defence can critically reduce an attacker’s confidence in the prospects 
for success in its offensive strike planning� Given the inherent and irreducible 
uncertainties of war that should fuel doubt in such plans, the additional uncer-
tainty imposed by U�S� missile defence should prove decisively deterring in the 
attacker’s calculations�”32 Colin’s thoughts on strategic missile defense remained 
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consistent over five decades, and U�S� policy largely, if not entirely, has caught up 
on a bipartisan basis�
A review of Colin Gray’s work reveals how easily he moved simultaneously within 
the two very different and often mutually exclusive worlds of academia and gov-
ernment policy� His scholarship, over time, contributed to the betterment of U�S� 
policy in a number of areas, but nowhere more than in the seemingly arcane and 
incredibly consequential arenas of deterrence, defense, and arms control� His 
scholarly writings helped move U�S� arms-control policy away from its reduc-
tionist action-reaction roots, deterrence policy away from its mechanical mirror 
imaging, and missile defense policy toward recognition of the value of strategic 
defense� Colin’s ideas and writings were his currency for these developments� He 
was an adviser who spoke truth to power with humility and great effect, despite 
the harsh criticism he often received for doing so at the time—criticism he typi-
cally endured with humor and good grace� It is no overstatement to conclude that 
the West is a safer place for his remarkable scholarship and tenacity�
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SOME LESSONS ON SPACEPOWER FROM COLIN GRAY
John J. Klein
Where is the theory of space power? Where is the Mahan for the final 
frontier?
COLIN S� GRAY
Colin Gray passed away in February 2020� He was a prolific author, and many 
within academia and at the service war colleges appreciated him as a great strate-
gic theorist� Yet what is lesser known is the profound impact he made on the de-
velopment of spacepower strategic thought�1 Absent robust historical experience 
of conflict in space on which to draw, Gray’s writings led to a better understand-
ing of space strategy� Crucially, Gray explained how spacepower theory should fit 
within the context of the enduring nature of war, the better to inform the future 
development of space-warfare strategy�
Gray published over thirty books on military history and strategic studies, 
along with innumerable articles and monographs� His ideas and concepts are 
lasting in their ability to illuminate the intricacies of politics, war, and strategy� 
While Gray provided an abundance of strategic thought on which national-
security and military practitioners could draw when considering the application 
of spacepower, this essay will discuss three key subjects: Gray’s development of 
spacepower theory, his influence as a teacher and mentor, and insights for today’s 
space professionals and members of the new U�S� Space Force that can be drawn 
from Gray’s writings�
SPACEPOWER THEORY
Early in his career, Gray showed an interest in space and its relation to the theory 
of war� In 1982, when he was beginning a stint supporting the Reagan adminis-
tration’s General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, he 
published American Military Space Policy: Information Systems, Weapon Systems 
and Arms Control� It is noteworthy that the fol-
lowing year the Reagan administration would 
consider the potential deployment of the Strate-
gic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as “Star 
Wars�” For Gray, the publication was intended “to 
encourage informed debate of U�S� space policy, 
particularly military space policy�”2 In this rela-
tively short study, he detailed many of his earliest 
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con Research Inc., and an adjunct professor at the 
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ideas on spacepower and the character of space warfare, and he addressed U�S� 
and Soviet technical space capabilities, offensive and defensive actions in space, 
and the policy implications of the stationing of weapons in orbit� Gray would 
continue to develop further space-strategy concepts and encourage the develop-
ment of spacepower theory through his numerous works� Alongside land, sea, 
air, and cyber power, Gray ensured that the strategic implications of spacepower 
were considered�
Moreover, Gray frequently wrote on nuclear weapons and the imperative 
to defend against their use� In noting the intersection of nuclear weapons and 
spacepower, he considered nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles to be 
space vehicles for most of their flight regime� Even though during the Cold War 
nuclear weapons benefited mutual deterrence between the Soviet Union and 
the United States, these “absolute weapons” were strategically unhelpful in use� 
Consequently, nuclear weapons are inherently and fatally limited as a practical 
war-fighting tool�3 Also, Gray believed that eschewing strategic defenses against 
nuclear weapons was both imprudent and immoral� Gray argued for defenses 
against nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as the basis for deterrence-by-
denial strategy and a hedge against deterrence failure� In particular, he viewed 
SDI as a credible defensive approach, potentially rendering Soviet nuclear-armed 
ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete as reliable military instruments�4 Taken 
as a whole, Gray’s views over the decades directly influenced both U�S� declara-
tory and action policies regarding missile defense and the eventual Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty withdrawal�
One of Gray’s best-known pieces on space strategy is his 1996 article “The 
Influence of Space Power upon History,” written while he was professor of 
politics and director of the Centre for Security Studies at the University of 
Hull� In this article he defines spacepower as “the ability to use space while 
denying reliable use to any foe�”5 He also laments that, despite spacepower’s 
growing importance as a domain of warfare, no comprehensive theory of it 
had been formulated and spacepower theorists remained scarce�6 He explores 
the potential reasons for the scarcity of notable spacepower theorists, and the 
epigraph that begins this essay comes from that article� Unbeknownst to Gray 
at the time, the quotation inspired many writers of spacepower theory and 
strategy who followed, including this author� Elaborating on the problem, he 
explained that “[t]oday, space power suffers from an unusual malady—an acute 
shortage of space focused strategic theory and the lack of a binding concept to 
aid understanding of what it is all about� People today, including many military 
professionals, remain less than enlightened on what space power is and does, 
how it works, and how it can and should function synergistically with other 
players in the joint military team�”7
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Gray thought that an in-depth understanding of the theory of war and past 
strategic frameworks could be used to guide the development of a clearly ar-
ticulated, all-encompassing strategy for military operations in and through space� 
Despite a few previous efforts to develop a comprehensive theory of space warfare, 
he observed that no adequate and fully comprehensive theoretical framework of 
spacepower yet had been formulated and much work remained to be done�
Gray had many consistent themes in his writings throughout the decades, 
including his frequent reference to Carl von Clausewitz and the Prussian strate-
gist’s theory of war�8 Clausewitz provided Gray with much of his intellectual am-
munition, and “The Influence of Space Power upon History” is no exception in 
this regard� Clausewitz and Gray both held that the “grammar” and character of 
strategy are in a constant state of change, but its fundamental nature and logic 
are eternal� Drawing from this strategic truth, Gray advised that despite space 
warfare having its own distinct character, spacepower theory needs to fit within 
our understanding of Clausewitz’s writing and the enduring nature of war� Gray 
wrote, “War in space has its own distinctive characteristics that policy must know 
and respect, but that war has meaning only for the purposes of policy�”9 Despite 
being a new domain in which to consider the matter of human conflict, war in 
space—like war in all other domains—will serve the ends of policy in pursuit of 
political objectives�
In his seminal book Modern Strategy, published in 1999, Gray wrote on space-
power’s place within the context of technological innovation and the future of 
warfare� Drawing on the work of geostrategist Halford Mackinder and Gray’s own 
novel thoughts regarding the strategic influence of geopolitics, Gray explored 
spacepower from the perspective of geography, writing as follows: “[W]orks of 
theory explaining spacepower should explore the interconnectedness, indeed 
interdependence, of the different geographical environments� Spacepower is of 
little interest per se� Strategic interest lies in the consequences of its application 
for deterrence and the conduct of war as a whole, within a context lit by steady 
recognition of the authority of the principle that the land matters most�”10
Furthermore, Gray noted that up to that point spacepower theory had been 
approached as almost everything but what it most truly is: the military exploita-
tion of a new geographical medium, and a domain that needs to be understood 
on its own technical, tactical, and operational terms, if it is to produce maximum 
strategic effectiveness� Gray made it clear, however, that the unique geography of 
space does not point the way to some unique logic of strategy, let alone a unique 
irrelevance of strategy�11 Hence, spacepower doctrine still must observe the en-
during nature of war and strategic theory�
Gray also looked to historical experience to offer insights into the application 
of spacepower� Drawing on the long-standing precedents of the application of 
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seapower and airpower, Gray thought that spacepower was likely to play adjunct 
or supporting roles during conflicts� Despite the dearth of strategic experience 
in space and spacepower’s promise to bring comprehensive changes in the form 
and structure of armed conflict, Gray noted that spacepower must not be thought 
of as the panacea for terrestrial security ills� Additionally, he warned that new 
sources of advantage bring new sources of vulnerability—a maxim that seems 
especially prescient for the United States and its rivals today within the space 
domain�12
TEACHER AND MENTOR
Gray had a significant and lasting commitment to his doctoral students, and 
was kind and generous with his time� He routinely held brown-bag lunches and 
strategic seminars at the universities at which he taught� During these gatherings, 
his doctoral students had the opportunity to try out various thesis ideas, debate 
among themselves, and hear any insights or suggestions that Gray had on the 
subject� Gray felt it deeply important to prepare the next generation of strategists 
and strategic thinkers, and it showed whenever he interacted with his students� 
Even when in the midst of writing his latest book or preparing for the next class, 
Gray graciously would carve out time in his schedule to hear about his students’ 
research and offer suggestions� Being his usual self when giving pointed feedback, 
he displayed the gift of using great wit in telling stories and teaching memorable 
lessons�
Let there be no mistake, however; Gray expected the highest levels of schol-
arship from those studying under him� As many of his students can attest, he 
routinely gave extensive feedback on drafts of their doctoral theses� Often, the 
margins of a thesis were full of his comments—in his famous red ink—regard-
ing language use, the need for clarity, and the pitfalls of overstatement� Gray 
consistently taught the lesson of never taking for granted that the reader would 
invest time in your work; one should strive constantly to make one’s research and 
writing the absolute best possible while getting to the “so what?” of the matter�
Ultimately, Gray’s teaching and mentorship likely are responsible for at least 
one generation of spacepower theorists in the United States, as well as around 
the world� He routinely recognized the talents of aspiring authors and helped 
ensure that their works saw the light of day through publication�13 Working 
behind the scenes, he also advanced the careers of others, including advocating 
for those he mentored to fill teaching positions at universities when opportuni-
ties arose� Gray’s generosity and refreshing lack of towering ego were enhanced 
by the fact that he was incredibly well connected, albeit quietly, within the U�S� 
military space community� This lent credibility to his own ideas, as well as those 
of others who studied under him� Through his steadfast efforts and support, 
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Gray developed and promoted a cadre of individuals who collectively advanced 
spacepower strategic thought�
INSIGHTS FOR TODAY’S SPACE PROFESSIONALS
Much has changed since Gray first penned his ideas on spacepower theory� Re-
cently the United States established the newest branch of its armed forces, the U�S� 
Space Force, and published its inaugural space capstone publication, Spacepower: 
Doctrine for Space Forces�14
Because of Gray’s consistent message regarding the enduring nature of war de-
spite the application of new technologies and operational concepts, his writings 
remain timeless in their utility and insights� What follows are some reminders 
derived from Gray’s contributions for today’s space professionals and members of 
the U�S� Space Force, as we consider the reemergence of great-power competition 
and the ever-expanding national-security interests in space�
Space Is Not a Sanctuary
Gray routinely held views that differed from the prevalent thinking of the day� 
Many of his contemporaries viewed space as a sanctuary that should be free of 
conflict� While today the United States and many of its allies recognize space as 
a “warfighting domain,” this is a recent phenomenon; in the early 1980s, it tradi-
tionally was held by most within the U�S� national-security space community that 
space was a sanctuary, or a domain where military conflict would never extend� 
Gray disagreed and stated emphatically in American Military Space Policy, “No 
satellite system, no matter how high its orbit or sophisticated its survival aids, 
enjoys assured survivability� Space is not a sanctuary�”15 Approaching space-
power theory in a way reflecting classical strategy leads to the understanding 
that militarily useful geographies eventually will be exploited and contested�16 He 
observed that many senior U�S� officials of the day incorrectly viewed the surviv-
ability of satellites in geosynchronous orbit as an irrefutable certainty�17
Many of his thoughts regarding the fallacies of the sanctuary school of thought 
and the vulnerability of satellites were reflected in the spacepower writings that 
followed�18 Providing a perspective based on experience and the fundamentals of 
strategy, in his 2005 book Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare Gray observed 
as follows: “It is a rule in strategy, one derived empirically from the evidence of 
two and a half millennia, that anything of great strategic importance to one bel-
ligerent, for that reason has to be worth attacking by others� And the greater the 
importance, the greater has to be the incentive to damage, disable, capture, or 
destroy it� In the bluntest of statements: space warfare is a certainty in the future 
because the use of space in war has become vital�”19
Gray understood the fallacies of viewing space as a sanctuary� Thinking this 
way would result in developed and fielded space systems being vulnerable to 
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attack and of questionable survivability during a conflict extending into space� 
The dogmatic view of space being a sanctuary would lead to the dangerous condi-
tion of peacetime efficiency and convenience preventing serious preparations for 
war� As a practical matter, and on the basis of historical experience, Gray viewed 
the United States as having no realistic choice other than to be prepared to fight 
in space—an enterprise that must involve the development of both offensive and 
defensive capabilities�20
Challenges of Space Arms Control
Gray was a consistent critic of many arms-control approaches used during the 
Cold War, including those related to the space domain�21 In his 1992 book House 
of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail, he wrote the following on the paradox of 
arms control: “[T]he first paradox, dignified throughout the remainder of this 
book as ‘the arms control paradox,’ postulates that if arms control is needed in 
a strategic relationship because states in question might go to war, it will be im-
practical for that very reason of need, whereas, if arms control should prove to be 
available, it will be irrelevant�”22
On the limitations of arms control and its frequent pitfalls, Gray noted that 
many arms-control proponents asserted that the United States needed an arms-
control agreement far more than the Soviet Union did, because of the disparity 
in space dependencies between the two sides� These advocates, however, tended 
to neglect such crucial issues as the scope of activity to be constrained, methods 
of verification, and the Soviet theory of war�23 On the whole, when considering 
the various space arms-control proposals, he viewed them as “pious nonsense,” 
because unduly uncritical obeisance was paid to an arms-control credo that re-
flected a triumph of hope over experience� Cutting to the crux of the problem, 
Gray explained that “[h]istory and the common sense of international politics 
tells us that one cannot legislate against military technologies that states have 
strong incentives to pursue�” In contrast to the arms-control advocates of the 
time, the Soviets understood and used the arms-control process as one of several 
interdependent instruments of conducting international relations effectively and 
limiting the strengths of other countries, including the United States�24
Gray thought that the United States should not sign any arms-control treaty 
formally conceding superiority to the Soviet Union�25 He thought historical 
experience had demonstrated that the Soviet Union had violated arms-control 
agreements when it was administratively convenient, militarily advantageous, 
and economically efficient to do so�26 Without a sound understanding of the 
technological trends that should be encouraged or discouraged, “arms control 
negotiators are engaged in an exercise that is little more than a lottery�” Gray was a 
staunch advocate of the United States maintaining its strategic advantage in space 
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capabilities, and he consistently advised U�S� policy leaders that the United States 
should not seek to obtain, or settle for, equality in space weaponry (whether it be 
equality in deployment or nondeployment of space capabilities)�27 He confessed, 
“I am profoundly skeptical of the likely practical value of the arms control pro-
cess to help fashion a military space environment conducive to the best interests 
of the United States�” Gray believed that solutions to the dilemmas of deterring 
conflict must be sought in the realm of politics, “not in weapons technologies or 
in arms-control band-aids�”28
A key takeaway for space professionals is that these inherent problems as-
sociated with arms control likely will reemerge during any future discussions 
on banning military technologies that states have strong incentives to pursue, 
such as direct-ascent, hit-to-kill antisatellite missiles or on-orbit kinetic-kill 
vehicles�
Be Wary of the Next “Big Idea”
Gray noted that there is a long history of the periodic reemergence of technol-
ogy’s application as a “hot” and “new” strategic concept within the U�S� defense 
community� He observed the succession of purportedly novel strategic concepts 
that repeatedly have gained popularity, and then official endorsements, on the 
basis of a largely false promise of superior performance� He warned, “There will 
always be a market for new sounding ideas expressed in jargon and neatly acro-
nymic� They come, they go, and they reappear in slightly different guise in the 
future�”29 Technology zealots’ claims that new strategic concepts will guarantee 
winning of the next war fall within the “zone of snake oil salesmanship�”30
Because space warfare frequently involves advanced technology, and because 
space only recently has come to be considered a domain for conflict, space pro-
fessionals should remain vigilant against those touting the next “big idea�” Con-
sistent through much of his writings, Gray advised current and future strategists 
that there are just three defenses against the usually false—or at least exagger-
ated—strategic promise of the hot, new concept: common sense, experience, and 
a sound education in strategy—especially in the enduring works of Thucydides, 
Sun-tzu, and Clausewitz�31
Predictive Failure Will Occur
Gray also observed a frequent trend—especially within defense policy circles 
and think tanks within Washington, DC—of seeking to predict the future� He 
warned against this predilection and the pervasive use of the phrase “the foresee-
able future�” Gray warned that the future is not knowable in any detail� One of the 
responsibilities of the strategist, Gray advised, is to prevent “the enthronement of 
the kind of official strategic certainty which precludes the development of stra-
tegic and military postural flexibility�”32 Experts and policy makers who advance 
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a knowable and certain future are dangerous to their organizations, as well to 
those in the fighting forces who will need to carry out their ill-conceived vision�
In contrast, Gray thought that strategists need to acknowledge the reality that 
predictive failure will occur� Strategists must contend with friction, chance, and 
uncertainty, and consequently strategists should be adaptable and flexible over a 
range of plausible—and some implausible—threats, to protect national interests 
wherever they lie� In providing guidance regarding an unknowable future, Gray 
wrote that “strategists have no choice other than to cope with their unavoidable 
ignorance as best they may�”33 Consequently, today’s space professionals and strat-
egists should plan across the gamut of scenarios and potential futures to account 
for the inherent failings of predictive analysis�
Space Is Critical, but Avoid Overstatement
Gray frequently advised that spacepower should fit within a joint war-fighting 
framework and the larger wartime effort� He commented, “Spacepower must 
always be useful, but its precise roles and actual strategic utility will be distinc-
tive to each class and case of conflict�”34 The lesson for competition in space is 
that planning should include conditions in which space-related activities will 
contribute significantly to war’s conclusion, and those situations in which it will 
not� When advocating for the importance of including spacepower and space 
capabilities in joint and coalition warfare, Gray advised, “Space warriors today 
should not compensate for the general underappreciation in the armed services 
by indulging in overstatement�”35 It is paramount that space professionals under-
stand fully the implications of space being a war-fighting domain, while acknowl-
edging the limits of spacepower�
Even though there are no reasons why space operations cannot deliver decisive 
strategic effects to achieve success, the conditions allowing for such a victory 
should be considered rare indeed� This is because for conflict to have the greatest 
impact and affect the strategic level of war, it must affect the preponderance of 
people where they live� Gray wrote, “[A]ll conflict must have terrestrial reference 
because man can live only upon the land�” As a result, there will be practical limits 
to what space operations can achieve strategically, no matter how significant a 
level of command of space is achieved or how well operations are executed� Al-
though command of space may achieve strategic effect, tactical and operational 
space actions will be strategically decisive in determining a war’s outcome only 
on the rarest occasions� This is because strategic effect is decided by the target, 
not by the means of attack�36
Gray viewed spacepower as often augmenting the effectiveness of air, sea, and 
land power�37 In noting how space forces and capabilities should be used during 
conflict, Gray observed, “Military space ventures have been inherently adjunct, 
supportive, and ancillary to the main terrestrial action of modern strategy�”38 
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Each branch of the armed forces has distinctive strengths and limitations, and 
space forces must contribute to this joint endeavor to achieve success in deter-
rence and war� Space warfare necessitates thinking about spacepower from a joint 
perspective and an all-domain approach� Consequently, spacepower and associ-
ated space capabilities should embrace their role within the application of land-, 
maritime-, and air-focused military forces�
Being in a supporting role, however, does not make space forces less impor-
tant� Indeed, winning in the space domain is still critical� Gray commented, “As 
the leading edge of overall U�S� combat potency, space power will decide the 
course and outcome of some conflicts, even though space forces may not them-
selves be combat forces with offensive capabilities�”39
Gray’s ideas and writings inspired many to advance the cause of strategy, includ-
ing that related to the space domain�40 His ability to explain the most complex 
ideas in a simple manner while always answering the “so what?” question was a 
true gift to the development of spacepower theory� He crafted strategic lessons 
for spacepower on the basis of the universal principles of strategy and essential 
unity in all strategic experience�
While many of Gray’s ideas were considered novel and counter to mainstream 
spacepower thinking at the time, his writings and ideas have gained acceptance 
over time� In fact, his “intellectual fingerprints” are all over many of the most 
significant works on spacepower, even including the aforementioned Spacepower: 
Doctrine for Space Forces, which was published in June 2020� Most importantly, 
because his ideas on strategy are based on historical experience within the con-
text of the enduring nature of war, his writings remain timeless in their relevance 
today and will remain so into the future�
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FROM ORBIT TO OCEAN
Fixing Southeast Asia’s Remote-Sensing Blind Spots
Gregory B. Poling
 Few regions are as reliant on the marine environment for food security, economic growth, and national security as maritime Southeast Asia� The 
region’s waters constitute some of the most biodiverse marine habitats on the 
planet� The South China Sea accounts for an estimated 12 percent of global fish 
catch and employs as many as half of the fishing vessels in the world�1
But this marine environment is teetering on the brink of environmental ca-
tastrophe� Fish stocks in the South China Sea have been depleted by between 70 
and 95 percent, depending on species, and the story is much the same throughout 
the region�2 Fishers must operate farther afield for longer to fill their holds, often 
racing each other to catch ever-depleting numbers of juvenile fish�
The growing competition for marine resources also worsens interstate friction, 
as fishers are forced to operate farther from shore, often in neighboring exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs), and without permission� Formerly lawful artisanal fish-
ers have become today’s illegal fishing fleets, and coastal communities on disput-
ed waters such as the South China Sea have every incentive to continue to operate 
in contested areas, even in the face of danger from competing law-enforcement 
and paramilitary forces� Most violent incidents in the South China Sea emerge 
from fishing competition, not oil and gas or military activities� That tendency 
only will increase as the marine environment deteriorates and stocks continue 
to shrink� And on top of this increasingly violent competition for fish, Southeast 
Asia’s waters are home to a resurgent threat of piracy and maritime crime; illicit 
trafficking in arms, drugs, and persons, including by terrorist organizations; and 
ever more capable vessels from the Chinese navy, coast guard, and other state 
agencies that increasingly transit, survey, and otherwise operate in neighboring 
states’ waters in a manner not always consistent with international law�
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Yet countries in this region, despite being so reliant on the marine ecosystem 
and so threatened by illegal activities at sea, are largely “sea blind�” Maritime do-
main awareness (MDA)—the ability to detect, identify, and track vessels at sea—
remains underdeveloped throughout Southeast Asia� Naval and law-enforcement 
agencies lack the quantity and quality of platforms needed to enforce laws even 
when they can detect illicit activity� Information sharing both within and among 
countries remains underdeveloped�
The United States has been working to fill capability gaps with material support 
and training through efforts such as the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative 
(originally the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative) and the Southeast Asia 
Maritime Law Enforcement 
Initiative� Partners such as Ja-
pan and Australia also provide 
maritime-capacity-building 
assistance in Southeast Asia, 
but the needs remain overwhelming� Even the outside security assistance received 
often focuses on expensive surface and air platforms that cannot possibly close the 
gap—procuring and maintaining enough patrol vessels and aircraft to monitor 
the vast waters of Southeast Asia effectively is a budgetary impossibility for most 
regional states�
Luckily, the last decade has seen the rapid development of cheaper, commer-
cially available remote-sensing technologies that hold the promise of revolution-
izing MDA for developing coastal states� However, Southeast Asian governments 
remain largely unprepared to take advantage of those opportunities� Additionally, 
the United States and other security-assistance providers have been slow to adapt 
to this changing ecosystem; they continue to try to mold the navies and coast 
guards of developing coastal states in the images of their own services, despite 
knowing that such an effort is doomed to fail� But affordable MDA tools exist in 
ever-greater numbers in the private sector, and Washington needs to refocus on 
facilitating access to these technologies and teaching best practices if it wants to 
be part of the solution�
This article opens with an examination of the remote-sensing tools that are or 
soon will be widely available to coastal states and how each will contribute to a rev-
olution in MDA capabilities� It then provides a brief assessment of how well each 
of five Southeast Asian states—Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Vietnam—are incorporating available remote-sensing tools, structuring govern-
ment agencies to take advantage of them, and establishing necessary regulations 
for their use� The article concludes with a brief discussion of MDA capacity– 
building efforts in the region by the United States and other states, and how they 
could focus more efficiently on boosting remote-sensing use by partner nations�
Most violent incidents in the South China Sea 
emerge from fishing competition, not oil and 
gas or military activities.
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THE NEAR FUTURE OF REMOTE SENSING
It is 2025, and a notification pops up on a screen in the National Coast Watch 
Center in the Philippines� It provides a snapshot of data on a suspicious vessel 
detected in the Philippine EEZ� Early that morning, a commercial satellite in 
low-earth orbit had detected several very-high-frequency (VHF) radio emissions 
in the area—which was suspicious, since there were no fishing or other vessels 
broadcasting identifying information from that location� An hour later, another 
satellite had collected synthetic aperture radar (SAR) data over the area, which 
showed at least two metal-hulled vessels� A third “bird,” this time collecting 
electro-optical imagery, had passed over a few hours later and the data had just 
come in� This triggered the notification�
The watch officer on duty checks the results� The SAR and optical imagery 
confirm the presence of two large metal vessels, which appear to be refriger-
ated cargo ships called reefers� The latter sensor also shows at least half a dozen 
wooden fishing boats nearby� The system has flagged the incident as probable 
transshipment of catch, which is what the officer expected; satellite detections of 
light sources in the area that month had shown an uptick in night fishing� The 
fishing boats likely are transferring squid and other high-value species bound for 
foreign markets�
Following protocol, the officer transmits a message to the closest Philippine 
Coast Guard station� There are no patrol ships close enough to conduct an inter-
diction at sea, but the service will have a drone overhead in under an hour� It will 
collect identifying information on the vessels to feed into a database accessible by 
law-enforcement officials in any country that is party to the Agreement on Port 
State Measures (known as PSMA)—which means almost everyone� The reefers 
likely will be impounded as soon as they try to off-load their catch� The smaller 
boats will get away, but their illicit network will take a hit, and the coast guard 
will step up patrols in the area�
This scenario is not speculative fiction; it is an example of the cost-effective 
MDA tools that will be available to all countries in the coming years� The shrink-
ing costs of satellite construction and launch are creating a boom in commercial 
low-earth operations� This means that many remote-sensing technologies—such 
as high-resolution satellite imagery and SAR, which previously were available 
only to well-heeled defense and intelligence agencies—are entering the commer-
cial market� Other technologies are emerging for the first time, made possible 
by experimentation in the marketplace, fueled by the much lower entry barriers 
to space� For island nations and developing states, this will be a game changer, 
assuming that they seize the opportunities it presents� It also assumes that the 
partners on whom they rely for capacity-building support, especially the United 
States, will help facilitate access to these technologies�
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A nonexhaustive listing and discussion follow of the various remote-sensing 
technologies that are or soon will be at the core of smart MDA efforts, along with 
some of the major players bringing them to market�
Coastal Radar
Coastal radar has been the most important tool for vessel detection for decades 
and will remain an essential part of any MDA sensing network� But there is wide 
variation in the types and ranges of coastal radar�
For those that can afford it, high-frequency surface-wave radar can detect ves-
sels effectively over two hundred nautical miles from shore� But the kind of afford-
able, generalized radar network that a developing coastal state would seek to oper-
ate generally covers only territorial waters and the contiguous zone, not the EEZ�3
Automatic Identification System
Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders are mandated by the Inter-
national Maritime Organization (IMO) for all vessels over three hundred tons 
that transit international waters�4 These transponders broadcast identifying infor-
mation about ships, including their IMO and Maritime Mobile Service Identity 
numbers, as well as, to prevent collisions, their heading and speed� IMO-approved 
class A transponders are designed to communicate ship to ship and ship to shore 
within a limited range� A global network of shore-based receivers exists primarily 
to monitor traffic in congested areas, such as ports and busy straits� The first satel-
lite AIS receivers were launched between 2007 and 2010; this allowed detection 
of vessels with sufficiently strong transponders far from shore for the first time�5
AIS is invaluable for monitoring legal activity but has obvious weaknesses� It 
is up to the ship’s captain to input the vessel’s data and ensure the transponder 
is broadcasting, which allows criminals easily to disable or spoof their transmis-
sions� Military and law-enforcement vessels are free to disable their transmissions 
at will� Any ship that is smaller than three hundred tons or only operates domesti-
cally is not required by the IMO to have a transponder� This includes most fishing 
vessels� Many states do require fishing boats to have AIS, but often only a cheaper 
class B transponder, which has an even more limited range, which often means 
that satellites cannot detect them�
Since the first AIS satellite launch, a commercial market has developed, 
driven largely by shipping, oil and gas, and other maritime industries that want 
to keep eyes on their vessels at all times� This market is led by companies such as 
ORBCOMM, exactEarth, and Spire, which supply AIS data to most of the pub-
licly available vessel-monitoring platforms, including MarineTraffic, Windward, 
and Global Fishing Watch� Some of these platforms, such as MarineTraffic, 
combine space-based AIS with a network of shore-based receivers for a more 
complete picture�6
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Most government agencies rely on noncommercial platforms to combine 
commercial AIS with other proprietary sensor data� The most widely used 
is SeaVision, developed by the U�S� Department of Transportation with sup-
port from the U�S� Navy and shared widely among American partners and al-
lies� SeaVision combines unclassified data streams that include terrestrial and 
satellite-based AIS, a limited amount of SAR, and coastal-radar data shared 
by the participating countries� Dozens of partner nations are using SeaVision, 
including most of Southeast Asia�
Vessel Monitoring Systems
Vessel monitoring system (VMS) is a generic term for systems mandated at a na-
tional or subnational level to monitor commercial fishing vessels� VMS transpon-
ders are intended to fill the gap left by AIS� Ideally, all legal fishers operating in a 
coastal state’s EEZ would be required to carry them on board to transmit the ves-
sel’s location and identifying information back to authorities in real time� Many 
commercial manufacturers offer VMSs with a wide range of capabilities and costs, 
but the purpose of all these systems is the same: to provide data that, combined 
with information from AIS, can ensure that all commercial vessels operating le-
gally in a coastal state’s waters can be monitored in real time� VMS, therefore, is a 
necessary component in any effective MDA network; without it, separating licit 
from illicit activity is all but impossible� This is because legal fishing vessels, which 
make up the largest number of boats in an EEZ at any time, cannot be otherwise 
distinguished from nefarious actors, since both are running “dark�”
Electro-optical Imagery
Electro-optical collection systems detect reflected light, including bands beyond 
the visible spectrum, producing panchromatic and multispectral images� This is 
what most users think of when they discuss satellite imagery� Over the last fifteen 
years or so, falling prices for satellite construction and launch have driven down 
the cost of imagery collection, such that a commercial market has developed for 
the first time� There are two broad categories of imagery providers, both of which 
have a role in MDA�
The first group includes suppliers, such as Airbus, Maxar, and ImageSat, 
which have relatively small constellations of large, expensive satellites with long 
lifetimes� They provide the highest-resolution imagery on the market—in some 
cases down to thirty centimeters, which is the legal limit in the United States�7 
They tend to be reliant on large government contracts but increasingly augment 
these with commercial operations�8 Their imagery can provide a high degree of 
detail about a vessel, making them particularly helpful in the identification part 
of MDA� But their relatively small constellations also make their imagery expen-
sive and available only infrequently�
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The other group of satellite imagery providers is being pioneered by Planet Labs� 
It and those seeking to follow its model are younger than the legacy providers and 
rely on larger constellations of cheaper satellites with shorter lifetimes in low-earth 
orbit� Their maximum resolu-
tions are generally lower, mak-
ing identification of specific 
vessels, or even vessel types, 
difficult, but their larger con-
stellations allow much more 
persistent coverage of an area 
at a lower cost� And as their 
satellites improve they are closing the resolution gap rapidly, suggesting that soon it 
will be possible to get both persistent coverage and very high resolution at low cost�
However, that will not fix the greatest limitation of electro-optical imagery for 
MDA: the weather� Satellites cannot take pictures through cloud cover, and in 
Southeast Asia that can mean long stretches of blindness owing to storms�
Synthetic Aperture Radar
Synthetic aperture radar is radar imagery collected by satellite� It helps mitigate 
the weather problem, being unaffected by cloud cover—a major advantage� But 
it provides other benefits as well� It is very useful for identifying metal vessels at 
sea and can be used to detect environmental hazards such as oil slicks� Vessels 
also are much easier to detect in a SAR image than in an electro-optical one, since 
they present as bright spots on a dark background�
But what SAR gains in detection it loses in identification; it does not provide 
enough detail to distinguish individual vessels, and often not even vessel types� 
It also makes it difficult to detect ships close to each other, such as during trans-
shipment at sea, because they will appear as one large object� And, of course, it 
cannot be used to detect ships with very little metal structure—which includes 
most artisanal fishing boats in places such as the Philippines and Vietnam�
Despite its limitations, SAR increasingly is seen as a vital tool in MDA capa-
bilities because of the ease of vessel detection it provides� It is experiencing the 
same drop in price as electro-optical imagery, although a few years behind� The 
market for SAR is dominated largely by legacy players such as Maxar’s subsidiary 
MDA and an Airbus constellation that includes multiple European SAR satellites� 
Outside the market, major players in the space industry such as China, India, 
Japan, and the United States operate their own SAR satellites�
But some new companies are seeking to disrupt the market in the same way 
that Planet Labs and its ilk are doing for electro-optical imagery� The Finnish 
company ICEYE, the U�S�-based Capella Space and Umbra Lab, and Japan’s 
Synspective all have announced plans for large constellations of low-earth-orbit 
The proliferation of remote-sensing tools 
means that . . . in the next few years the vol-
ume of . . . data will increase many times over. 
. . . Will relevant authorities . . . be able to 
collect it, process it, and compare it with other 
sources to create a robust MDA network?
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satellites that could provide much cheaper, more-persistent coverage at resolu-
tions higher than one meter� ICEYE launched the first such satellite in 2018 and 
followed that with more launches in 2019 and 2020� Capella and Synspective 
made their first launches in late 2020, while Umbra planned to begin launches 
soon�9 Completion of those constellations will have an enormous impact on 
MDA capabilities around the globe�
Low-Light Imaging
Low-light imaging refers to the detection of light sources in the visible spectrum, 
originally developed for meteorological research but more recently applied to 
the MDA field� This is made possible by the visible infrared imaging radiometer 
suite (VIIRS) sensor developed by the U�S� National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) and NASA and launched in 2011� The sensor’s primary 
mission is to detect moonlight reflecting off clouds�10 However, it also is capable 
of detecting the bright lights that many fishing vessels use to attract fish at 
night—an especially popular technique when fishing for squid and other species 
in the waters of Southeast Asia and the Pacific�
The Earth Observation Group at NOAA developed algorithms to identify fish-
ing activity, plus a handful of other sources of light such as gas flaring, but not the 
modest light sources that commercial vessels in transit put out� NOAA released 
this VIIRS Boat Detection tool free to the public until late 2019 and the Navy 
began including its data in SeaVision�11 Since then, the Earth Observation Group 
has moved from NOAA to the Colorado School of Mines, where it continues to 
release the VIIRS Boat Detection tool, charging nothing for data with a forty-
five-day delay and a subscription fee for near-real-time data�12
VIIRS has obvious limitations� For instance, it can detect a dark vessel when cor-
related with AIS or VMS, but it cannot provide the details needed to identify it� It is 
unable to disaggregate light sources that are close together, so it cannot tell whether 
a return comes from one boat or a whole fleet� But it provides useful information 
about fishing patterns at large scale� Given the success of the VIIRS Boat Detection 
tool, other players likely will develop new low-light-imaging platforms for MDA�
Radio-Frequency Detection
The term radio-frequency detection refers to satellite-based sensors that can trian-
gulate the location of terrestrial radio-frequency broadcasts, including from ves-
sels at sea� This technology is a new entrant into the remote-sensing market, but 
it has great potential for use in MDA� Early innovators on this front are the U�S�-
based HawkEye 360 and the French company Unseenlabs� HawkEye 360’s grow-
ing constellation of satellites can detect a range of frequencies, including AIS, 
VHF channels 16 and 70 (used for distress signals and safety announcements), 
X-band radar, emergency locator beacons (known as EPIRBs), and L-band radio 
frequencies used for global positioning systems, including China’s BeiDou�13
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These transmissions can be used to detect otherwise dark vessels, because 
even ships that disable or do not carry AIS or VMS transceivers still use marine 
radar, radios, and other transmitting devices� It also can be used to detect inten-
tional spoofing of AIS by determining that a vessel’s broadcasts are not coming 
from where its transponder indicates it is located� A cluster of radio-frequency-
detecting satellites, in a single pass, can triangulate the location of dark vessels 
over a very wide area� This makes it an efficient means of initial detection, which 
can trigger more-targeted remote-sensing tools to follow up and identify suspi-
cious vessels�
Data Processing
The processing of data is just as important as data collection� The proliferation 
of remote-sensing tools means that private individuals and state actors both have 
access to a previously unimaginable amount of data about the maritime domain, 
and in the next few years the volume of those data will increase many times over� 
By the mid-2020s, it will be all but impossible for a vessel of more than a few 
meters in length to operate at sea without detection�
The question is, Will relevant authorities make use of that information ef-
fectively? Will they be able to collect it, process it, and compare it with other 
sources to create a robust MDA network? Part of the challenge will be bureau-
cratic; authorities must make sure that remote-sensing data are getting to the 
right agencies in an efficient manner, not lost in the interagency “food fights” 
endemic to all government bureaucracies� But an equal part of the solution will 
be technological, relying on artificial intelligence and machine learning to collate 
remote-sensing data so that suspicious vessel behavior can be flagged quickly 
enough for law-enforcement agencies, fisheries managers, and others to act on it�
Leading efforts on this front include the work of OceanMind, a nonprofit that 
began in 2014 as a partnership between Satellite Applications Catapult and the 
Pew Charitable Trusts before becoming an independent entity in 2018�14 Ocean-
Mind develops tools to automate vessel detection from remote-sensing sources, 
provide real-time alerts about potential illicit activity, and more� Skylight, a 
branch of late Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen’s Vulcan Inc�, is engaged in similar 
efforts� Another promising company in this field is Orbital Insight, although its 
object-detection algorithms are not focused primarily on MDA� All three outfits 
concentrate to one degree or another on using artificial intelligence to automate 
the process of vessel detection in SAR or electro-optical imagery and the subse-
quent correlation of that information with AIS and VMS data�15
Global Fishing Watch, which was launched by Google, Oceana, and SkyTruth 
but is now an independent organization, takes a different approach� It publishes 
fishing vessel AIS data from around the world in real time and invites the public 
to help analyze and identify irregularities—in effect, crowdsourcing the fight 
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against illegal fishing� It also has added VMS transmissions from willing partner 
nations, along with VIIRS data�16 Israel-based Windward has developed its own 
AIS platform, along with numerous algorithms to automate the detection of un-
usual or illicit activity such as transshipments at sea and intentional spoofing or 
disabling of AIS�17
This is just a sampling of leading private-sector efforts to develop remote-sensing 
tools for MDA� Space-based tools and analytic platforms that previously were the 
sole domain of governments are being replicated by nonprofits and commercial 
technology firms, while entirely new technologies are emerging from the private 
sector� Radar and patrol platforms will continue to play critical roles, but the 
foundation of effective MDA has moved to space-based assets� Most coastal states, 
however, remain unaware of or too slow to adapt to these new technologies�
SOUTHEAST ASIA’S REMOTE-SENSING STRUGGLES
Given their long list of maritime-security challenges and considerable MDA gaps, 
Southeast Asian states are underutilizing remote sensing� Thailand has surged 
ahead of the rest of the region in recent years in experimenting with new tech-
nologies and partnering with the private sector, but it still has a lot of work to do� 
Indonesia made some important strides over the last five years, as countering ille-
gal fishing became a major focus of the government, but it has yet to move much 
beyond legacy technologies, and interagency competition severely hampers ef-
fective use of the data it does receive� In Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, 
sea blindness is the rule, not the exception� All three have recognized the need to 
improve MDA and are making modest improvements, but none has an effective 
VMS or adequately incorporates surveillance tools beyond AIS, coastal radar, 
and surface or air patrols�
Only these five states are examined here� They share similar challenges: 
large and difficult-to-monitor EEZs, historical underinvestment in maritime 
capabilities, and constrained government budgets� Neighboring Singapore, by 
comparison, is the most technologically advanced state in the region when it 
comes to MDA capabilities, but with its small EEZ and developed economy it 
does not share many of its neighbors’ constraints in this area, nor does it require 
significant maritime-capacity-building assistance from outside partners such as 
the United States�
Thailand
In April 2015, Thailand’s seafood industry received a “yellow card” from the Eu-
ropean Union (EU), owing to gross violations of international law� Bangkok was 
given a limited time to show improvements or it would suffer a ban on seafood 
exports to the European market� Since then, Thailand has worked to improve its 
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MDA and enforcement practices to comply with international standards, and 
the yellow card was lifted in early 2019�18 The country signed on to the PSMA 
in 2016 as a sign of continued efforts toward combating illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing�19
Thailand explicitly requires VMS devices on all fishing vessels operating in 
its waters� It issued a royal ordinance to this effect in 2015 and immediately fol-
lowed up with guidance from the Department of Fisheries on how VMS instal-
lation would be inspected and enforced�20 Since then the government has issued 
regular amendments clarifying VMS compliance requirements�21 Even with the 
EU yellow card lifted, Thailand continues to take VMS implementation seriously 
as a tool for IUU prevention and enforcement� The Department of Fisheries 
uses both VMS and AIS data to alert the Thai Maritime Enforcement Command 
Center (THAI-MECC) or law-enforcement agencies of any violations occurring 
in their jurisdictions� Like most Southeast Asian states, Thailand is a partner in 
SeaVision and uses it to access terrestrial and satellite AIS alongside its own data, 
including from coastal radars�
The Department of Fisheries has embarked on a landmark partnership with 
OceanMind and the Seafood Task Force, another international nonprofit, to 
improve monitoring and seafood traceability for its fishing fleet� Given Ocean-
Mind’s competencies, this likely includes some analysis of SAR data�22 SeaVi-
sion also provides access to some SAR data, though users have limited ability to 
order collections� This dabbling with SAR is an important step but the tool still 
does not seem to be a routine component of MDA operations by the Department 
of Fisheries or THAI-MECC� The same is true of electro-optical imagery and 
VIIRS� While Thai authorities might be using these for pilot projects, they are 
not used in day-to-day operations� Instead, Thailand remains primarily reliant 
on law-enforcement vessels and patrol aircraft, including unmanned aerial ve-
hicles, to follow up on any suspicious activity that AIS or VMS detects�23
One of Thailand’s most important steps to improve MDA and interagency 
coordination was the strengthening and reorganization of THAI-MECC in 2019� 
Previously the Thai Maritime Enforcement Coordinating Center, the renamed 
body has become a leading example for the region of how to empower a single 
government agency to combine information from relevant maritime depart-
ments into a common operating picture�24 It is empowered to handle all national-
level MDA, including for both law-enforcement agencies and the armed forces� 
The Royal Thai Navy, the Marine Department, and the Department of Fisheries 
all are required to feed AIS, VMS, and other forms of information to THAI-
MECC, which collates it and shares information about violations with enforce-
ment agencies� THAI-MECC is now Thailand’s national single point of contact 
to coordinate with partner nations on maritime-security issues and is expected 
72
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/1
 P O L I N G  6 7
to develop into a robust maritime fusion center to collect, process, and distribute 
remote-sensing data�
Indonesia
Shortly after his election in 2014, Indonesia’s president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo 
appointed businesswoman Susi Pudjiastuti as minister of maritime affairs and 
fisheries� For the next five years, Minister Susi led an effort to halt rampant IUU 
fishing and protect local fish stocks, and thereby to safeguard the archipelago’s 
marine economy� In 2014, she convinced Jokowi to declare a one-year morato-
rium on all foreign fishing in Indonesian waters; later that year, she launched her 
trademark policy of sinking foreign vessels caught fishing illegally�25
Indonesia first mandated the use of VMS devices by “any person performing 
business and/or activities on fishery management” in 2009�26 In 2015, Susi’s office 
finally issued Regulation No� 42, which provided guidelines on VMS implemen-
tation� The regulation set up a fisheries-vessel-monitoring center and assigned 
a director general in the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries to standardize 
VMS operating procedures for all vessels and manage inspections and installation 
of transponders via a team of fisheries supervisors� This director general was tasked 
with handling all VMS data and conferring with counterparts across ministries to 
sanction violators� The regulation also set out stringent requirements for potential 
VMS vendors� All Indonesian 
fishing vessels over thirty tons 
now must have a VMS device 
installed, which they are re-
quired to keep on at all times 
while fishing, along with a certificate proving that the vessel’s data can be transmit-
ted successfully to the fisheries-vessel-monitoring center�27 In June 2017, Indonesia 
became the first country in the world to share its national VMS data publicly, allow-
ing the information to be published on Global Fishing Watch’s online platform�28
Like many counterparts in Southeast Asia, Indonesian maritime agencies 
rely on SeaVision to gather AIS data and collate them with other tools, includ-
ing coastal radar� Like their Thai counterparts, Indonesian law-enforcement 
and fisheries-management agencies are using electro-optical imagery, SAR, and 
VIIRS in small-scale research projects, but these technologies do not seem to 
be part of day-to-day MDA operations� Instead, Jakarta continues to rely on an 
insufficient number of air- and surface-patrol assets to augment the country’s 
AIS and VMS capabilities� This means that Indonesian maritime agencies, which 
are less well funded, less capable, and less coordinated than those in Thailand, 
are stuck in a hopeless game of Whac-A-Mole� They disrupt a small percentage 
of the illicit activity in one of the world’s largest EEZs, but most of the bad actors 
continue to operate undetected�
By the mid-2020s, it will be all but impos-
sible for a vessel of more than a few meters in 
length to operate at sea without detection.
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Interagency rivalry compounds these problems� The Indonesian Maritime 
Security Agency, or BAKAMLA, often is referred to as Indonesia’s coast guard, 
but it does not have the resources or the sole mandate to fulfill such a charge� 
BAKAMLA was formed in December 2014 to coordinate law-enforcement ca-
pabilities across all agencies, as well as to conduct its own operations�29 It techni-
cally has a mandate to collect all maritime intelligence and information from and 
disseminate these to other relevant law-enforcement bodies, which would include 
remote-sensing data� But it has no authority over counterparts such as the navy 
or the water police, which means that in practice it cannot demand information 
from them� The navy in particular has strong bureaucratic incentives to hoard 
information and create its own separate operating picture�30 The situation grew 
more complicated in 2015 when Jokowi set up a presidential task force to combat 
illegal fishing, to coordinate efforts among ministries�31 In practice, the task force 
did not function as it was meant to because of bureaucratic “stovepiping” and a 
mismatch in priorities with the other agencies, which are not as focused on ille-
gal fishing� The task force was disbanded in 2019 and a new Indonesia Maritime 
Information Center was launched in July 2020 to strengthen interagency coordi-
nation� The center is promising but remains untested�
Further improvements in MDA will require better interagency coordination, 
which is unlikely unless BAKAMLA is given the funding and mandate to serve 
as a national maritime single point of contact like THAI-MECC� Steps are be-
ing taken to establish a maritime information fusion center within BAKAMLA, 
which would be a welcome advance, but such a center will succeed only if other 
agencies and the armed forces are compelled to share more data�32
Jakarta took another important step with the recent announcement that 
BAKAMLA would be placed in charge of overall maritime security in the “North 
Natuna Sea”—that area of the South China Sea that falls within Indonesia’s EEZ�33 
But it remains to be seen how well that order will be implemented and how much 
authority BAKAMLA will exercise over other agencies in practice�
Malaysia
Malaysia faces the same maritime-security challenges as Indonesia and Thailand, 
including illegal fishing, trafficking, piracy, and external security threats, espe-
cially in the South China Sea� However, maritime security and MDA capabili-
ties have not received nearly the same high-level attention from the Malaysian 
government� Interagency rivalry, especially between the Royal Malaysian Navy 
and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), prevents effective 
information sharing and muddies the waters when it comes to determining 
jurisdiction� It took high-level political intervention in Thailand and Indo-
nesia to prioritize greater transparency and information sharing as necessary 
components for improved MDA; in the absence of such leadership, Malaysia’s 
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maritime-security agencies continue the bureaucratic default behavior of hoard-
ing privileged information and seeing transparency more as a threat of embar-
rassment than as an opportunity to improve performance�
Malaysia’s use of remote-sensing tools for MDA is modest and hampered by 
unclear legal requirements, a lack of regulatory follow-through, and unequal 
access to information for responsible agencies� The Fisheries Department is 
charged with VMS implementation, but the system covers only large vessels, both 
Malaysian and foreign, operating far from shore� The regulation and implemen-
tation of the system are less clear than in neighboring Indonesia and Thailand� 
The 2013 National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing 
specifies that every fishing vessel over seventy tons, as a requirement for renew-
ing a fishing license, must carry a mobile transceiver unit that reports the ship’s 
location to the Fisheries Department’s VMS system�34 That document claims that 
Malaysia has been using satellite-based VMS since 1999, but if so it was only on 
a small scale; the requirement for vessels over seventy tons to be covered by VMS 
did not begin until 2006�35 Senior officials have indicated that implementation 
and enforcement were not strict until around 2014�36 Regardless, the system cov-
ers only a small percentage of total fishing activity in Malaysian waters� The 2013 
national plan claimed that VMS requirements would be expanded to other types 
of vessels, but that does not appear to be happening�37
The Royal Malaysian Navy and MMEA use AIS to monitor commercial traf-
fic in the country’s waters, but not in an efficient or collaborative manner� Both 
have access to shore-based AIS receivers�38 But while the Royal Malaysian Navy 
uses SeaVision to integrate this information with satellite-based AIS and other 
data streams, it has no obligation or incentive to share these additional data with 
MMEA or other agencies� The navy devolves remote-sensing information gather-
ing to local commands, which make an assessment before sending enforcement 
vessels to investigate suspicious activity� No Malaysian agency seems to be using 
other remote-sensing tools, whether electro-optical imagery, SAR, or VIIRS, as 
part of normal MDA operations, though they have access to limited amounts of 
each through SeaVision�
There is no maritime single point of contact or fusion center in Malaysia, save 
for one that the armed forces operate at Tawau, which only monitors security 
threats off the east coast of Sabah� MMEA is the obvious candidate to fill this 
role� It was established in 2004 and explicitly was empowered to carry out coastal 
surveillance and “enforce law and order under any federal law�”39 The agency has 
plans to establish its own fusion center, but bureaucratic hurdles prevent it from 
playing a robust interagency coordinating role� Its legal authority to mandate 
cooperation from other agencies is vague—purposefully� Meanwhile, Malaysia 
operates multiple competing interagency groups and ad hoc committees with 
75
Naval War College: Winter 2021 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 7 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
authority over maritime surveillance, including the National Security Council, 
the Maritime Information Exchange Centre, and the Action Committee on 
Maritime Operation� The National Security Council has a National Surveillance 
and Operation Centre to coordinate intelligence and information sharing, but it 
is focused on traditional national-security threats, not MDA�
Philippines
The Philippines is likely the most sea blind of the countries examined in this 
article� It combines limited remote-sensing and patrol capabilities with a larger 
and more challenging maritime geography than most other states� Manila’s in-
ability to monitor its vast EEZ effectively has been on display for years, especially 
in contested areas of the South China Sea� But it also has difficulty keeping an 
eye on its archipelagic waters and territorial sea� That is why President Rodrigo 
Duterte recently demanded that all foreign vessels seek permission before tran-
siting Philippine waters�40 The order violates international law and Philippine 
authorities have no capability to enforce it� It also shows how sea blindness leads 
to bad policy making by robbing authorities of necessary information and casting 
the maritime commons as a source of unknown threat rather than shared op-
portunity� The silver lining for the Philippines is that it recognizes its own MDA 
shortcomings more than many of its neighbors, is undertaking some needed 
regulatory and bureaucratic fixes, and enjoys considerable outside capacity-
building support—especially from the United States�
The Philippines is the only country examined in this article that has no VMS 
system in place� The Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) laid out 
plans for a nationwide VMS system covering licensed fishing vessels in the EEZ 
and high seas in 2012, but they were never implemented�41 The bureau issued 
new regulations mandating VMS in 2018, but there has been little movement so 
far� The regulation called for all vessels over fifty tons to be equipped with VMS 
within one year—a deadline already missed—with those between thirty and fifty 
tons to follow within two years�42 BFAR has stated that installing VMS on more 
than five thousand vessels is an important component of its Integrated Marine 
Environment Monitoring Phase II program, which seeks to create a fisheries-
monitoring center in line with recommendations that different regional fisheries-
management organizations have made�43
The Philippine Navy, BFAR, and component agencies of the National Coast 
Watch System make regular use of both terrestrial and satellite-based AIS 
through SeaVision�44 However, SeaVision and other platforms are not used 
uniformly across all agencies� Beyond AIS, the Philippines does not seem to be 
using any remote-sensing technologies in normal MDA operations, although it 
could be experimenting with SAR and electro-optical satellite imagery� Philip-
pine academics and nongovernmental organizations have begun using VIIRS 
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to study fishing patterns, which might raise the technology’s profile in official 
government circles�45
The Philippines established the National Coast Watch System in 2011, with 
support from the U�S� government� It is intended to be the primary inter-
agency coordinating mechanism for maritime security and MDA� It consists 
of the National Coast Watch Council, established via executive order in 2012 
to coordinate maritime policy, and the National Coast Watch Center, which 
serves as a maritime fusion center to collect and distribute data to relevant 
agencies� It is run predominantly by the Philippine Coast Guard but is sup-
ported by ten different agencies—with sometimes conflicting mandates and 
little desire to share data� These include the Philippine Navy, the national 
police, BFAR, and the drug-enforcement agency�46 It also is unclear how the 
National Coast Watch Cen-
ter, which is tasked with 24/7 
monitoring of the maritime 
domain through the various 
components of the National 
Coast Watch System, will in-
tegrate—or compete—with 
BFAR’s planned Fisheries 
and Marine Environment 
Center, with its fifteen regional monitoring centers across the Philippines� 
The former will not be able to establish an effective MDA system without ac-
cess to the latter’s VMS data�
Vietnam
Since receiving a yellow card of its own from the EU in October 2017, Vietnam 
has taken a raft of steps to crack down on its fishers’ illegal activities and to moni-
tor its waters better� Part of this effort has involved some uneven implementation 
of new remote-sensing plans, mostly at the provincial level� While Hanoi has 
made considerable progress on the regulatory front, actual MDA capabilities 
remain lacking� Following the issuance of the yellow card, Vietnam passed a new 
law on fisheries in November 2017 and in 2018 released a national plan of action 
to deter illegal fishing�47 Hanoi formed the National Steering Committee on IUU 
Fishing Prevention in May 2019 to coordinate its efforts better—likely with an 
eye toward the European Union’s review of its progress in November� That com-
mittee reports directly to the prime minister�48 The Europeans decided not to lift 
the yellow card at that time but praised the steps Hanoi had taken�49
Vietnam’s 2017 law on fisheries mandates that all commercial fishing vessels 
over fifteen meters be equipped with VMS� At the time of the law’s passage, only 
three thousand Vietnamese fishing boats had such systems, under a program 
Saving dwindling fish stocks, dismantling 
trafficking networks, preventing the spread of 
Islamic State–linked terror cells, countering 
Chinese aggression in the South China Sea—
meeting these . . . challenges is impossible 
without much better ability to detect, identify, 
and track vessels at sea.
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called MOVIMAR� That effort was funded by France’s development agency and 
makes use of French space agency satellites, primarily to track ocean conditions 
and issue storm warnings to the vessels, not to monitor their fishing activity�50 The 
2018 national plan of action called on the Directorate of Fisheries and individual 
provincial governments to make better use of MOVIMAR to detect and deter il-
legal fishing� As a result, plans are under way to install the systems on all fishing 
vessels, starting with those at least twenty-four meters in length, then expanding 
to all those of at least fifteen meters� But the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, which oversees the Directorate of Fisheries and wrote the plan of 
action, is leaving implementation to provincial authorities, resulting in uneven 
progress� The EU cited slow installation of VMS transceivers as a reason for not 
lifting the yellow card�51
Aside from VMS, Vietnam’s remote-sensing capabilities are extremely un-
derdeveloped� The Vietnamese navy, coast guard, and Fisheries Surveillance 
(a branch of the Fisheries Directorate) are the primary actors in the maritime-
security and MDA space� But there is no evidence that any of them make regular 
use of remote-sensing technologies, aside from coastal radar and terrestrial AIS� 
Vietnam has a robust network of shore-based AIS stations and recently was added 
as a SeaVision participating country� But it shares only a fraction of its terrestrial 
data and does not appear to use the platform in day-to-day MDA operations� It 
seems likely that a small number of Vietnamese users are testing out the platform, 
so relevant agencies could adopt it more broadly in the future�52
The Vietnam National Space Center (VNSC), under the Academy of Science 
and Technology, is responsible for obtaining and sharing space-based remote-
sensing data� But its focus is mostly on developing national space capabilities, not 
collecting and analyzing remote-sensing data from commercial and partner-nation 
sources� For instance, the center plans to launch Vietnam’s first national SAR satel-
lite in 2023�53 But with hundreds of low-cost commercial SAR satellites going up in 
the next three years, this at best will duplicate, and in many ways fall short of, capa-
bilities available on the commercial market� The VNSC also has no clear authority 
to request VMS data from the Directorate of Fisheries� Nonetheless, the center 
would constitute the most sensible choice for a future maritime fusion center—if it 
were given more power to coordinate among relevant agencies and if it refocused 
its mission on efficiently boosting MDA capabilities using all available sources�
Vietnam also lacks a maritime single point of contact to coordinate efforts 
and work with partners� Each province operates its own regulatory bodies with 
only general guidance from national agencies, and there is limited coordination 
among relevant national-level actors� The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development is responsible for combating IUU fishing through the Vietnam 
Fisheries Resources Surveillance; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ National 
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Border Commission is the principal agency for the National Steering Commit-
tee on the East Sea and Islands; and the Ministry of National Defense oversees 
the navy and coast guard and maintains its own operating picture at sea� None 
of these has clear authority to coordinate information sharing in the name of 
greater national MDA�
There is no greater security need in Southeast Asia than improved MDA� Saving 
dwindling fish stocks, dismantling trafficking networks, preventing the spread 
of Islamic State–linked terror cells, countering Chinese aggression in the South 
China Sea—meeting these and many other challenges is impossible without 
much better ability to detect, identify, and track vessels at sea� Yet regional states 
historically have underinvested in patrol and sensing capabilities in both naval 
and law-enforcement agencies� They also have proved very resistant to informa-
tion sharing, both within and among countries� This is changing slowly, in places 
such as the Sulu Sea and the Strait of Malacca, but much more work is needed�
Improving MDA in Southeast Asia also is critical to the national-security 
interests of the United States and other outside parties� The South China Sea is a 
primary theater of U�S�-China competition, and the inability of other claimants 
to monitor Beijing’s activities effectively is one of the foremost challenges in these 
waters� Poor MDA makes Southeast Asia a continuing hot spot for trafficking, 
piracy and maritime crime, and transnational terrorism� And rapidly depleting 
fish stocks threaten the livelihoods of tens of thousands, the food security of mil-
lions, and potentially the stability of governments in this critical region�
The U�S� government and its partner governments recognize the challenge, as 
reflected in the unprecedented amount of security assistance directed at maritime 
capacity building in Southeast Asia� But Washington still is focused too much on 
high-end maritime-security cooperation at the expense of nuts-and-bolts MDA 
capabilities� It tends to focus on naval operations rather than law enforcement, 
because most engagements take place between the Pacific Fleet and partner na-
vies� Even when law enforcement is the focus, the United States and like-minded 
security partners most often focus on replicating their own best practices in 
conducting MDA operations� The same goes for the sensing and patrol platforms 
that they transfer to regional states� But trying to implement twentieth-century 
MDA solutions that work for developed states is not going to be cost-effective for 
developing coastal nations in the twenty-first century� Coast guard cutters and 
manned patrol aircraft are important, but they also are expensive to obtain, op-
erate, and maintain, which means that Southeast Asian partners never will have 
enough to monitor their vast waters effectively�
Luckily, MDA in the coming decades will be dominated by cheaper, more-
efficient remote-sensing tools� The United States, Australia, Japan, and others 
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should not abandon high-end maritime-security assistance, but they should 
shift more of their efforts toward introducing partners to the booming market 
in remote sensing� This will require recognizing that the days of relying on 
government agencies—or large government contractors—to develop and de-
ploy most MDA technologies are ending quickly� The U�S� government should 
not try to re-create the remote-sensing technologies and platforms emerging 
in the private sectors just so it can provide its own version to partner nations; 
instead it should help introduce partners to the diverse offerings of the mar-
ket� It should provide more assistance in processing the vast quantities of data 
that result� And it should advise partners on regulatory and bureaucratic best 
practices to use those data effectively in naval and law-enforcement operations� 
The future of MDA is increasingly clear; the United States and its partners in 
Southeast Asia should embrace it�
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THEORIES OF NAVAL BLOCKADES AND THEIR  
APPLICATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Adam Biggs, Dan Xu, Joshua Roaf, and Tatana Olson
 The naval blockade is a classic strategy for gaining sea control or imposing sea denial� It harks back to the age of sail, when seafaring strategy and tactics 
inherently were dependent on the weather�1 But whereas once winds could help 
rout the mightiest fleet in the world (as partly explains the defeat of the Spanish 
Armada in 1588), modern naval forces have different capabilities and modern 
naval operations have different limitations�2 Even so, the naval blockade remains 
in use as a strategy today, as was demonstrated during recent unrest in the Middle 
East�3 Technological advancements in weapon systems, platforms, and commu-
nications, however, raise questions about the continuing relevance of blockade 
strategies and tactics that were developed during previous eras of naval warfare� 
If modern navies are using a centuries-old strategy, to what extent do the old 
rules still apply?
This article will address the theory and practice of naval blockades, with a 
specific emphasis on how they apply (or do not) in the twenty-first century� The 
discussion will begin by addressing the general legality of these actions, as they 
largely are governed by international law� Legal issues also have significant implica-
tions regarding terminology (e�g�, whether an action constitutes a quarantine or a 
blockade could become the topic of significant legal analysis), so the relevant terms 
will be addressed first, to avoid confusion arising from labeling or wording�4 The 
discussion then will address the classic models of naval blockades, the most influ-
ential of which will be deemed the proximity model� Theories of naval blockades 
will be evaluated in historical context against the various claims made for different 
blockade models�5 Next, the discussion will compare the efficacy of earlier naval 
blockades in achieving some operational end point with the potential efficacy of 
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blockades today� This portion mostly will discuss how naval tactics have changed 
and the dependence on the open seas of international trade today� Finally, the 
analysis will move from theory to practice, examining two current international 
conflicts for which naval blockades have been discussed as potential solutions�
This succession of analyses accomplishes the following� First, the legality and 
ethics overview provides enough basic knowledge of international law to estab-
lish adequate context for the remainder of the discussion� The key advancement 
of theory then comes in the challenge to conventional thinking about blockades, 
accomplished by dissecting the basic components that affect naval strategy� 
Advancing the enforcement model proposed herein exposes the shortcomings 
in classical thinking; the model redefines how to evaluate blockades and make 
decisions about imposing them� This should contribute to a larger discussion 
about command-and-control strategy and tactics at sea� A primary purpose 
of the article is to build on existing research to improve the classification of 
blockades so as to incorporate them better within the greater context of both 
naval history and modern strategy� Although the enforcement model reevaluates 
some basic approaches to blockades with regard to their purpose, description, 
and application, this analysis is intended to advance the topic into the modern 
era by relabeling prior models and providing strategic examples� Therefore, the 
most important goal of this article is not to complete a discussion but to begin a 
larger examination of naval tactics below the level of armed conflict—that is, to 
rejuvenate the topic of blockades to draw contrasts between old ways of thinking 
and new tactics, techniques, and procedures� Ultimately, this article is intended to 
provide insight on how a classic naval strategy might be understood and applied 
within the context of modern naval operations�
LEGALITY, ETHICS, AND TERMINOLOGY ASSOCIATED WITH 
NAVAL BLOCKADES
There are multiple methods of blocking naval access or commercial trade to a re-
gion, but their employment carries significant ramifications in terms of interna-
tional law� The legal issues make definitions critical; which terminology is applied 
is not a mere matter of labeling� The legal restrictions also affect how a blockade 
will be conducted� For purposes of this discussion, the overarching definition 
applied will be as follows: a naval blockade involves blocking access to a region� 
Access encompasses military, trade, and physical aspects; the last mentioned may 
include the ability to perform construction of new or on existing facilities� The 
discussion then addresses how international law restricts different types of ac-
cess, and what that means for naval operations�
Terminology-related confusion surrounds the use of sanctions versus em-
bargoes versus blockades. The difference largely rests in the scope of actions 
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undertaken under each concept� Sanctions involve actions (diplomatic, eco-
nomic, military, or otherwise) that countries take for a variety of reasons, such as 
to condemn particular behaviors or contain an emerging threat�6 However, the 
important point is that the term sanction is construed broadly� An embargo, on 
the other hand, involves the prohibition of trade with a particular group, either 
in part or in totality�7 Thus, embargoes tend to be more severe and encompassing� 
Put another way, all embargoes are sanctions, but not all sanctions are embargoes� 
Colloquial usage of the term sanction, however, tends to confer a more limited 
scope compared with the restrictions involved in an embargo� A blockade is the 
most severe of the three types� This term refers to a belligerent action that one 
nation takes against another to deny access to entire regions (i�e�, for purposes 
of this article, sea denial)� Blockades typically involve military actions intended 
to keep an enemy from receiving aid�8 All three terms carry legal implications, 
and while the international community largely agrees on the differences among 
these concepts, definitional debate occurs regularly regarding whether particular 
operations are sanctions, embargoes, or blockades�
As important as the distinctions in terminology are, it also is critical to un-
derstand who applies the labels authoritatively� According to the United Nations 
Charter, only the Security Council decides on sanctions and, by extension, the 
even more severe options�9 Article 41 of the Charter reads as follows: “The Secu-
rity Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are 
to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members 
of the United Nations to apply such measures� These may include complete or 
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, 
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations�”10 
These rules essentially grant the Security Council the right to determine what 
course of action is appropriate for a given situation� However, article 41 mostly 
covers sanctions and embargoes; it does not discuss how military forces could be 
employed to enforce the agreed-upon restrictions� Military intervention is better 
addressed by article 42, which extends and clarifies the capabilities of the Security 
Council in these matters� “Should the Security Council consider that measures 
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, 
it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain 
or restore international peace and security� Such action may include demonstra-
tions, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the 
United Nations�”11 
These two articles form the primary international law governing the appli-
cation of sanctions, embargoes, and blockades� Unfortunately, owing to their 
brevity they do not delve into details; they were not written to cover the specific 
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parameters of a given scenario� The Security Council largely is left to decide 
which actions will receive international approval and how they will be applied� 
Any actions that the Security Council approves regarding sanctions, embargoes, 
and blockades are legal, by mutual agreement; however, when not all members 
of the Security Council approved the actions in question directly, the details of 
terminology and past practice become more important�
Limited attempts have been made to clarify the intent behind these articles, 
especially with regard to armed conflict at sea� The San Remo Manual on Inter-
national Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea provides the most modern 
international interpretation specifically applying to blockades�12 This volume is 
one of the few comprehensive international instruments drafted in the twentieth 
century that guide determinations of legality regarding naval warfare�13 Although 
it is a legally recognized document, it represents a codification of customary 
international law and therefore is not fully binding� Still, it captures the current 
international consensus regarding blockades�
Perhaps some of the manual’s more important contributions involve the defi-
nition of neutral waters. The manual states that “[n]eutral waters consist of the 
internal waters, territorial sea, and, where applicable, the archipelagic water, of 
neutral States� Neutral airspace consists of the airspace over neutral waters and 
the land territory of neutral States�”14 These descriptions effectively determine the 
accepted neutral areas during international conflict, but the definitions also set 
up how merchant vessels can be treated during a blockade� The manual states that 
 [m]erchant vessels flying the flag of neutral States may not be attacked unless they:
(a) are believed on reasonable grounds to be carrying contraband or breaching a 
blockade, and after prior warning they intentionally and clearly refuse to stop, or 
intentionally and clearly resist visit, search, or capture;
(b) engage in belligerent acts on behalf of the enemy;
(c) act as auxiliaries to the enemy’s armed forces;
(d) are incorporated into or assist the enemy’s intelligence system;
(e) sail under convoy of enemy warships or military aircraft; or
(f) otherwise make an effective contribution to the enemy’s military action, e�g�, by 
carrying military materials, and it is not feasible for the attacking forces to first place 
passengers and crew in a place of safety� Unless circumstances do not permit, they are 
to be given a warning, so that they can re-route, off-load, or take other precautions�15
The treatment of merchant vessels or others flying the flags of neutral states will 
become particularly important later in this discussion, as it pertains to theoreti-
cal differences among blockade types� The relevant point here is that customary 
88
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/1
 B I G G S ,  X U,  R OA F,  &  O L S O N  8 3
international guidelines do exist regarding target discrimination and legal actions 
against neutral or seemingly neutral vessels during a blockade�
These international laws are important considerations for conducting na-
val operations, including blockades with our allies or against our enemies� In 
addition to customary international law, however, existing U�S� law describes 
accepted procedures for blockades� These instructions are documented in The 
Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, which directly addresses 
naval blockades�16 Our American definition of a blockade closely matches the 
international guidelines pertaining to military action� “Blockade is a belligerent 
operation to prevent vessels and/or aircraft of all nations, enemy as well as neu-
tral, from entering or exiting specified ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging 
to, occupied by, or under the control of an enemy nation�”17 The additional point 
is that our rules are far clearer than the UN Charter articles� Specifically, The 
Commander’s Handbook outlines several criteria to which a valid naval blockade 
must conform�
1� The belligerent nation must establish the blockade, which should be 
accompanied by a declaration that states the beginning date of the 
blockade, the geographical limits, and any grace period allotted for 
neutral vessels and aircraft to leave the restricted area�
2� All nations affected must be notified of the blockade�
3� The blockade must be effective and maintained by legitimate methods 
and means of warfare sufficient to render ingress or egress of the 
blockaded area dangerous�
4� The blockade must be applied with impartiality; any discrimination by 
the belligerent nation in favor of or against the vessels and aircraft of a 
particular nation renders the blockade invalid�
5� The blockade may not block access to or departure from neutral ports and 
coasts�18
These laws and criteria provide basic information regarding our self-imposed 
regulations and some understanding of how they differ in scope and detail from 
international law� Granted, this brief overview does not address a myriad of both 
important and nuanced aspects of naval blockades� For example, our domestic laws 
specifically prohibit imposing a blockade if the sole purpose is to starve the civil-
ian population or deny it anything essential to survival�19 Still, for the purposes of 
legal terminology, the U�S� Navy regards a blockade as belligerent action designed 
to prevent access to a specific region� This definition is in keeping with our guide-
lines that differentiate among terms that include sanction, embargo, and blockade.
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For all the foregoing discussion of legal definitions, it also is important to 
consider the operational implications of terminology—how these terms will be 
defined and used in practice� The critical example here involves sea control, or 
command of the sea.20 In this context, sea control is to be understood in terms 
of the operational concepts formulated with regard to strategy and tactics, 
rather than as a matter of legal definition� The concept encompasses a limited 
or nonpermanent geographical control that allows the controlling naval force 
to exercise the full range of operations within a particular area, including those 
employing undersea elements, surface vessels, aerial assets, and even electronic 
signals�21 The concept of control must extend as well to sea denial; the term refers 
to the ability to prevent adversarial operations within the same temporal and 
geographical space�22 Therefore, sea control encompasses the ability to operate 
unconstrained within a particular environment while simultaneously denying 
operational access to adversarial forces�
The concepts of naval blockades and sea control clearly overlap when discuss-
ing blockade effectiveness, which under our own legal guidelines is a critical 
requirement for maintaining a legal blockade�23 The greatest difficulty comes in 
determining whether a blockading force truly has sea control, involving both 
its own ability to operate without constraints and its ability to deny access to 
adversarial forces� When the engagement involves direct action, it is relatively 
easy to establish whether those conditions exist; however, when sea control is 
estimated largely on the basis of available forces, the determination rests on the 
probability of success of the various strategic courses of action available� The lat-
ter situation requires that any blockade established be such that the international 
legal community will deem it valid and effective even without any martial action� 
Once any active engagement occurs, the circumstances inherently change, and 
related decisions and subsequent actions represent an entirely separate, equally 
complicated discussion�
The point is simply that legal definitions function as mere guidelines when 
they are applied to operational realities in theater� Therefore, while in the context 
in question sea control represents the operational application of the chosen strat-
egy and tactics, in the circumstances of a particular naval blockade it may exist 
in accordance with or in violation of international law� There always will be sig-
nificant gaps between legal definitions and the operational realities of a specific 
set of circumstances, which makes legal determinations subject to interpretation�
In summary, extensive international and domestic instructions exist that lay 
out the operational norms to which naval forces are expected to adhere during 
the conduct of a blockade� For purposes of this discussion, the most important 
point is that all these laws serve only to set the playing field during a time of war� 
Legality presets some rules, which some nations then follow, to varying extents; 
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however, often other parties ignore them entirely� For example, no blockade ever 
has existed without blockade-runners attempting to circumvent it� The laws 
also do not assist in the theoretical matter of incorporating blockades into the 
formulation of naval strategy and tactics or in the practical matter of applying a 
blockade as part of an ongoing naval operation�
These last two points must be addressed formally because, as documented in 
this section, there exists a substantial body of international laws that still govern 
a strategy that was designed during the age of sail� The continued existence of 
these laws seems to imply that blockades remain an effective strategy, which 
raises multiple questions about when and why our naval forces would consider 
using this approach to resolve some conflict today� Therefore, the discussion now 
moves from terminology and legal considerations to the theory and practice of 
conducting naval blockades�
ON THE THEORY AND TYPES OF BLOCKADES
Over the history of naval conflict, the importance of the role that blockading 
strategies have played cannot be overstated� Alfred Thayer Mahan suggested that 
decisive control of the sea required both offensive actions through decisive battles 
and defensive actions through the protection and control of contested waters�24 
Controlling such waterways ostensibly requires at least a partial blockade exer-
cised against hostile forces�
Given the blockade’s historical prominence and effectiveness as a naval strat-
egy, it is important to consider different types of blockades and how they have 
been enacted� Previous descriptions of blockades have divided them roughly 
into three different types, forming part of what we will refer to as the proximity 
model: close blockades, semidistant (or loose) blockades, and distant blockades�25 
Close Blockade
Historically, a close blockade required placing warships within sight of the block-
aded coast or port to ensure the immediate interception of any ship entering or 
leaving the area� Bernard Brodie describes the purpose of a close blockade as ef-
fectively reducing the size of the sea available to the enemy to nothing; or, to put it 
another way, a close blockade effectively makes the enemy’s coast your frontier�26 
The goal is to create a secure perimeter that prevents anything from slipping 
through� Ships’ crews must maintain constant vigilance, and the sheer manpower 
required to execute such a blockade is tied directly to the size of the blockaded 
region� Imposing and maintaining a close blockade of a single port may be a 
reasonable objective; however, conducting a close blockade of an entire coastline 
becomes an increasingly problematic challenge� Succeeding at the latter requires 
a dramatic asymmetry in naval forces, leaving the blockaded nation incapable of 
mustering sufficient operational naval forces to break through�
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A close blockade represents naval strategic thinking and technology devel-
oped during the age of sail� Early in that era blockades generally were ineffective 
or extremely limited because naval forces’ poor seaworthiness and restricted 
range of action prevented them from sustaining operations on a hostile coast�27 
However, by the late sixteenth century the development of much larger and 
more-seaworthy sailing ships enabled sustained naval operations, and by the 
eighteenth century the longer underway time enabled by the coppering of ship 
bottoms made a powerful force such as Britain’s Royal Navy capable of projecting 
and sustaining sufficient naval power to blockade almost any coast in the world�28 
Still, the important practical implications are the advantages and disadvantag-
es of close blockades� The primary benefit of a close blockade is that it effectively 
prevents a smaller force from operating outside its home port at all—superior 
control of the seas carries obvious strategic advantages� Yet other advantages 
also must be considered, such as with regard to relative morale; the blockading 
force feels strong and confident, even if its actions require little to no movement, 
whereas the blockaded force balks at its forced inaction and suffers damage to its 
morale� However, close blockades carry inherent weaknesses too� The approach 
requires manpower proportional to the blockaded area, and maintaining that 
level of effort can be as exhausting for the blockading naval force as for the block-
aded� A tight perimeter is required to ensure that neither vessels of the enemy nor 
blockade-runners of any sort slip through, which means that the blockading force 
must be not only sizable but constantly vigilant� Furthermore, a close blockade 
actually can play to the advantage of the smaller force, if the effort ties the larger 
force to a given area, preventing it from operating elsewhere�29 
Close blockades also epitomize the rationales of the age of sail because their 
effectiveness rested in part on blockading ships’ ability to remain safely out of the 
range of coastal cannon� Since then, the development of and advances in aviation 
have complicated this calculus, as the blockading force must defend itself against 
not only seaborne but airborne forces� This added dimension complicates strate-
gic decision-making and calls into question what a “close” blockade would look 
like if our modern Navy conducted one�
Semidistant or Loose Blockade
A semidistant blockade differs from a close blockade according to the distance 
of the blockading force from the hostile coast; however, the distinction is based 
not on nautical mileage but on intent� A semidistant blockade is aimed at hostile 
naval forces as part of an effort to seek decisive victory through confrontation�30 
These efforts are less suffocating for the blockaded region because the blockad-
ing force cannot, and does not attempt to, deny all access to the region� The less 
secure perimeter permits merchant vessels, and perhaps even limited military 
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reinforcements, access to the blockaded areas� Thus, the blockade function ap-
plies more to enemy naval forces than to any others attempting to access a region�
A semidistant blockade does carry some advantages and disadvantages rela-
tive to a close blockade� For example, the advent, then the expanded use, of mines 
and torpedoes made applying a close blockade much more difficult�31 When 
contending with mines (and we should keep in mind that in the nineteenth cen-
tury so-called torpedoes were actually mines) the blockading force assumed the 
primary operational risk to life� While setting a mine some defenders might lose 
their lives, but a ship navigating a minefield (and its entire crew) risked sinking 
entirely� Granted, mining a port takes time, so enacting this defensive strategy re-
quires making several assumptions and having certain opportunities� Still, defen-
sive mining offered a counterstrategy to the close blockade that required a similar 
counter in blockading strategy� The semidistant blockade was one such counter�
Additionally, a semidistant blockade might be enacted because of a paucity of 
available naval forces� A close blockade required dominant asymmetry in naval 
forces, whereas a semidistant blockade could be enacted even when the blockad-
ing party did not maintain an edge in raw naval power over the adversary� A dis-
advantage comes in the form of allowing some degree of relief for the blockaded 
region, since the focus is on the enemy’s operational forces, not necessarily on 
denying trade access� However, trade likely would suffer reduction as well; the 
degree to which that was so could be measured by the attempted or successful 
running of the semidistant blockade�
Distant Blockade
The third type of blockade in the proximity model is the distant blockade� Similar 
to those of the semidistant variety, these blockades developed as a reaction to 
changes in technology and the corresponding changes in naval strategy� As the 
age of sail gave way to the age of steam, evolutions in naval capability changed the 
demands for fleet resources; consumption of large amounts of fuel changed the 
logistical needs of a fleet� Shifts in the wind no longer provided the same respite 
to either blockading or blockaded forces, and coal-burning ships were limited in 
range compared with sailing ships�32 Combined with the threat of mines, these 
changes in naval technology required shifting why and where naval forces would 
be deployed during a blockade� Expressed differently, a distant blockade can be 
considered a close blockade imposed by a superior class of ship�33 Therefore, in 
a limited sense, a distant blockade became a close blockade, adjusted to the dis-
tances appropriate to the capabilities of more-modern fleets�
Even so, a distant blockade could be seen in a different light if the distance was 
determined for reasons other than technology� For example, a close blockade se-
cures nearly unlimited control over a very small area, whereas a distant blockade 
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secures very limited control over an almost unlimited area� The scope and appli-
cation of sea power are determined by the tools and resources involved� A naval 
force could adopt a distant blockade if it had only limited advantages in resources 
over the opposing naval force; this was so even if it had vastly superior technology 
yet limited resources� In such a situation, a distant blockading force can threaten 
enemy forces with interception and destruction only if the hostile ships venture 
too far from their home ports�34 This approach greatly limits the expenditure of 
resources while still allowing for the establishment of overall naval superiority� 
However, such a blockade would not prevent the hostile force from easily gaining 
access to relief� Therefore, a distant blockade might be seen as a marginal naval 
advantage applied robustly over a great area, rather than as a strategic tool to 
deny access to a particular region� The opportunities a distant blockade opens 
are therefore more abstract than the concrete goals of a close blockade—another 
difference related to intent and opportunity�
These observations are not wholly novel� Corbett differentiated between a 
close blockade designed to deny an enemy the ability even to leave port and 
a distant or observational blockade intended to draw out enemy forces for 
a decisive conflict that would favor the blockading force�35 Put differently, a 
distant blockade would be indistinguishable from open naval warfare against 
an equal opponent over contested waters; what makes it a blockade is the 
advantages—in raw naval forces, technology, or both—enjoyed by the forces 
on one side, and how that naval power employs those forces� For purposes 
of theoretical and legal categorization, the intent behind the choice of block-
ading type becomes an important differentiating factor, in addition to the 
technology extant at the time�
THE PROXIMITY MODEL
These three types of blockades—close, semidistant, and distant—compose what 
we refer to as the proximity model� It is noteworthy that this distinction is ours, 
whereas the language and descriptors are not� However, applying the concept of 
proximity describes changes in both the actual strategy and the intent behind 
the new actions� With regard to the change in strategy, proximity encompasses 
how blockading naval forces adapted naval operations to advances in technology 
by extending the functional operations of a close blockade farther offshore� In 
particular, mines forced blockaders to maintain their close blockades at a greater 
distance from shore, and steam changed the logistical requirements for a fleet 
intending to adopt and maintain a close blockade� Still, the underlying intent 
remained the same—a fleet endeavored to deny all access to a region by estab-
lishing a secure perimeter that prevented anything, even merchant vessels, from 
breaching the cordoned-off area�
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A second, and secondary, reason for labeling these ideas the proximity model 
relates to the possibility of permissible passage through the secure border� Spe-
cifically, a close blockade establishes a perimeter intended to be so secure that 
no vessel can breach it; a distant blockade establishes a looser net with a far less 
secure perimeter, and a semidistant blockade falls somewhere between those two 
concepts� In this context, proximity refers to the distance between ships, which re-
flects both the intent of the blockade and the technological capability of the time� 
In this adaptive way the proximity model can address changes in both intent and 
technology while still addressing the key concerns of the scholars who originally 
developed and used this language (specifically Professor Milan N� Vego, whose 
work shaped the development of the proximity model)�36 
Granted, maintaining a certain physical proximity between ships along the 
perimeter is only one method of securing the perimeter and denying passage 
through the blockade� Technological advancements allow the security of the cor-
don to be maintained without requiring the physical proximity of ships to be as 
close� Thus, the proximity model truly depends on the degree of security that the 
ships provide over the physical area; proximity therefore becomes a measure of 
the tightness of the security established along the perimeter, by whatever means� 
In the historical context, secure perimeters were established by establishing and 
maintaining a close physical proximity of ships, but the modern context allowed a 
reinterpretation of close, semidistant, and distant purely on the basis of the degree 
to which blockaders could regulate the flow of traffic in and out of the blockaded 
area� This control could be established by employing various forces, including 
airpower as supplied either from aircraft carrier or land, and therefore without 
necessarily requiring a tight net of ships in close physical proximity to each other 
or the shore�
Before we continue, it is worth noting that the proximity model is among the 
most common methods of differentiating blockades, but it is not the only one� 
Another, related method could be referred to as the dimensional model�37 Again, 
the dimensional model label is of our own making, yet it aptly describes the con-
cept� This approach defines a blockade along several dimensions, as follows:
• distance from hostile force: the distance of the perimeter of the blockade, 
whether close or distant, from the blockaded regions
• distance from supply: the variation in practicability of maintaining a blockade 
near home waters versus far from home ports
• permeability: the tightness of the perimeter and the possibility of vessels 
slipping through
• aggression: the level of coercion the blockading force uses, including paper, 
pacific, and belligerent modes38
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The dimensional model provides a highly useful lexicon for categorizing and 
assessing blockading tactics and logistics across a variety of critical dimensions�
THE ENFORCEMENT MODEL
To combine the virtues of the proximity and dimensional models, we propose the 
enforcement model of naval blockades� Whereas the proximity model derives its 
name from the distance of the blockade from the coast or the distances between 
the naval units maintaining the perimeter, and the dimensional model is so la-
beled because it assesses blockades through multiple parameters, the enforcement 
model derives its name from the treatment of blockade-runners� Application of 
the enforcement model still builds on proximity-model and dimensional-model 
tenets by suggesting that the intent and distance of the blockade can have not 
only theoretical significance but practical implications for how a blockade would 
be imposed� The enforcement model is a hybrid of the other two approaches, 
designed to integrate their core premises for both retrospective contemplation 
and prospective practical application�
The enforcement model posits that the best way to evaluate and characterize 
a blockade, whether historically or strategically, is to examine the actions taken 
against individuals who attempt to violate the blockade� It is critical to differen-
tiate categorically between neutral ships and blockade-runners, even if it is not 
always possible for the blockading force to distinguish between them immedi-
ately� Neutral ships may not be attempting to pass through the blockade at all, 
or they may be trying to pass through the perimeter with goods that do not fall 
under sanctions while heading to a port not intentionally cut off by the blockade� 
Despite the many ways in which a ship could be neutral in these scenarios, a key 
characterizing factor is the extent to which a blockading force will investigate 
neutrality to ensure that vessels are not trying to evade the blockade; in the most 
extreme circumstances, the blockading force may not permit any neutral passage 
at all�
Runners provide the opportunity for a particularly interesting assessment of 
the resolve of the blockading force, the potential success of the blockade, and the 
needs of the blockaded region� A more restrictive blockade may have fewer run-
ners, as no one may attempt to impersonate a neutral vessel, and the resolve of the 
blockading force becomes instantly recognizable by whether the force intervenes 
at all, or takes full offensive actions against blockade-runners, or something in 
between� A willingness to intervene forcefully, and to maintain continuously a 
force able to do so, offers insight into what it will take to sustain the blockade� 
Finally, evaluating the activities of blockade-runners also provides insight into 
the blockaded region, because the goods and services most in demand are the 
ones on which smugglers are most likely to concentrate when they endeavor to 
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circumvent the blockade� When we examine blockade categories with regard to 
blockade-runners, a close blockade represents the harshest execution of the con-
cept; in that mode, all blockade-runners—by intent, if not practice—are inter-
cepted and punished, perhaps destroyed� A distant blockade provides the loosest 
net, permitting most blockade-runners to pass by unpunished�
Types of Blockades within the Enforcement Model
The enforcement model involves not categorical differences but rather esca-
lational differences—variations in the responses to blockade-runners� Each 
higher echelon of the model corresponds to a more suffocating blockade, and 
thus to stricter treatment of blockade-runners� The overarching term blockade 
still can be applied to all levels in the model, since the underlying intent remains 
to block or deny access in some way� The four levels of the enforcement model 
are as follows: paper blockades, presence blockades, martial blockades, and total 
blockades�
Paper Blockades. Paper blockades consist of sanctions, embargoes, and other le-
gally condoned barriers to trade and access� The term paper blockade is meant to 
describe not a weak or ineffective blockade but rather one that exists largely in the 
form of a declaration� However, sanctions have only limited effectiveness if there 
is no mechanism to enforce them� This first level also immediately demonstrates 
the underlying importance of considering intent and enforcement in evaluating 
the theoretical and practical significance of naval blockades—namely, sanctions 
describe the outer boundary of blockading actions, yet the sanctions themselves 
are not as important as the actions used to enforce them� If the international com-
munity places sanctions on a country yet no military or law-enforcement entity 
exists to enforce them, the restriction may carry only as far as the paper on which 
it is written� Blockade-runners can throw away the written admonishment and 
continue with their original activities, and enforcement of the blockade itself may 
hamper normal national policing efforts�
However, sanctions supported by military forces—including the actual use of 
those forces—carry significant weight� The sanctions themselves only set out the 
intent to blockade and the terms intended to be imposed� The more revealing 
operational description regarding sanctions comes from the application of naval 
forces, whether in the form of soft power or the use of arms, on any individuals 
who choose to violate the terms of the blockade� The term paper blockade there-
fore describes sanctions or similar prohibitions that declare an intent or issue 
orders to deny access or resources, but lack the mechanisms to enforce that intent 
suitably� Under guidance from The Commander’s Handbook, the United States 
would consider such a blockading tactic not strictly legal, as the lack of an ability 
to enforce the blockade brings its validity into question�39 
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The enforcement model does not attempt to judge the purpose or efficacy of 
sanctions, although it should be noted that there is a large political science litera-
ture specifically dealing with the topic; instead, the primary goal here is to place 
sanctions within the larger context of blockades�
Presence Blockades. Presence blockades mark an increase in the naval forces in-
volved and their collective willingness to enforce the blockade� This approach 
could involve checking cargoes and manifests; establishing a physical presence at 
either embarkation or destination; or sending vessels to patrol contested territory, 
representing a military presence within the blockaded region�
Thus, a variety of methods may denote a presence blockade� The difference 
from a paper blockade is that the blockading force makes its presence felt� Still, 
presence blockades may not address blockade-runners aggressively even if they 
deny some access to the area or some flow of resources� Blockade-runners may be 
permitted to run through the blockade without immediate military intervention�
Martial Blockades. Martial blockades increase the intervention options avail-
able in that blockading forces may intervene immediately with force against any 
blockade-runners� Trade still may flow through the blockade and individuals 
may continue to beat the blockade through the use of false flags, cargo-smuggling 
techniques, or other means, but incorporating immediate military intervention 
dramatically increases the enforcement options available and the consequences 
for attempting to run the blockade� A martial blockade may adhere to interna-
tional legal standards, because this type allows neutral ships to pass� Forceful 
intervention may be permitted only in limited circumstances and against certain 
parties, but it is permitted� Thus, with a martial blockade the intent is to deny not 
all access but only access by a particular party and to a particular region�
In relation to the classifications of the proximity model, martial blockades 
are similar to both semidistant and distant blockades� The blockading force is 
attempting to deny access by using force, yet the lack of a complete presence, 
for whatever reason, prevents the imposition of a suffocating blockade on the 
intended region� Still, even a distant blockade involves the use of force and there-
fore clearly would qualify as a martial blockade�
Total Blockades. Total blockades represent the classic type of blockade, in which 
the blockading force allows no access or passage to anyone else� It involves a com-
plete military shutdown of the region to all parties and anticipates immediate 
action against any and all forces entering the region�
A total blockade therefore would be similar to a close blockade, owing to the 
tightness of the restrictions imposed, although with modern naval technology a 
total blockade could be imposed at quite a distance offshore� This final method is 
the most severe, as it permits no access to the blockaded region� The blockading 
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force will use force aggressively, undeniably, and immediately against anyone at-
tempting entry to the blockaded region�
Comparisons among Models
The ascending levels of the enforcement model represent escalations of force, 
with each higher level carrying forward all the enforcement actions available to 
the blockading force at lower levels� However, escalation does not necessarily 
have to follow a strictly sequential path� A martial blockade could be imposed 
without first imposing a paper blockade and then a presence blockade, but put-
ting in place a martial blockade does not exclude the possibility of imposing legal 
sanctions or merely establishing a physical presence� The key difference becomes 
the totality of the enforcement techniques available to the blockading fleet, which 
must be made known to all at the time of enacting the blockade—a requirement 
under U�S� law�40 
The enforcement model also allows for better practical differentiation among 
blockade types� Sanctions can and likely will be imposed across all the levels 
incorporated in the model; however, the mere imposition of sanctions does 
not determine the naval actions that the blockading force may undertake� The 
enforcement model’s levels can be determined for historical cases by analyzing 
how the blockading fleet acted against blockade-runners� This means that the en-
forcement model can be applied alongside the traditional proximity model when 
considering or evaluating the strategy and tactics used during a blockade� Finally, 
the enforcement model can assist in planning for future blockades, because it in-
herently builds on the stated limitations on the blockading force, thereby keeping 
in line with our required standards of notification�41 
An important comparison involves how the enforcement model differs from 
the dimensional model, especially with regard to terminology� Although the 
dimensional model does include coercion as a possible methodology, it differen-
tiates among paper, pacific, and belligerent blockades� The dimensional model 
would be more likely to interpret a paper blockade as weak or ineffective, given 
the minimal level of force the blockading parties apply� The term pacific blockade 
describes a blockade that is conducted amid general hostilities and includes the 
intent to disturb international trade with the blockaded region�42 While neutral 
parties would be allowed to pass, active hostilities between the blockading and 
blockaded forces is expected� A pacific blockade would fall somewhere between 
the enforcement model’s presence and martial blockades, in that a presence 
blockade applies a physical presence to enforce sanctions or embargoes, while 
a martial blockade involves hostile actions between the opposing parties but no 
attacks on neutral parties� Unfortunately, use of the term pacific blockade does 
not make this differentiation very clear (and it also has nothing to do with a 
blockade occurring in the Pacific Ocean!)� Belligerent blockades would involve 
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direct action, although the enforcement model differentiates between a martial 
blockade and a total blockade by defining how far a blockading force will go to 
stop runners, rather than merely including direct action as a possible means of 
pressuring the blockaded force� Thus, practical and theoretical differences in 
terminology separate the dimensional and enforcement models, although con-
sideration of the coercive dimension provides the best comparison between the 
two models�
The enforcement model’s differences from the proximity model in how it 
makes theoretical categorizations of blockade types are not purely matters of 
description or historical classification� The enforcement model better aligns 
with naval blockades as they would be applied in the twenty-first century� This 
assertion requires some defense, including a comparison of the effectiveness of 
blockading tactics in cases from the modern era with those drawn from history� 
The discussion now will turn to the effectiveness of blockades in the twenty-first 
century, both as a practical evaluation of the strategy’s utility today and as a de-
fense of the enforcement model�
PREVIOUS EFFECTIVENESS OF BLOCKADES  
VERSUS EFFECTIVENESS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Understanding the effectiveness of a blockade requires first understanding the 
importance of sea power in general, especially with regard to the heavy reliance 
of trade on the sea� In previous centuries the importance of the shipping of goods 
by sea was obvious; today, even if it is less obvious in the global consciousness, 
seaborne shipping remains a critical part of the global economy, notwithstanding 
the development of modern ground-based and aerial methods of transportation� 
The global economy remains highly dependent on maritime shipping—over 90 
percent of the world’s trade involves the sea in some way—so the sea continues 
to be a dominant factor in the global economy�43 This makes control of sea-lanes 
critical to global power even today�
Throughout their evolution, blockades have undergone reinterpretation to 
incorporate new dimensions and adjust to “modern” developments, whenever 
those occurred� Eighteenth-century strategies were adapted largely to the 
sail as the modern technology, then nineteenth-century strategies adapted to 
steam power, and twentieth-century strategies adapted to incorporate aerial 
intervention�
Twenty-first-century technological advancements deal largely with signals, 
making the role of electronic communications the critical area to which blockade 
strategies must adapt� The term signals as used here does not exclude the forms 
of electronic or information warfare that first developed during the twentieth 
century; however, prospective operations now must address the explosion in 
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bandwidth and global connectivity that transformed simple signals and global 
positioning from individually useful tools into critical infrastructure and opera-
tional elements within a modern military� Whereas signals intelligence, when it 
emerged in the twentieth century, was a novel development, in the twenty-first 
century this technological capability may come to dominate military operations� 
Here the terms signals and signals intelligence are construed broadly and applied 
to developments in communications and remote operations that do not require 
physical presence�
Adapting blockades to this evolution is, in many ways, no different from the 
earlier adaptation to an aerial dimension, except that planners must take into ac-
count the effect of denied and degraded environments on the potential success or 
disruption of any blockade� Stopping the flow of information alone could disrupt 
shipping effectively without requiring a full physical force to apply the blockade� 
Ensuring or denying access to information available via remote devices, drones, 
and other communication modes becomes a critical aspect, whether to the abil-
ity to impose a blockade on one side or to exploit a vulnerability so as to break 
through it on the other side� Cyber warfare and signal denial become the primary 
dimensions—at the moment—that the twenty-first century has introduced into 
blockading strategy and tactics, to which a modern warfare concept must adapt 
and which it must attempt to overcome�
Yet even such modern evolutions do not alter the potential influence of sea 
power over the global economy, and people can continue to appreciate the power 
of a blockade that attempts to deny the delivery of resources or other access to an 
area� Historical naval blockades were only as effective as the reliance of an area 
on maritime access, and this principle remains true despite the advancement of 
technology� The greatest change simply has been the introduction of the aerial 
and signal dimensions, which do not fall outside the scope of naval power� An 
aircraft carrier is a tangible and powerful example of how naval and air forces can 
be blended into a nexus of projected power, and cruisers are ideal examples of 
aerial defense and signal denial�
Thus, the potential effectiveness of the blockading strategy remains largely 
unchanged, but the factors that may impact its effectiveness have not necessar-
ily remained the same� While naval blockades remain an important strategy for 
sapping hostile capabilities, the means by which they are made effective have 
evolved�
The next steps in this analysis will involve comparing and contrasting the 
factors impacting a blockade’s success in previous eras versus factors that impact 
blockading success today� With regard to evaluating the effectiveness of a block-
ade, three questions apply� (1) Did/does the blockade achieve the operational 
goal or intended outcome for which it was imposed? (2) Did/does the blockade 
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contribute to the overall strategic success, or were/are extraneous factors respon-
sible for the improvements in the situation? (3) Were/are the costs and resources 
expended worth the ends achieved?44 Our goal here is to provide higher-level 
guidance applicable to a wide array of circumstances, both retrospective and 
prospective, rather than an exhaustive breakdown of past incidents� In the con-
sideration of blockades from previous eras, five factors can be identified as the 
predominant influences on the success or failure of a blockade�
1� Asymmetry of naval strength between the blockading force and the 
opposing force
2� Types of naval forces
3� The willpower to maintain the blockade
4� Suitability of the region for blockade
5� Logistics and resupply
Asymmetry of Naval Strength
The foremost, and perhaps most obvious, factor influencing blockade success is 
asymmetry in naval power between the opposing sides� An effective blockade 
is plausible only in cases in which the blockading power maintains naval forces 
significantly larger than those of the navy being contained� This asymmetry al-
lows the stronger force to contain the lesser force largely by its mere presence, 
or else the defending force would offer some kind of challenge, perhaps even 
coming out and meeting the blockading force in open battle� A superior force 
keeps the smaller force contained and limits the latter’s strategic and tactical 
options�
Asymmetry also dictates the options for the type of blockade� A close blockade 
demands a significant expenditure of resources, which in turn requires having 
more resources to commit� The more closely matched the naval forces, the less 
able one side would be to maintain such a blockade except by tethering a signifi-
cant portion of its total forces to one area and straining its supply lines, all while 
exposing those blockading forces to counterattack�
An important historical example regarding asymmetry of naval forces is the 
Union blockade of the Confederacy during the Civil War� The Union main-
tained the stronger fleet, by far�45 This asymmetry in favor of the Union block-
ading forces had several interesting consequences relevant to any evaluation 
of its success� Some historians note that, despite the asymmetry, the blockade 
was able to maintain only limited effectiveness; for example, blockade-running 
kept the Confederacy supplied with ammunition�46 Therefore asymmetry in 
naval power alone may not determine success, as even significant asymmetry 
overall may be wasted if the blockading force spreads itself too thinly along the 
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blockade perimeter� However, the Union blockade ultimately proved effective 
in other ways; it crippled exports, disrupted regional shipping, and prevented 
importing sufficient goods critical to infrastructure�47 In this sense, even a 
blockade that can stop some but not all blockade-runners still can be effective 
enough at denying or disrupting trade to cripple the blockaded economy� Such 
an outcome requires sustained blockading that is possible only with a substantial 
asymmetry in naval forces�
Other strategic and tactical options become available to a highly superior 
blockading force� For example, a strong blockading force may be able to choose 
which blockade-runners to allow through� Permitting passage of luxury items 
but not critical operational supplies such as ammunition or weapons can cause 
demoralization and discontent within the civilian population�48 A superior force 
also can choose which goods and commodities to blockade against, and other 
aspects of how to execute the blockade� Energy sources could be targeted if the 
nation is not able readily to replenish those losses from internal sources, or the 
blockading force more broadly could alter the economic impact asymmetrically 
by denying only importing or only exporting� The combined point is that a block-
ade can be targeted against specific economic goods or exchanges to create either 
a strategic or a morale asymmetry that the superior force can use to its advantage�
In sum, asymmetry of naval forces has a significant impact on blockade ef-
fectiveness and options for the blockading fleet� Yet asymmetry alone is not suf-
ficient to determine success�
Types of Naval Forces
A factor related to the relative power of naval forces is the types available� The 
Civil War example highlights how the types of forces the Union had available 
for its blockade influenced strategy and tactics on both sides�49 The Confederacy 
could not match the Union in sheer naval strength, but its navy did use mines to 
prevent Union access to Mobile Bay�50 This gave Southern ships a chance to reach 
the port in safety—if they managed to pass through the minefield themselves, 
amid other complexities involved in mine warfare�51 In this case, the smaller fleet 
could not match the larger in building ships, but it could employ a defensive 
strategy that provided an advantage, as its ships knew the safe path through the 
minefield� Against a larger and more powerful fleet that seeks to keep enemy 
forces contained, a smaller fleet still may be able to take action; it is a matter of 
how� The materials to which the smaller fleet has access may determine the basis 
on which it builds its defensive strategy�
This principle applies to the stronger fleet as well in choosing its strategy� Block-
ades only evolved from the close-proximity type into more-advanced versions 
because of ships’ improved technological capabilities� If a fleet could apply copper 
to its ships’ bottoms, it could sustain those ships at sea longer, which enabled it to 
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sustain the blockade longer and at greater distances�52 Thus, the characteristics of 
its fleet can impact significantly the choices available to a blockading power�
This principle extends to modern naval forces, and in intriguing ways� For 
example, an exceptionally powerful fleet may have modern destroyers and air-
craft carriers, but unless it has sufficient numbers of wooden-hulled minesweep-
ers the opposition’s best defense becomes less-advanced ships and well-mined 
passages� Even if two fleets are matched equally in modern destroyers, mining 
remains an important tactic if only one fleet possesses sufficient numbers of 
minesweepers to clear a path�53 This principle regarding fleet composition applies 
likewise if one fleet has more aircraft carriers while the opposing fleet has more 
submarines, or one fleet has more ballistic-missile submarines while the other 
has more fast-attack submarines� The two fleets’ base compositions, including 
both their strengths and weaknesses, enable different blockading strategies and 
become a critical factor determining blockade success� Thus, the types of naval 
forces in a fleet represent another form of asymmetry that, while likely to reflect 
and confirm force-strength disparities, could be used to great advantage by fleets 
maintaining either an offensive or defensive position during a blockade�
Willpower
The third consideration is the willpower to maintain the blockade� A blockade is 
effective only as long as it actually is maintained� In the absence of some decisive 
military action or enemy capitulation, how long is the blockading force willing to 
dedicate the resources necessary to continue the effort? Imposing and maintain-
ing a total blockade on even a tight perimeter require intense motivation, and the 
need therefor would increase significantly if the blockade were applied to an ever-
larger region� The willpower to maintain the blockade must exceed the perceived 
costs of expending whatever resources are necessary to maintain the blockade�
Of course, such costs are relative and depend on one’s perception of the cost-
benefit equation� Although the resources needed to support a blockade may be 
quantifiable, the costs associated with expending those resources on a blockade 
constitute the critical factor, and perceptions of that calculus could be influenced 
by a wide variety of factors� One highly influential factor is the blockade’s per-
ceived value to ongoing operations or national security� The Union blockade 
required the dedication of substantial resources over a period of years, yet the 
determination to maintain the blockade remained largely intact�54 If the Union 
had suffered significant naval losses in other, direct clashes while it was busy 
maintaining the blockade, this might have affected its willpower to maintain the 
blockade; however, in the absence of such losses its willpower remained largely 
undamaged and it was able to continue�
The value of the blockade—or, to look at it from another direction, the value of 
the thing to be blockaded—even might supersede asymmetry as a factor making 
104
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/1
 B I G G S ,  X U,  R OA F,  &  O L S O N  9 9
a blockading force willing to maintain the effort� The American quarantine of 
Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis was predicated on Cold War imperatives 
that made permitting nuclear missiles to reach Cuba unthinkable, so the will-
power to maintain the blockade likely exceeded any consideration regarding 
resource expenditure�55 A more recent example of the significance of willpower 
is the blockade by the Sri Lankan navy (SLN) of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE)�56 For decades, SLN bases along the northern and eastern coasts of 
Sri Lanka suffered aggressive attacks—swarm, suicide-boat, and amphibious—by 
the highly capable and sophisticated LTTE�57 But in 2006 a new Sri Lankan gov-
ernment came into power whose leadership believed that the only way to defeat 
the LTTE was through the aggressive application of naval force—at any cost� The 
SLN’s approach included the use of intelligence to target LTTE cargo vessels that 
transported arms and supplies; introduction of the “small boat concept,” which 
involved countering the LTTE’s swarm tactics with an overwhelming number of 
small, high-speed, heavily armed patrol craft; the use of land-based radar sites to 
detect and disrupt LTTE activities; and a naval blockade� The blockade was aimed 
at cutting off the LTTE’s seaward escape and supply routes; it focused primarily 
on the LTTE’s headquarters in Jaffna� Although success came with a considerable 
loss of life (military and civilian) and SLN naval vessels, the SLN’s commitment 
to using overwhelming naval force against the LTTE, including maintaining the 
blockade, ultimately enabled the Sri Lankan government to prevail after nearly 
thirty years of civil war�
Essentially, willpower as a factor in determining the strength of a blockade is 
tangential to the asymmetry of naval forces� However, these examples show how 
prominent it can be in determining a blockade’s success�
Suitability of the Region
The fourth factor is the suitability of the region for blockading� This determina-
tion is straightforward, dictated more by geography and navigational factors 
than anything else� Variables include the presence and nature of islands, straits, 
tidal forces, and the like� This factor itself can go a long way toward determining 
whether a blockade will be attempted at all and dictating how one may proceed�
For example, blockading a region that has only one method of ingress and 
egress offers a simple scenario; blockading a small archipelago remains relatively 
simple� But blockading entire island chains, such as those spread across the 
South Pacific, is much more complicated, and thus difficult�
In past eras, geographical factors by themselves could determine whether 
a blockade would be successful� This was especially the case when changing 
winds were likely to provide opportunities for a blockaded fleet to evade the 
blockaders�
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Logistics and Resupply
The sustainability of a blockade rests largely on matters of logistics and resup-
ply� A blockade is not a single decisive naval action but instead depends on the 
ability of the blockading force to maintain its posture over a longer term� The 
dimensional model identifies near and far as two types of blockade, where those 
terms refer to the distance of the theater from the blockading country�58 Greater 
distance complicates the logistics of resupply, making it more difficult to main-
tain the blockade�
Naval technology is a significant factor with regard to logistics� When evalu-
ating the challenges of imposing and maintaining blockades across different 
historical eras, such issues as the pluses and minuses of sail versus steam must 
be considered�
MODERN FACTORS THAT IMPACT BLOCKADE EFFECTIVENESS IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Not all previously relevant factors have become irrelevant in modern naval op-
erations; the development of nuclear weapons did not eliminate the use of small 
arms, and the shift to fourth-generation warfare did not eliminate the relevance 
of all tactics used previously�59 Likewise, earlier blockading factors and tactics 
continue to exist, yet their potential influence must be considered in the context 
of conditions that have developed in the modern era� These factors relating to 
blockading, by their advance in parallel with other technological developments, 
changed naval operations as they transitioned from the age of the sail to the age 
of steam� Modern naval operations must incorporate factors that historical naval 
operations did not need to consider in their decision-making processes�
The following five additional factors that could impact the success of naval 
blockades must be addressed�
1� Enforcement rules applied
2� International cooperation
3� Self-sufficiency of the blockaded region
4� Aerial dimension
5� Signal dimension
Analysis of the enforcement rules in use constitutes a direct application of the 
enforcement model, which argues that the effectiveness of the blockade can be 
measured by the treatment of blockade-runners� For example, paper blockades 
could prove largely ineffective if blockade-runners ignore the rules entirely—as 
they most likely will; in contrast, if someone knows that running a blockade car-
ries an imminent risk of attack, that immediate threat provides a deterrent effect 
that contributes to the blockade’s success� In essence, the success of a blockade 
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depends on how effectively the blockade can stop runners, and stopping blockade- 
runners relies on the enforcement rules the blockading force applies�
Another, sometimes underappreciated factor involves international coopera-
tion, especially important given that globalization has led to a more interconnect-
ed world and greater international traffic on the open seas� As one consideration, 
for an international blockade to be strictly legal, the UN Security Council must 
approve it� Another element of international cooperation—or the lack thereof—
involves the other countries in the vicinity of the blockaded region� A blockade is 
going to impact nearby states indirectly even if its scope does not cover their ter-
ritorial waters� Shipping routes will be disrupted and the potential for incidents 
will increase dramatically, whether those incidents arise from misidentification 
of ships or the sheer proximity of operational naval forces� Denial of access to 
neighboring states’ territorial waters also could create problems for the blockad-
ing force by complicating its own sources and lines of resupply� There are myriad 
means of indirect interference by which nearby states, if they choose to exercise 
them, can complicate and limit the blockade� Thus, their consent becomes a sig-
nificant factor in determining the blockade’s success�
A third factor involves the self-sufficiency of the blockaded region� Especially 
in the historical examples, the effectiveness of a naval blockade was influenced 
by the extent to which the region depended on access to ports and shipping by 
sea for goods and supplies� The more self-sufficient the region is, or the more it 
has access to alternative sources of supply by land, the less effective the blockade 
will be� This self-sufficiency also could impact what types of goods or trade a 
blockade can deny most effectively� If the region largely depends on imports for 
a certain commodity, such as oil, then blockading those shipping routes known 
to be used to resupply oil could lead to highly successful presence or martial 
blockades without requiring a total blockade�60 Such strategic decisions have 
significant implications on how a blockade would be enacted, so these factors 
should be considered proactively when determining which enforcement rules to 
apply during the blockade�
An additional aspect of self-sufficiency is the land-based defensive capabilities 
of the blockaded region� Specifically, many evaluations of and projections from 
historical blockades neglect to consider how the aerial dimension might have 
affected those operations, simply because aerial forces had not been invented 
at the time� But modern analysts must consider aerial forces (aircraft and mis-
siles) as a critical factor in evaluating the potential effectiveness of a blockade� 
Essentially, whereas regional self-sufficiency might allow a blockaded region to 
withstand a blockade by surviving the deprivation of resources, aerial offensive 
and defensive elements might allow it to break the blockade and restore the flow 
of goods� These considerations would complicate significantly the challenge of 
blockading an area such as mainland China or the continental United States� 
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Land-based defenses delivered by air provide the blockaded region an effective 
military option to break the blockade and prevent it from achieving its objectives� 
Therefore, for a modern blockade to be effective the aerial dimension must be 
considered, and those forces must be either effectively suppressed or otherwise 
made irrelevant� Aerial factors represented a significant technological advance-
ment of the twentieth century, during which naval operations advanced from the 
last vestiges of the age of sail into the age of steam and then into the age of air, as 
the skies themselves became a significant part of naval operations� Modern forces 
must continue to account for this dimension�
But the twenty-first century has seen yet another evolution in naval forces—
bringing on the age of signal�61 Denying communications and other signals to an 
adversary’s naval operations can be as detrimental to its efforts as the presence 
of a superior naval force in the region� The effectiveness of any modern blockade 
could depend on the signal-disruption capabilities of the adversary� Even supe-
rior fleet forces would not be sufficient to establish sea control over a region if the 
comprehensive sea-denial capabilities of the adversarial force are sufficient—an 
especially relevant consideration with the recent reversion to a focus on great-
power competition�62 Among the components of naval operations, this is the 
aspect most likely to expand its influence during the twenty-first century� Anyone 
considering attempting a blockade in the future will have to evaluate carefully 
the growing role of signal denial as a critical component of military operations�
The five factors discussed here provide a useful framework to be used when 
evaluating or planning a blockade, but their relative relevance and importance 
depend greatly on the specific contexts in which they are applied� Therefore the 
final section will consider two sets of recent events during which the possibility 
of a blockade has been part of the international discussion�
TWO TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY SCENARIOS POSSIBLY  
REQUIRING A NAVAL BLOCKADE
There are at least two ongoing international situations to which naval blockades 
have been discussed as possible solutions: the dispute over the Spratly Islands in 
the South China Sea, and the efforts to discourage North Korea from pursuing 
its nuclear-weapons program� The discussion that follows does not constitute 
recommendation of a particular course of action, but rather a practical analysis of 
the usefulness of a blockade as a naval strategy to address issues occurring in the 
modern era� The evaluation of these scenarios will touch on many of the factors 
addressed previously concerning the general effectiveness of naval blockades�
The Spratly Islands Dispute
The dispute over the Spratlys concerns a highly contested intersection of waters 
surrounded by many different nations; at its center is an island chain in the South 
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China Sea over which multiple nations—including China, Taiwan, Malaysia, 
Brunei, the Philippines, and Vietnam—claim some degree of sovereignty� The 
fact that the islands contain no arable land, have no indigenous inhabitants, and 
offer only a limited supply of drinkable water is insufficient to avoid disputes 
among the regional states; while there are multiple reasons for this competitive 
approach, they largely concern the economic and strategic value of the area�63 
Additionally, American naval vessels’ patrolling of the area to exert the freedom 
of the seas has led to international expressions of concern�
Would a naval blockade of the area be a suitable means of enforcing the inter-
national will? China has expressed interest in militarizing these islands by build-
ing air bases on them, stationing missiles there, or both� Would denying access to 
the islands via blockade prevent the introduction of military assets, and thus the 
islands’ militarization? An evaluation of the possible effectiveness of a blockade 
in this scenario can employ the theories and factors discussed earlier�
Asymmetry is the first consideration� The applicability of this aspect de-
pends on the nations involved in the blockade� For the sake of discussion, let us 
assume that the other parties hold fast and the dispute becomes a matter simply 
between the United States and China� Current American naval power provides 
sufficient forces to enact a blockade anywhere in the world� Other factors then 
determine whether such a blockade would last a day or a decade� Foremost, 
the willpower to maintain the blockade would have to be strong� The Spratly 
Islands are an archipelago in the middle of open seas, so geographically the area 
is not well suited to a blockade, and they are more than an ocean away from our 
home ports, so the logistics of resupply would be complicated� According to the 
classical factors relevant to blockades, therefore, imposing and maintaining a 
blockade of the Spratly Islands would be impractical�
Then more-modern factors must be considered� The self-sufficiency of the 
blockaded region is irrelevant because no one lives on the islands; however, if 
China decided to keep a permanent military presence there, its self-sufficiency 
would be near zero, as the installation would run out of fresh water in days� In 
the latter scenario, a blockade could be highly effective, with the personnel on 
the islands forced to abandon them�
International support, especially in these contested waters, is another im-
portant consideration� Our presumption for the sake of argument was that 
other nations hold fast, but it would be foolish to assume that dozens of nations 
would take no action of any kind� With so many nations involved, the logistical 
hurdles would become impossible to navigate if even half the interested parties 
decided to act indirectly to make the blockade more challenging�
Whether this blockade would be successful, then, would come down to the 
rules enforced, which likely would determine and drive the course of action� Open 
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warfare between the United States and China over uninhabited islands is unlikely, 
which means that the blockade employed likely would be of either the paper or 
the presence type; blockade-runners could ignore either approach easily unless a 
party intervened with force� Thus, a blockade of the Spratly Islands likely would be 
a protracted and complicated endeavor that could be made effective only during a 
full-scale war—which emphasizes the futility of the suggestion, as in such a case the 
Spratly Islands would be reduced to an afterthought�
North Korea
The second scenario involves a blockade of North Korea as a means of forcing a 
cessation of its nuclear-weapons program� This would be an extreme step—an at-
tempt to use a naval blockade to enforce international sanctions that North Korea 
actively has attempted to circumvent for years�64 The asymmetry of naval forces 
is unquestionable, measured on any dimension� American willpower to stop the 
North Korean nuclear threat would be resolute� The geography makes the region 
suitable for blockade, in that North Korea has only two coasts, consisting of 1,550 
miles of coastline� Logistics and resupply could be issues, although the burden 
would be reduced greatly because the United States operates multiple naval bases 
in Japan, in North Korea’s immediate vicinity�
Considering the longtime alliances between the United States and South Ko-
rea and the United States and Japan, international cooperation likely would favor 
the United States� However, Russia and China share a significant land border with 
North Korea, and the influences they might exert are also critical to consider� If 
the Russians and Chinese were willing to supply North Korea via this land border, 
a naval blockade would prove wholly ineffective—“blockade-runners” simply 
would have found another avenue left open to them by the rules of the enforced 
blockade�
As with the Spratly Islands scenario, the enforcement rules become a critical 
concern� Those rules would depend on international cooperation, the willpower 
of the blockading force, and asymmetry in naval power, among other factors� 
In this sense, the enforcement rules are not just a theoretical classification but a 
summary consideration leading to the final course of action� Imposing and main-
taining a total blockade, including an aerial blockade to stop resupply via the land 
border, would require war, possibly with multiple nations�
Both the Spratly Islands and North Korea scenarios present a complex array of 
factors, a complete evaluation of which is beyond the scope of this paper� How-
ever, the decision whether to employ a naval blockade should be made by assess-
ing seven key factors: asymmetry, willpower, suitability, logistics, international 
cooperation, self-sufficiency, and enforcement rules� Ultimately, the key factor is 
enforcement of the blockade, especially with regard to how blockade-runners are 
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treated� Despite favorable assessment across the other factors, without the ability 
to enforce the blockade, it is unlikely to be successful�
BLOCKADES: FROM FARRAGUT TO THE FUTURE
Dr� Vego has written, “The successful conduct of naval warfare depends on one’s 
ability to obtain and maintain or deny control of a part of the maritime theater�”65 
This article has revisited the blockade as a naval strategy that exists at a lower 
hierarchical level than armed conflict, but that may evolve into armed conflict� 
Despite the blockade’s prominent use throughout naval history, there has been 
little evaluation of how it would apply in the modern era� It is especially impor-
tant to consider whether the differences between historical cases and modern 
scenarios can highlight changes over time that would expose shortcomings in 
current naval strategy�
Although this article has addressed numerous topics, ranging from legality to 
the development of the enforcement model, and has provided practical compari-
sons, just as notable are the many topics not addressed in sufficient depth� For 
example, the evolving roles of airpower and signals intelligence represent compli-
cated topics warranting more in-depth examination� Likewise, additional efforts 
should examine the importance of domestic support for making naval blockades 
successful; the potential for electronic banking to sap the effectiveness of physical 
blockades; and, in contrast, the support that electronic banking could lend to the 
application of sanctions, making them more than mere paper blockades�66 
Ultimately, the naval blockade continues to be a relevant part of modern naval 
strategy, but conducting one is a complicated endeavor� While much has changed 
since the days of sailing ships, the underlying principles of naval blockades re-
main as important today as they were to Admiral David G� Farragut during the 
Civil War� However, too many evaluations of naval blockades rely on specific and 
historical examples to determine the relevant factors, which limits their value 
to those conducting naval decision-making today� In short, if blockades are to 
be considered an important aspect of naval operations, we need to develop and 
employ theories that enable the practical application of blockades today, not just 
their historical consideration�
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 Maintaining a competitive edge in the twenty-first century is no small feat for any large, hierarchically based, and geographically dispersed organiza-
tion, such as the U�S� Navy�1 While there are many initiatives designed to keep 
pace with the tsunami of technological developments and ever-evolving global 
politics, the role of leadership in charting a course to excel in this environment 
is paramount�
This article tells the story of Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard’s experience culti-
vating the type of transformational leadership necessary to succeed—and even 
thrive—in today’s rapidly changing, complex world� Having applied a learning-
organization framework for more than a decade, the shipyard has changed how 
its members think, act, and communicate� By shifting its workplace culture from 
one that was stratified, stovepiped, and command-and-control oriented to one 
that encourages risk taking, adaptation, and individual empowerment (without 
changing its organizational structure), Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (PHNS) not 
only has improved its performance significantly but has expanded the notion of 
what it means to be a leader in the Navy�
MILITARY ADAPTATION, INNOVATION, AND TRANSFORMATION
The military’s primary role is to respond to threats to national security� These 
threats may come in many forms—political, eco-
nomic, and ideological, to name a few—and often 
they occur with little to no warning� Operating in 
such a complicated, complex, and unpredictable 
environment, the military must remain vigilant 
in its efforts to stay abreast of changing condi-
tions and be able to adapt to them quickly� In his 
landmark publication The Professional Soldier 
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(1960), Morris Janowitz underscored this point, noting that, contrary to popular 
opinion, the military as an institution is not static but adapts in response to the 
changing conditions of the society� For instance, following World War II the 
international context changed significantly, to a situation in which the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons and strategic concepts of dissuasion led to a trans-
formation of military professionals’ function; instead of seeking victory on the 
battlefield, they became controllers of a machine designed to remain inactive�2 
Military and diplomatic historian Williamson Murray also highlights the 
adaptive nature of military organizations� In his book Military Adaptation in 
War: With Fear of Change, he presents several historical case studies examining 
how military organizations cope with changing conditions� In particular, he 
focuses on the impact of new technological, strategic, operational, and tactical 
concepts with respect to the services’ performance� He notes that adaptation 
in the military occurred at a glacial pace until technological and sociological 
changes of the Industrial Revolution began to interfere with the processes of 
war� This called for continual change, during peacetime and war, in response 
to an increasingly complex battle space—making adaptation a major element 
in military effectiveness� And this continual change must occur despite the fact 
that “discipline and rigid respect for one’s superiors—on which cohesion in 
battle depends—are antithetical to the processes of adaptation, which require 
a willingness on the part of subordinates to question the revealed wisdom of 
their superiors�”3 Murray goes on to observe that the inherent tension between 
the need for military organizations to be disciplined and obedient and the 
need for organizations to be able to adapt to constant change is what “makes 
military innovation in peacetime and adaptation in war so difficult�”4 Difficult 
or not, forces affecting national defense in today’s world—including disruptive 
technologies, cyber warfare, and protracted conflict against nonstate actors in 
a low-tech, global war on terrorism—have both accelerated armed conflict and 
modified our notions of warfare, creating the need for continuous processes of 
innovation and adaptation�5 
Although military organizations must (and do) adapt to changing condi-
tions to fulfill their missions successfully, this sort of flexibility generally is not 
considered to be part of the culture of military organizations�6 On the contrary, 
the military is renowned for being one of the oldest and most prominent exam-
ples of formal organizations, forged by tradition and seemingly more commit-
ted to the ethos of the past than to preparing to meet the future�7 Similarly, the 
bureaucracies (both civilian and military) that run the military also can inhibit 
flexibility and the ability to effect change, since they strive to impose order on 
disorder rather than adapting to a changing and uncertain world�8 
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While adaptation and innovation in the military occur despite considerable 
constraints, developing this capacity in anticipation of fluctuating conditions 
rather than merely in response to them marks the difference between adequately 
and high-performing organizations� At the core of high-performing organiza-
tions are leaders who encourage followers to act independently to achieve goals 
that represent the values and motivations of both leaders and followers�
According to James MacGregor Burns, an American historian, political 
scientist, and authority on the study of leadership, this type of leadership 
is transforming leadership. Burns identified two basic forms of leadership, 
transactional and transforming� He considered transactional leadership to be 
the most common, existing where “leaders approach followers with an eye 
to exchanging one thing for another,” such as wages for labor or influence 
for campaign contributions; transactional leaders essentially are brokers� 
Transforming leaders, on the other hand, recognize and exploit an existing 
need or demand of a potential follower� They also look for possible motives 
and higher needs in followers, engaging the follower as a complete person�9 
Leaders in the military (as in most organizations) generally fall into Burns’s 
transactional leader category�
To meet the multiple, complex challenges of the twenty-first century, the 
Navy needs more leaders who can transform rather than simply transact� 
As the Navy’s 2016 Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority makes clear, 
today’s security environment—characterized by a rapid pace of change in the 
maritime system, in the information system, and in the evolution and adop-
tion of technology—is one in which “[o]ur competitors are moving quickly, 
and our adversaries are bent on leaving us swirling in their wake” as they hone 
their ability to adapt swiftly to this new environment� In response, Navy leaders 
should accelerate learning by individuals, teams, and organizations, since do-
ing so empowers, enables, and facilitates the true potential of sailors, officers, 
and Department of the Navy civilians to determine the best ways to operate in 
today’s security environment�10 
IMPROVING PERFORMANCE AT PEARL HARBOR  
NAVAL SHIPYARD
Considered even then to be a strategic location between the U�S� mainland and 
the rest of the Asia-Pacific region, Hawaii became home to Navy Yard Pearl Har-
bor (NYPH) on 13 May 1908� Operationally, NYPH served as a vital mid-Pacific 
coaling and repair station for the U�S� Navy� Strategically, it served as a defensive 
outpost� According to Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), parent com-
mand of what is known today as Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, “[t]he Shipyard 
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has continuously improved from its modest creation as a coaling and repair sta-
tion into a world-class Navy complex � � � enabl[ing] the U�S� Navy to secure sea 
lanes of communication and commerce, effectively projecting power across the 
expansive Pacific and Indian oceans�” Today, PHNS is the nation’s largest, most 
comprehensive fleet-repair and -maintenance facility between the U�S� West 
Coast and the Far East�11 
Navy Yard Pearl Harbor performed a near miracle in 1942 when it managed 
to repair fully USS Yorktown (CV 10), which had been damaged badly in the 
Battle of the Coral Sea, in a mere three days, despite estimates that it would 
take ninety days to complete repairs of that magnitude� During the battle, “[a] 
551-pound armor-piercing bomb had plunged through the flight deck 15 feet 
inboard of her island and penetrated fifty feet into the ship before exploding 
above the forward engine room� Six compartments were destroyed, as were 
the lighting systems on three decks and across 24 frames� The gears control-
ling the No� 2 elevator were damaged� She had lost her radar and refrigeration 
system� Near misses by eight bombs had opened seams in her hull from frames 
100 to 130 and ruptured the fuel-oil compartments�” Despite the extensive 
damage, 1,400 repairmen—shipfitters, machinists, welders, electricians, and 
shipwrights—worked around the clock to restore Yorktown’s structures and 
systems� Integrated with the team were planners and estimators who worked 
on board providing advice directly from the ship’s plans� This impressive team-
work enabled the speedy repair of Yorktown, allowing it to contribute to the 
decisive victory in the Battle of Midway—a pivotal point for the Allies in World 
War II in the Pacific�12 
Some sixty years later, however, PHNS no longer was living up to its motto 
“We Keep Them Fit to Fight�” Instead, the shipyard was “struggling with perfor-
mance issues and was generally recognized as being the worst performing ship-
yard, the fourth of the four public shipyards�” The Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) commission noted that cost, efficiency, and quality at PHNS were major 
issues of concern, and that it had considered closing the shipyard in 2005� After a 
great deal of deliberation involving congressional testimony, factors such as Pearl 
Harbor’s location in the Pacific, the need for surge maintenance capacity, and 
the impact the shipyard had on Hawaii’s economy kept PHNS from being closed 
down�13 Yet although the BRAC commission’s recommendation was not followed 
and the shipyard was not closed, “it did get the attention of the men and women 
of Pearl Harbor and the leadership at the Naval Reactors Program�” The Naval 
Reactors Program “provides the design, development and operational support 
required to provide militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants and ensure their 
safe, reliable and long-lived operation�”14 
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The shipyard’s continual poor performance over time, combined with calls 
to close the yard through the BRAC process, made it clear that PHNS needed 
to change� The lead Naval Reactors representative acknowledged this and re-
sponded in an uncharacteristic way for a senior leader� Rather than directing 
others to make necessary changes, “he began the path to change [by first] creat-
ing change within himself�” He demonstrated this during a standard NAVSEA 
review of the shipyard� “Instead of focusing leadership’s attention on the nu-
merous shortcomings and deficiencies that were identified during the review, 
the lead Naval Reactors representative chose to share his belief in the shipyard 
and what its leaders were capable of�” Just as PHNS had made a critical differ-
ence during World War II, so too was it capable of high-quality performance 
today� By focusing on a vision of what the shipyard could be, the Naval Reac-
tors representative “created a spark that would fuel the drive to transform the 
shipyard into a learning organization�”
THE SHIPYARD BECOMES A LEARNING ORGANIZATION
While the Naval Reactors representative’s vision of what PHNS could be (again) 
ignited a transformation, Peter Senge’s concept of a learning organization turned 
that spark into a long-burning flame� The representative believed that Senge’s 
learning-organization framework, explained in his book The Fifth Discipline: 
The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, would help PHNS return to 
its legacy as a shipyard capable of delivering high-quality work and performing 
exceptional feats� Consequently, he familiarized the shipyard leadership with the 
concept and book during a routine visit�
Senge, a systems engineer and major figure in organizational development, be-
lieves that only those organizations that are able to adapt quickly and effectively 
will be able to excel in their field or market� Those that do this are organizations 
skilled at creating, acquiring, and transferring knowledge and at modifying their 
behavior to reflect new knowledge and insights�15 In brief, a learning organization 
is one “that is continually expanding its capacity to create its future � � � where 
‘adaptive learning’ must be joined by ‘generative learning,’ learning that enhances 
our capacity to create�”16 
Senge’s learning-organization model consists of the following five disciplines:17 
1� Personal mastery: continual clarification of what is important to us and 
learning how to see current reality more clearly
2� Mental models: deeply held internal images of how the world works
3� Shared vision: what you and the other members want to create or 
accomplish as part of the organization
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4� Team learning: the process of aligning and developing the capacity of a 
team to create the results its members truly desire
5� Systems thinking: a framework for seeing interrelationships rather than 
things, for seeing patterns of change rather than static “snapshots”; it also 
provides a language for complexity
These five disciplines must develop together, even though integrating new ap-
proaches is much more difficult than applying them separately� Because of this, 
systems thinking is the fifth discipline� “It is the discipline that integrates the 
disciplines, fusing them into a coherent body of theory and practice�” Systems 
thinking also helps one understand one of the subtlest, most important aspects 
of a learning organization: “a shift of mind from seeing ourselves separate from 
the world to connected to the world, from seeing problems as caused by someone 
or something ‘out there’ to seeing how our own actions create the problems we 
experience�”18 By reframing how we view the world and our role and responsibil-
ity in creating it, Senge’s learning-organization framework provides a pathway to 
creating an environment in which people are empowered to lead efforts to create 
the results they desire for their future�
While the shipyard recognized more than a decade ago that Senge’s learning- 
organization framework provided a way to improve its performance in a sus-
tained manner, the 2017 U�S� Navy Strategic Readiness Review (SRR) also ac-
knowledged the value of Senge’s concept� The review noted that, “faced with a 
dynamic environment, a learning culture is critical to ensuring adaptability of 
the organization� A culture that makes people eager to understand risk enables 
early identification of systemic risks and behaviors before problems occur�” In 
addition, the SRR went so far as to define a learning organization using Senge’s 
terms, stating that a learning organization is “an enterprise that encourages, and 
ultimately embraces, learning through systems thinking, personal mastery, men-
tal models, shared vision, and team learning�”19 
WALKING THE TALK: FIRST STEPS
The first indication that PHNS was “walking the talk” (i�e�, evolving into a 
learning organization) surfaced in connection to a routine activity: a shipyard 
performance review conducted by an external agency� Once the review was 
completed, the shipyard’s senior leadership responded to its findings during 
a formal outbrief, then spent the following year addressing the findings and 
making improvements�
But instead of conducting the performance-review process in the standard 
manner, the external review in 2006 was conducted as a learning organization 
would� Two primary actions demonstrated this� The definition of the aim of the 
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external review itself constituted the first action� Instead of highlighting discrete 
problems that needed to be fixed at PHNS, as typically was done, the review fo-
cused on what needed to be done to effect lasting change at the shipyard� As an 
example, the review team’s most significant finding was not a specific technical 
or operational problem but rather the fact that PHNS “middle management is 
unable to effect change without significant senior management involvement�” 
Bound in a confining governance structure that mirrored a military hierarchy, 
PHNS relied on top-down direction from senior leadership for all performance-
improvement initiatives� While this leadership model yielded some short-term 
gains, most efforts lost momentum over time when senior leaders stopped invest-
ing their time and energy� As a result, lasting change—and its desired outcome of 
sustained improved performance—remained elusive at the shipyard�
This idea of “stickiness” as it relates to inducing long-lasting organizational 
and cultural change is a key concept for Senge and others� Organizations often 
set out on well-intended and well-planned organizational improvements, with 
an eye toward shifting the basic culture of the organization, only to find that 
over time the organization, suffering from bureaucratic inertia, reverts to old 
habits� In contrast, the PHNS example shows a leadership team dedicated to 
persisting in an effort that was bound to take many years to complete and in 
which results would be incremental and often hard to see or measure� This level 
of strategic patience is rare within highly structured and successful organiza-
tions such as the Navy, because there is no competitor to drive organizational 
improvement� Militaries are quick to respond to enemy capability improve-
ments (hardware) with similar advancement and growth, but organizational 
and cultural change rarely is brought about through peer competition; almost 
always it is an internal crisis or near crisis that dictates organizational self-
assessment and eventual change� In bringing about enduring and sticky change, 
as seen in this example, PHNS truly has demonstrated the meaning of being a 
learning organization�
The second primary action demonstrating learning-organization behavior 
at PHNS concerned the outbrief resulting from the 2006 external performance 
review� In the past, only senior leaders from the Navy and PHNS had addressed 
review findings; during this particular outbrief, however, middle managers 
responsible for specific issues were called on to address the findings� The 
eleven middle managers who participated came to be known as the “Group of 
Eleven” (subsequently called the Learning Organization Steering Group)� They 
committed individually, to the Navy and to the shipyard’s senior leaders, to be 
the middle managers and leaders the shipyard needed to start the transforma-
tional process necessary to achieve sustained improved performance� Equally 
important, Navy and the PHNS senior leadership clearly demonstrated trust 
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and support in the middle managers’ ability to improve performance over the 
long run� This was a critical event, as it illustrated to everyone in the shipyard 
that PHNS was on the path to becoming a learning organization�
One small group of middle managers started by reading The Fifth Discipline 
(which came to be known as the “black book” because of its cover)� They used 
the five disciplines as a framework, with some from this group practicing per-
sonal mastery as the first step in the process, while the Group of Eleven started 
by developing a shared vision within the team� The Group of Eleven also created 
a presentation to raise awareness about PHNS’s actual performance, to ensure 
that everyone shared a common understanding about the current state of affairs� 
While the presentation addressed concrete (and uncomfortable) topics such as 
customer dissatisfaction and poor teamwork, the Group of Eleven portrayed 
these difficult facts as important for developing a way forward toward addressing 
these shortfalls in the learning-organization framework�
LEARNING-ORGANIZATION ENABLERS
In addition to conducting training sessions to educate the shipyard workforce 
about core learning-organization concepts such as the five disciplines and how 
to build a learning organization through team learning, dialogue, and discus-
sion, PHNS also established learning cells to facilitate workers’ adoption of 
learning-organization concepts and practices�20 Learning cells consisted of teams 
of people from various areas and levels of the command who wanted to think 
imaginatively about their future and came together to build better relationships 
with each other so there would be trust and openness among team members� 
They did so by engaging in free-flowing dialogue around specific topics such as 
team learning, brainstorming, and constructive dialogue that were designed to 
“suspend assumptions[,] � � � allowing the group to discover insights not attain-
able individually�” Most of the insights that led to enhanced performance revolved 
around changing people’s behaviors and interactions�
For instance, a learning cell involving workers who were striving to improve 
depot maintenance soon realized that the main obstacle to achieving this goal 
had to do with constructive dialogue rather than work schedules and budgets� 
Learning-organization dialogue principles revealed that many depot mainte-
nance workers feared project meetings, especially if they needed to report bad 
news, since their project superintendent would use these meetings to berate 
them publicly and emotionally for poor performance� When the project super-
intendent discovered this, he realized that to improve his team’s performance he 
would need to change his leadership style� Deciding to become what Senge refers 
to as a servant leader, he began to focus on how he could help his people be-
come successful� He became more engaged with his team by walking around the 
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depot, asking people what they needed, and clearing roadblocks when necessary� 
These simple actions, combined with the continual learning that took place in 
the learning cell, transformed the depot-maintenance project team, resulting in 
completion of the shortest depot maintenance period of the last five maintenance 
periods at both public and private shipyards�
In addition to facilitating group learning and building trust and under-
standing, the cells were an expeditious way to effect change� Unlike other 
performance-improvement processes that the shipyard had implemented, such as 
Lean Six Sigma—which follows a regimented format, typically requiring several 
weeks to prepare for an event, a full week to conduct it, and a couple of weeks of 
postevent activities to complete the process—learning cells required much less 
time� (The effect of the earlier adoption of Lean Six Sigma is discussed in a later 
section�) In fact, an effective and efficient learning cell facilitator could prepare 
for a learning-cell gathering in a week’s time� After meeting for a few days to 
identify, prioritize, and discuss issues, a learning cell generally would walk away 
committed to carrying out agreed-upon, concrete actions� Over time, learning 
cells became the primary learning-organization structure through which the 
shipyard made many improvements�
Brainstorming sessions with middle managers and supervisors from across 
PHNS also were held as part of the learning process� These sessions created an 
environment of openness and trust that allowed attendees to identify the range 
of diverse problems at the shipyard� During brainstorming sessions, participants 
wrote their problems on pieces of paper, taped the slips to a wall, and explained 
how they highlighted a particular problem� By the time several iterations had 
been completed for one particular brainstorming session, the problems identi-
fied covered a ten-foot section of the wall� Posting the problems in this manner 
achieved two important outcomes: (1) everyone could appreciate the seriousness 
of the situation at the shipyard, and (2) similarities and patterns concerning 
certain problems and their underlying causes became evident� The problems 
then were grouped according to focus areas that needed to be worked on� With 
a multiplicity of groupings on the wall, middle managers who participated in 
the brainstorming recognized that determining top-priority areas was essential� 
Accordingly, participating middle managers conducted a blind vote (to prevent 
bias)� It identified three primary focus areas: problem solving, motivation, 
and teamwork� Each area would be targeted as part of the shipyard’s learning- 
organization transformation effort�
Strong support from senior leadership was critical to facilitating the ship-
yard’s learning-organization journey� Recognizing that it would take years 
for the shipyard to transform into a learning organization, Admiral Kirkland 
H� Donald, USN, the Director of Naval Reactors during this time, provided 
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essential top cover as the shipyard pursued its transformation journey� For ex-
ample, Navy leaders from various commands were required to contact him per-
sonally first if they had any problems with the shipyard’s performance� Because 
Donald rerouted these concerns, the shipyard was able to focus its full attention 
on transforming itself into a learning organization� Moreover, senior leadership’s 
commitment sent a message to other commands that it fully supported PHNS’s 
efforts in this regard�
Command leadership documented in shipyard instructions the steps needed 
to enable and assist the shipyard in its transformation effort but underscored the 
importance of leadership� Developed by the shipyard commander in conjunction 
with midlevel managers, the Command Leadership System served two primary 
purposes, as follows: (1) it aligned command leadership, and (2) it improved ship-
yard leaders’ understanding of their multiple roles as leaders� The shipyard com-
mander recognized that leaders’ existing top-down, directive approach to leader-
ship needed to change to foster the yard’s growth as a learning organization� The 
instruction helped them do this by discussing the attributes of leaders serving in 
a learning organization, as described in the black book� It also included a descrip-
tion of the shipyard’s existing organizational and governance structure to show 
the interrelatedness of departments and leadership within the entire system of the 
shipyard� Descriptions of various leadership governance boards and the role of 
those boards in making business decisions in the shipyard were included as well�
LEARNING-ORGANIZATION CHALLENGES
Moving from generating good ideas to implementing them is a challenge that 
most organizations must face, and PHNS was no different� Senge notes that 
“[o]ne thing all managers know is that many of the best ideas never get into 
practice� Brilliant strategies fail to get translated into action� Systemic insights 
never find their way into operating policies� A pilot experiment may prove to 
everyone’s satisfaction that a new approach leads to better results, but widespread 
adoption of the approach never occurs�”21 
According to the learning-organization model, the gap between thinking and 
doing stems primarily from mental models� In other words, new insights fail to 
be put into practice because they conflict with deeply held mental models of how 
the world works—models that limit us to familiar ways of thinking and acting�22 
Middle managers at PHNS began to realize that their own mental models were 
preventing them from making the shipyard what they wanted it to be� They ad-
dressed this obstacle by creating the shipyard’s first system archetype for organi-
zational behavior, using the “limits to growth” archetype described in the black 
book� A system archetype is a pattern of structure that recurs again and again� 
The limits-to-growth archetype describes the interaction between a reinforcing 
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process (i�e�, one that fosters growth) and its secondary effects that limit growth� 
Essentially, this concept of a system archetype helps people understand situations 
where growth bumps up against limits to growth�23 
By using the shipyard’s limits-to-growth archetype, the group of middle man-
agers who developed it soon recognized that, while activities such as learning 
cells, brainstorming sessions, and training did indeed promote learning- 
organization behaviors, they also limited growth� Because these activities were vol-
untary, and consequently were conducted on top of regular work responsibilities, 
they were offset “by the limit of growth of people who were not able to effectively 
manage their time�” To remove this barrier to growth, middle managers responded 
by developing and conducting training on time-management techniques�
Another challenge to the shipyard’s desire to become a learning organization 
was the Lean Six Sigma program� Recognizing the benefits of Lean Six Sigma 
methods and success in industry, in May 2008 Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Gordon R� England signed DoD-Wide Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) / 
Lean Six Sigma (LSS) Program, Directive 5010�42, which directed Department 
of Defense (DoD) services and agencies to adopt Lean Six Sigma to achieve con-
tinuous performance improvement�24 Well ahead of DoD, PHNS began to imple-
ment its own Lean Six program in 2004—only two years before the introduction 
of learning-organization concepts� The use of Lean practices gave rise to many 
mental models about performance improvement that seemed to conflict with 
learning-organization concepts; it also created many misconceptions about learn-
ing organizations� This generated increased resistance to the learning-organization 
model, as evidenced by personal conflicts between those who supported Lean 
practices and those who supported learning-organization efforts� The existence of 
two performance-improvement models—not to mention the promotion of “high-
performance organization” concepts only a few years earlier—made some people 
think that the learning-organization framework was simply the newest “flavor of 
the month�” Predictably, this situation also created wide-ranging confusion�
Changes in leadership also presented a significant challenge to the shipyard’s 
efforts to inculcate learning-organization behaviors� As those in leadership po-
sitions moved on to other positions and new leaders replaced them, it became 
apparent that those replacing the previous leaders did not share their mental 
models� This slowed the transformation process, since the new leaders were 
unable or unwilling to support the learning-organization transformation� To 
address this situation, PHNS employees who were committed to this transforma-
tion developed a workshop to reinforce learning-organization fundamentals that 
had been learned and integrated into shipyard operations and workers’ personal 
development previously� This provided a support structure for new supervisors 
who were interested in these principles and who wanted to contribute to the 
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transformation of the shipyard� The workshop also served as a coaching tool for 
teams, since it helped them to benchmark their performance by monitoring the 
routine application of learning-organization behaviors�
LEADERS IN A LEARNING ORGANIZATION
The “word ‘leader’ has come to refer largely to positional authority, a synonym for 
top management� � � � [It implies] that the only people with power to bring about 
change are those at the top of the hierarchy, not those further down�” Regrettably, 
this notion (1) creates the belief that all those who are not at the top of the hierarchy 
are not leaders and, hence, have little ability to bring about change, and (2) over-
simplifies the complex subject of “how to understand the diverse roles of leaders 
� � � and how to develop networks of leaders capable of sustaining deep change�”25 
The military possesses a cultural advantage in this respect, in that its culture 
encourages and fosters “leaders” at every level in the chain of command� For ex-
ample, a young officer on a ship is given responsibility for leading and caring for 
people immediately after reporting aboard� This long-held cultural norm encour-
ages risk taking and initiative at a very early stage in a career and provides fertile 
ground for encouraging a learning mind-set throughout the organization instead 
of simply at the top� Recognizing that initiating and sustaining profound change 
calls for different types of leadership, the leaders in a learning organization are 
designers, teachers, and stewards (described below)� They also are present at all 
levels of an organization, as opposed to serving only in senior positions� 
• The leader as designer: Customarily, shipyard leaders at PHNS often viewed 
themselves as part of the command-and-control system of the shipyard, priz-
ing compliance and performing tasks and fulfilling requirements provided to 
them in written instructions� Essentially, they performed as directed accord-
ing to shipyard rules, regulations, and norms, rather than seeing the shipyard 
as a living system and themselves as designers of that system�
In contrast, learning organizations have leaders “who appreciate organiza-
tions as living organisms�”26 They see themselves as designers who can create 
“organizational artifacts” such as new metrics, innovative practices, guid-
ing ideas, or formal roles and processes� More importantly, these leaders as 
designers recognize that what truly matters is what happens when people use 
those artifacts, practices, ideas, or processes to improve performance�
• The leader as teacher: Before the shipyard’s transition into a learning organi-
zation, shipyard leaders generally were reactive when confronted with prob-
lems—they looked for quick fixes� In addition, when problems with shipyard 
personnel occurred, these leaders often relied on the shipyard’s training pro-
gram to sort them out rather than dealing with the people directly involved 
so they could understand the situation better�
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In learning organizations, leaders as teachers understand the concept of 
mental models—that is, the underlying assumptions that shape followers’ 
behaviors and actions—and use this awareness to help others see problems 
in terms of underlying systemic structures rather than merely short-term 
events� The leader’s core task as a teacher is to “help people see reality as a 
medium for creating their visions rather than as a source of limitation�”27 
• The leader as steward: Shipyard leaders tended to focus primarily on the 
needs of their own individual organizations, and in doing so they created 
“stovepipes” within PHNS� Moreover, when a problem occurred, the phrase 
“stay out of the spotlight” commonly was heard among shipyard leaders, 
since personnel preferred to have someone else in the organization take 
the blame and criticism associated with the problem� In contrast, leaders as 
stewards in learning organizations do what is right for the entire organiza-
tion; they serve a larger purpose�28 When faced with a problem, these leaders 
work with others, taking the time to understand how the entire system is 
functioning and enabling those directly involved with the problem to develop 
long-term solutions� 
In addition to recognizing the need for different types of leaders, PHNS real-
ized that facilitating lasting behavioral changes at the shipyard would take a great 
deal of time� The leadership also recognized that measuring progress would 
require unique metrics different from traditional business measurements such 
as costs and schedules� Indeed, measuring progress would require taking into ac-
count personnel interactions and behaviors such as “changes in attitude, relation-
ships, how people communicate with one another, passion, and commitment�”
CULTIVATING LEARNING-ORGANIZATION LEADERS
Creating a learning organization requires leadership that is not based on tradi-
tional hierarchy� Rather, it calls for a combination of different people from all 
levels of the system who lead in different ways and who are dependent on each 
other�29 To this end, PHNS created a course to educate the entire shipyard work-
force about learning-organization concepts� The three-day course, titled TALK 
101, helped students learn about the five learning-organization disciplines, 
what they meant, and how they related to the shipyard�30 What made this course 
impactful was not simply the information conveyed but the learning experience 
in which participants engaged� It was the first command-wide training course 
to assert that the command’s growth and improvement depended on the growth 
and improvement of its people as individuals (versus teams)� To facilitate this 
critical individual development, TALK 101 encouraged personal reflection, 
conducted interactive group exercises, and incorporated personal testimonies 
from leaders across the command on how they applied learning-organization 
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concepts to improve themselves and the command� The workshop encouraged 
some participants to seek out gaps in their performance so they could improve 
on them to help improve shipyard performance� All these activities served to 
foster dialogue, which helped to start new relationships, strengthen existing 
ones, build trust, and improve communication skills� A nuclear business of-
ficer at the shipyard commented, “We all learned how to conduct a skillful 
dialogue to best share information and opinions�” This was especially relevant 
because poor communication and weak relationships between managers and 
supervisors had been flagged as a reason why leadership often was unaware of 
problems at the shipyard�
The Personal Mastery Executive Workshop (PMEW) was another way that 
PHNS cultivated leaders� It was developed in response to a significant “say-do 
gap” among shipyard leaders� While efforts to educate the shipyard workforce 
about learning-organization concepts were flourishing, this say-do gap among 
many in formal leadership positions hindered the overall transformation 
process� As the gap between leaders’ words and actions grew, doubts about 
the efficacy of becoming a learning organization arose, negatively impacting 
even those who truly were committed to the process� To eliminate this gap, the 
PMEW concentrated on aligning leaders with their roles and responsibilities 
as facilitators of organizational change at the shipyard� The weeklong work-
shop focused on the core competencies of leaders in a learning organization, 
highlighting the importance of establishing a vision and plans that supported 
organizational goals, such as increasing emotional intelligence, building trust, 
and effectively leading those who still were learning about the five disciplines 
and other aspects of learning organizations�
While leaders were cultivated, in part, through formal education and train-
ing, it became clear to the shipyard that performance-improvement activities 
such as these were successful only when participants committed to being en-
gaged actively both during and after the events� To promote postactivity engage-
ment, the shipyard created the “personal mastery support structure,” designed 
to foster continual learning� Leaders participating in the PMEW, for example, 
were required to speak with their supervisors on the last day of the workshop, 
declaring their commitment to the organization and explaining their plans for 
making progress in their individual areas of responsibility� This was followed 
by embedding their improvement plans into their performance objectives and 
organizational self-assessments, to ensure individual accountability� Peer-to-
peer gatherings known as “reunions” also became part of the personal mastery 
support structure� These events provided a forum for first-line supervisors and 
their peers to sit with their department heads in an informal setting to discuss 
progress on supervisors’ personal-development plans, review course content, 
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and talk about other topics related to improving performance� Finally, mentor-
ing relationships among peers (who became known as “accountability part-
ners”) were another means to encourage sustained engagement, and thereby to 
enable the shipyard’s conversion into a learning organization�
IMPROVING SHIPYARD PERFORMANCE
Educating the shipyard workforce about learning-organization concepts and 
practices yielded improvements in three main areas: problem solving, motiva-
tion, and teamwork� Problem-solving capabilities were enhanced, for instance, 
by redesigning PHNS’s original Critique Program to align with the learning-
organization disciplines of mental models and team learning� The Critique 
Program had existed to address unanticipated events that were problematic� 
PHNS unnecessarily employed a top-down approach to solving these prob-
lems, focusing primarily on holding people accountable for mistakes or failures 
rather than viewing these events as opportunities to learn� In contrast, by re-
designing the program to take a bottom-up approach to problem solving and 
create a safe learning environment, the shipyard shifted from assigning blame 
to encouraging all workers to apply their critical-thinking skills to solve prob-
lems� Essentially, the program redesign changed team members’ mental models 
about the nature and purpose of a critique� No longer perceived as a mechanism 
simply to hold individuals accountable (which imbued a sense of negativity), 
critiques became an opportunity to learn from mistakes, as well as to leverage 
teams’ diverse and innovative approaches to solving problems�
This shift in approach resulted in an increased level of motivation and per-
formance based on a shared vision� A noteworthy example of this concerned 
a project to repair USS Olympia (a Los Angeles–class submarine)� In mid-June 
2007, PHNS committed to NAVSEA to complete planned valve repairs to 
Olympia by 15 August� However, many at PHNS were concerned that this goal 
would not be achieved, since about 80 percent of the valve team—the marine 
machinery mechanics and supervisors assigned to the task—had less than one 
year of experience, while the production schedule would have been demanding 
even for an experienced, senior team�
The Olympia project-management team and Machine Shop 38 (the lead 
shop for this assignment) decided to introduce learning-organization princi-
ples to the valve team to ensure its success� Senior leaders briefed the mechanics 
on these principles and followed up by organizing workers-only brainstorming 
sessions at which mechanics were encouraged to speak up and discuss what 
they needed to do� The mechanics then developed and delivered a prioritized 
list of activities and needs to the project supervisor, which were acted on� For 
example, they identified a need for more space and help to stage the mechanics’ 
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gear; a vacant enclosure was moved to the work area and additional tools were 
supplied� In addition to responding to workers’ identified needs, “project 
management shared information about status, milestones, and schedules with 
workers in regular briefings and by posting charts�” This enabled the work-
ers to become part of the shared vision of “15 valves by August 15�” Having a 
shared vision helped the mechanics (who generally had been assigned their 
work one task at a time) to understand the big picture—in other words, how 
an individual’s job impacted other jobs and schedules� Another team was as-
signed to fast-track workers’ ideas for improvements� All these efforts resulted 
in a noticeable trend as the work progressed, in which the mechanics became 
more familiar with valve repair and associated scheduling implications to the 
project overall and were motivated to improve their performance� In fact, the 
mechanics’ performance improved to the point that they finished the project 
one day early and under budget�31 
As one might imagine, mastering the learning-organization discipline of 
team learning (a discipline that builds on shared vision and personal mastery) 
improved teamwork at PHNS in significant ways� According to Senge, team 
learning is the process of aligning and developing the capacity of a team to cre-
ate the results its members truly desire� A collective discipline, team learning 
has the following three critical dimensions: (1) it fosters collective intelligence; 
(2) it enables teams to act in spontaneous, yet coordinated, ways through “op-
erational trust”; and (3) it promotes learning beyond one team to other teams�32 
In December 2014, PHNS was designated the “Corporate Lead Shipyard,” 
responsible for executing a complex and critical repair on active nuclear sub-
marines� A demanding process, the repair called for around-the-clock shifts six 
days a week for ten months, as well as for qualifying new and improved meth-
odologies, such as compact Freon freeze seal, critical complex nuclear mock-up 
training, and multisubmarine team execution� In addition, all three of these 
methodologies required critical assessments and refinement of research and 
development, nuclear training, mechanical skills proficiency training, design of 
special tools, and personnel qualifications�33 In short, the complexity and difficul-
ty of this repair mission meant that if the shipyard was to succeed it would have 
to mature rapidly in its “productioneering”—team learning—efforts toward plan-
ning, training, and execution of critical, complex, and high-risk nuclear work�34 
Accordingly, the shipyard conducted a variety of activities, including a rapid-
improvement event (RIE) based on team-learning dimensions� The RIE engaged 
deck-plate experts (e�g�, mechanics, engineers, technicians, training instructors, 
and first-line supervisors) to increase ownership, improve self-accountability, 
develop improvement items and processes, and define team values� Doing so 
helped them define a vision for the mission� The RIE also taught critical thinking 
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skills and self-reflection, both of which facilitated individual and team improve-
ment� In essence, “the RIE shaped a culture change that drove a new team battle 
cry, success is achieved through ‘T�E�A�M�’ = Tactically Executing Anticipated 
Movement�”35 This culture change was evidenced by the team’s transparency, 
communication, and cohesiveness, which together demonstrated a discernible 
unity among multiple trades/shops and engineering codes�36 
TRANSFORMING THE SHIPYARD AND THE NAVY
By prioritizing the development of the key learning-organization competencies 
outlined in The Fifth Discipline—specifically, personal mastery, mental models, 
shared vision, team learning, and systems thinking—over the past ten-plus years, 
PHNS successfully changed its trajectory from a shipyard that was threatened 
with closure to one that excels in its mission of repairing, maintaining, and mod-
ernizing the U�S� Pacific Fleet� No longer responding to changes and problems 
in a hierarchical, stovepiped, and often reproachful manner, as they often had 
done before becoming a learning organization, shipyard leaders today leverage 
collective intelligence and experience to deal with issues that arise� They do this 
by continuing to practice learning-organization principles deliberately, both per-
sonally and with their teams� By eliminating the say-do gap often associated with 
effecting change, PHNS leaders not only model the behavior they seek in others 
but motivate shipyard workers at all levels to do the same� This has transformed 
the culture of the shipyard, enhancing its overall performance and increasing the 
satisfaction of its employees�
Senge’s learning-organization principles not only have assisted PHNS in becom-
ing the organization it wants to be but also provide a possible framework for 
the Navy to transform its traditional command-and-control hierarchies to less-
rigid structures that allow for rapid knowledge transfer, effective information 
sharing, and continual learning� The transparent and aspirational nature of a 
learning-organization culture also encourages humility and reflection—qualities 
necessary for adapting to the generational shift the Navy and industry are expe-
riencing today� Learning-organization fundamentals can galvanize large groups 
of people and transcend generational differences by helping to generate a shared 
purpose (vision) to achieve the desired future� And finally, the five disciplines 
of a learning organization also promote adaptability—a critical attribute when 
dealing with the highly dynamic and complex environments of the twenty-first 
century� Considering the multiple and recurring benefits of cultivating a learn-
ing culture, Navy leaders might consider incorporating the five disciplines, or 
other frameworks that facilitate continuous learning, as a way to transform their 
organizations into the ones they seek�
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The United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission con-
vened a daylong hearing on the global power-projection capabilities of the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on 20 February 2020� What follows is a ver-
sion of the testimony with which the author responded to the commission’s 
questions on Chinese bases and access points, drawing on an original data set 
of the ninety-five overseas port terminals that Chinese firms—primarily three 
entities, two of which are central state–owned enterprises—own, operate, or 
both�1 These facilities are concentrated in the Indian Ocean and eastern Medi-
terranean Sea�
Some of the terminals in this expanding commercial network may serve dual-
use functions as “strategic strongpoints” for the PLA to sustain overseas military 
operations of increasing complexity and duration� This strongpoint model is 
not suited for supporting high-end combat; rather, it is optimized for peace-
time logistics and intelligence collection� Domestically, efforts are under way to 
achieve greater “military-civilian fusion,” such that PLA forces can use terminals 
operated by Chinese firms more readily� Internationally, the PLA Navy (PLAN) 
engages in military diplomacy that advances the 
political relationships between China and host 
countries, including by conducting port calls at 
facilities owned and operated by Chinese firms�
The testimony concludes with analysis of 
Chinese firms’ terminals in the United States and 
several recommendations for U�S� policy makers 
to understand and mitigate security risks from 
China’s overseas port expansion�
RESEARCH & DEBATE
PIER COMPETITOR TESTIMONY ON CHINA’S GLOBAL PORTS
Isaac Kardon
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RESEARCH & DEBATE
PIER COMPETITOR TESTIMONY ON CHINA’S GLOBAL PORTS
Isaac Kardon
Where and how is China securing bases and other access points to facilitate its 
expeditionary capabilities?
The PLA’s air- and sealift capabilities remain insufficient to supply and sustain 
complex military operations beyond the range of mainland logistics networks� 
Yet, with the notable exception of the sole military “support base” in Djibouti, 
these limited vessels and aircraft are the PLA’s only organic mode of “strategic de-
livery” to project military power overseas�2 Lacking a network of overseas bases, 
the PLA must rely on a variety of commercial access points to operate beyond the 
first island chain� Because the PLAN is the service branch to which virtually all 
these missions fall, this testimony focuses on port facilities�
The PLAN depends on commercial ports to support its growing operations 
overseas� Over the course of deploying thirty-five escort task forces since 2008 
to perform an antipiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, the PLAN has developed 
a pattern of procuring commercial husbanding services for fuel and supplies at 
hundreds of ports across the globe� All navies that operate abroad rely to some 
degree on such routine commercial arrangements� The distinctive aspect of the 
PLAN’s efforts to support a growing overseas presence, however, is its access to 
a large and growing number of ports (partly) owned and operated by People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) firms� PLA officers and Chinese analysts tout a variety 
of possible dual-use functions at these ports, which in some cases are dubbed 
China’s overseas “strategic strongpoints�”3
How does the PLAN use these facilities; where are the facilities located; who 
owns and operates them; and what, if any, military purposes do they serve? After 
summarizing the pattern of commercial activity, we will turn to the potential 
dual-use functions of Chinese-owned and -operated ports and the prospects for 
securing actual military bases�
China’s Global Port Portfolio
Since the late 1990s, a handful of Chinese firms have seized considerable market 
share as international terminal operators� They have leveraged capital and exper-
tise drawn from the extraordinary scale of China’s own domestic port industry 
(which boasts thirty-one of the world’s top fifty ports by total cargo tonnage, and 
seven of the top ten highest-throughput containerports) to expand overseas�4 As 
of July 2020, PRC firms (partly) owned or operated some ninety-five ports across 
the globe�5 At a far larger number of ports—on the order of hundreds—Chinese 
firms have built port works, upgraded equipment, or dredged harbors�6 However, 
such contracted projects do not leave a Chinese firm in control of the manage-
ment or operations of the port, and thus are excluded from analysis here of how 
Chinese commercial facilities may support military operations�
Ownership is a major factor in unlocking dual-use potential� Of the ninety-five 
Chinese-operated/owned ports abroad, central state–owned enterprises (SOEs) 
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have operational roles, ownership stakes, or both in fifty-two of them, and eight 
involve local SOEs but no central SOEs�7 In thirty-five of the Chinese-operated/
owned overseas ports, private firms have ownership stakes or operational roles 
and no SOEs are present� A Chinese firm is the majority shareholder in at least 
one terminal at fifty-six ports, and the 100 percent shareholder in twenty-three 
of those�
Of China’s overseas port operations, 81 percent (seventy-seven of ninety-five) 
are accounted for by three Chinese firms: Hutchison Ports (Hutchison), COSCO 
Shipping Ports (COSCO), and China Merchants Port (CMPort)� Each is a subsid-
iary of a larger enterprise group, with COSCO and CMPort answering to a central 
SOE led by an executive with vice-ministerial rank in government� Hutchison is 
a majority shareholder in thirty-six of its thirty-eight ports, including twenty in 
which it holds 100 percent stakes� COSCO holds majority stakes in seven of its 
nineteen overseas ports� CMPort holds majority stakes in three of its thirty-three 
overseas terminals; in twenty-nine of CMPort’s terminals it maintains a minority 
partnership through a joint venture (with the French firm CMA CGM) in which 
CMPort has no managerial or operational role, only portfolio investment and 
board representation�8
The geography of these firms’ holdings is represented in the figure� By ocean, 
there are thirty-one in the Atlantic, twenty-five in the Indian Ocean, twenty-one 
in the Pacific, and sixteen in the Mediterranean� Regionally, there are twenty-two 
in Europe, twenty in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), eighteen in the 
Americas, eighteen in South and Southeast Asia, and nine in sub-Saharan Africa� 
Fifty-three of these ports are located proximate to key maritime choke points� Of 
these, ten are near the English Channel, nine are near the Malacca Strait, nine are 
near the Strait of Hormuz, six are near the Suez Canal, and four each are near the 
Panama Canal, the Gibraltar Strait, and the Turkish straits�9
Analysis
The “where” of prospective PLAN access points basically can be read off a map 
such as the figure� That spatial representation reveals more about the distribution 
than does a simple count of ports� While a plurality of China’s overseas ports are 
on the Atlantic, their wide geographic dispersion (ten in the western Atlantic, ten 
in the eastern Atlantic, eleven in the northern Atlantic) makes that accounting 
misleading� But because the Atlantic ports lie across the ocean on different con-
tinents, the western Indian Ocean region, or MENA, should be considered the 
area of greatest concentration—and especially so if we include the seven ports on 
the eastern Mediterranean, which serve vital roles for traffic moving through the 
Suez Canal into or out of the Indian Ocean� South and Southeast Asia also host 
concentrations of Chinese ports at key locations along major sea lines of com-
munication (SLOCs) and proximate to critical choke points�
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The “how” of securing control over the operations of a port and using it is more 
complex� China’s lack of alliances means that there are no standing legal com-
mitments for military use (with the exception of Djibouti), and each such access 
agreement will be negotiated ad hoc—and likely out of public view�10 The fact pat-
tern above shows a significant incidence of Chinese SOE ownership and operation 
at foreign port facilities, concentrated in a small handful of firms� On its face, this 
suggests the potential for a high degree of coordination between firms and the 
military for use of a network of commercial port facilities� This assumption bears 
further scrutiny, though, as there are several other characteristics of port opera-
tions that may be more decisive than corporate ownership� There also are a large 
number of ports in countries in which the PLA is unlikely to enjoy the political 
favor of the host government� Analysis of these characteristics allows us to win-
now down the list to a handful of ports that should be considered most likely can-
didates for fuller dual-use development as PLAN access points in critical regions�
The dominance of the political over the commercial in firm behavior cannot 
be assumed on the basis of ownership�11 More significant than corporate owner-
ship is the degree to which the firm itself controls the operations of the port, 
the physical capacity of the port to supply naval vessels, the specific conditions 
of the concession from the local port authority (e�g�, lease term, responsibilities 
of various partners to a venture), and the nature and scope of China’s broader 
diplomatic and economic relations with the host country� In general, a terminal 
operator will have significant discretion in granting access to naval vessels seek-
ing to call, warehousing and storage, and bunkering, as well as use of dry dock, 
medical, power, and other terminal facilities� Majority or sole ownership of the 
port operator is the condition that best positions a firm to guarantee logistical 
CHINESE FIRMS’ GLOBAL PORT PORTFOLIO
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support for naval operations� Such arrangements are more feasible in friendly 
countries in which low transparency is the norm in contracting (and governance 
generally) and where China accounts for a large proportion of their overall trade 
and investment�
Considering these factors at the firm level helps narrow the field� Of the major 
firms involved, Hutchison is a relatively unlikely candidate to make its ports ac-
cessible to the PLA� Of the fifty-six majority stakes Chinese firms hold, Hutchi-
son holds thirty-six, including twenty of the twenty-three ports where a Chinese 
firm has sole ownership of a terminal� Nearly half its holdings are in advanced 
industrial democracies and tend to be single terminals within much larger port 
complexes� This private firm’s senior management is from Hong Kong, Europe, 
and Latin America and the company is incorporated in the Cayman Islands 
(with subsidiaries scattered across other jurisdictions, including the British 
Virgin Islands and Singapore)� Its major operations can be found in the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Mexico, but it also operates several ports in and 
around the Persian Gulf (the United Arab Emirates [UAE], Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 
and Pakistan), the eastern Mediterranean (Egypt), the Panama Canal, and East 
Africa (Tanzania) in which it holds majority or total ownership of one or more 
terminals� Hutchison’s political and geographic distance from Beijing makes it 
a less likely candidate for the deep cooperation required to establish dual-use 
functions�12 Its governance is more transparent than that of SOEs� Diversion of 
corporate resources toward noneconomic purposes likely would meet internal 
resistance and invite external scrutiny�
By contrast, COSCO is a central SOE that formerly was controlled directly by 
the PRC Ministry of Transport as the sole domestic and international shipping 
operator in China� It has undergone several rounds of corporate transformation 
and mergers to become a global transport and logistics behemoth�13 Its terminal-
operating subsidiary, COSCO Shipping Ports, has taken a variety of notable posi-
tions in foreign ports, including majority control of the port authority at Piraeus, 
Greece, with a 100 percent ownership of development and operations at two of 
that port’s terminals� Other notable projects include COSCO’s first international 
greenfield port development, a 90 percent stake in the Khalifa port in Abu Dhabi, 
UAE, to set up the largest freight station in the Middle East; a second greenfield 
investment, at Puerto Chancay in Peru, is also a majority stake (60 percent)� 
COSCO’s notable lack of transparency and appetite for loss-making ventures 
owing to heavy subsidization and support from Beijing make it a most-likely 
candidate for facilitating military use of its port facilities—and also its shipping, 
container, and general logistics capacity�14
CMPort is also a central SOE, but with a political reputation and corpo-
rate strategy quite different from COSCO’s� Firm representatives and industry 
138
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/1
 K A R D O N  1 3 3
executives note its independent origins as a Hong Kong trading house founded 
during the “self-strengthening movement” in opposition to British occupation, 
and have taken somewhat more conservative positions in overseas ports (with 
major exceptions at Hambantota and Djibouti)�15 The bulk of CMPort’s overseas 
ports (twenty-nine of thirty-three) are in fact portfolio investments—that is, 
minority stakes in a joint venture with the French firm CMA CGM’s terminal-
operating subsidiary Terminal Link, in which CMPort has no operational or 
managerial role�16 CMPort has sought to distinguish itself with slick marketing 
and appeals to foreign investors on the strength of its “Shekou Model” for com-
prehensive development of a port site into a trade-and-commerce hub, drawing 
attention to its corporate strategy from the likes of Wharton and Harvard Busi-
ness School�17 The firm’s executives are media-savvy (at least compared with 
COSCO’s) promoters who traffic in business jargon and explain their firm’s 
interests as maximizing “synergies” with “exposure to major trade flows and key 
resources�”18
However, CMPort operates the port adjacent to the Djibouti base, where it 
regularly has devoted commercial pier space to PLAN surface combatants�19 
The comprehensive commercial ecosystem prescribed in its Shekou Model also 
establishes a large and diverse Chinese commercial presence, including ashore 
transport, logistics, industrial, and communications facilities� While less easily 
persuaded to crowd out its commercial business than COSCO or local SOEs, 
CMPort is demonstrably willing to coordinate with the PLAN and has pursued 
some projects in strategic areas despite their dubious commercial prospects 
(Hambantota, in Sri Lanka, stands out on this count)�
Beyond those “big three” players, other PRC firms operate or own only a 
small handful of ports worthy of close scrutiny� China Overseas Port Holding 
Company is a state-owned firm that is the sole owner and operator of the Paki-
stani port of Gwadar� According to its chairman, Zhang Baozhong, the firm was 
“specially designed and purposely built for the construction of the Gwadar Port 
by the Chinese government�”20 One unnamed PLA officer reportedly said of 
China’s military use of Gwadar as a base that “the food is already on the plate, 
we’ll eat it whenever we want to�”21 Pakistan stands out as a country where China’s 
extraordinarily close political, military, and economic ties make it a prime can-
didate for expansion of PLAN operations� Provincial SOEs Guangxi Beibu Gulf 
International Port Group and Tianjin Union Development Group are developing 
port projects in Cambodia under an unusual land lease, and construction of a 
military-grade airfield and reported PLA activity in the area have raised hack-
les�22 Cambodia, like Pakistan and North Korea, is among the countries most 
likely to cooperate in nonpublic ways with the PRC to provide reliable military 
access to the PLA�
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For the PLA to use any of these ports meaningfully, however, lines of commu-
nication and authorities for military appropriation of civilian facilities need to be 
established� This prompts the next question addressed in this testimony�
How do policies such as “military-civil fusion” and laws and regulations such as 
China’s 2017 National Defense Transportation Law improve the PLA’s expedition-
ary and force-projection capabilities?
Beijing’s energetic promotion of “military-civil fusion” has created wide av-
enues for cooperation between the PLA and industry�23 Among the significant 
elements of this program for the military use of commercial port facilities are 
a series of reforms, as well as laws and regulations obligating firms to prepare 
actively for and accommodate military requests� A National Defense Mobiliza-
tion Law, a National Defense Transportation Law, and two newly formed and 
upgraded organs under the Central Military Commission (CMC)—the National 
Defense Mobilization Department and the Logistics Support Department, cre-
ated in a major round of PLA reforms in 2016—stand out as key indications of 
the desired trajectory of more-integrated dual-use capabilities�24 Central policy 
is driving toward a more substantial role for the military and the state in defining 
the conditions under which civilian assets and resources are employed�25
The mobilization law guarantees fiscal reimbursement to central and local 
budgets (art� 6) and further promises untold “rewards for citizens and organiza-
tions that have made outstanding contributions in national defense mobiliza-
tion” (art� 7)� Certain key construction projects, designated jointly by the State 
Council and CMC (art� 22), are to be built to military standards (art� 23), with 
the benefit of “subsidies or other preferential policies” (art� 24)�26 While the 
implementation of the law is left to lower-level authorities, the mandate is clear: 
“any organization or individual has the obligation to accept the expropriation of 
civil resources in accordance with the law” (art� 55)�27 The mobilization law also 
establishes a system for maintaining and transferring “strategic material reserves” 
from enterprises to the military (arts� 33–36)� While administrative regulations 
are left to local military and civilian authorities (notably, the Transportation War 
Readiness Offices at the provincial level), those organs may task the enterprises 
with storing military supplies at overseas facilities� The prerogative to use civil 
transportation capacity—including port facilities, airports, rails, and roads—is 
granted expressly under standing defense-mobilization regulations issued by the 
CMC and State Council�28
Under what circumstances will enterprises have the capacity and willingness 
to build and maintain facilities, equipment, and supplies to military standards, 
which diverts resources and space that otherwise might have commercial value? 
These considerations are closely held, so observable evidence of participation in 
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other military-civilian fusion programs is probably the best indicator� COSCO 
and CMPort containerships and roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels have par-
ticipated in a number of military-civilian exercises, including transport of live 
ammunition and use of RO/RO vessels built to military specifications, so there 
is a basis for expecting cooperation on other matters�29 Making this integration 
systematic and reliable in the event of domestic crisis, however, is a challenge� A 
foreign crisis would involve greater difficulty, by orders of magnitude, requiring 
the Chinese companies to overcome both distance and the acute political sen-
sitivities of a host country that likely will prefer not to be drawn into a conflict�
PLA analysts have studied aspects of this problem of integration and have 
flagged various issues concerning the suitability of commercial facilities for mili-
tary use�30 One 2019 study written by a member of the joint staff of the Eastern 
Theater Command with academics from the Army Transportation Academy 
and Tsinghua University argues that the relevant national-defense requirements 
have not been implemented properly for port construction� Enterprises need to 
build “combat-ready terminals,” with RO/RO berths built to a higher standard 
than those for passenger automobiles, and ensure a ten-meter minimum depth 
in berths; create assembly sites, storage facilities greater than 120,000 square me-
ters, and cold-chain storage for overseas replenishment; and build high-quality 
roads serving the port that can bear heavy equipment�31 Commercial demand for 
these facilities is low, so better “top-level design” and subsidies are necessary for 
enterprises to properly construct ports—even domestically—that can support 
military use�32
Military analysts from the PLA Navy Service College in Tianjin have at-
tempted to model out how commercial cargo terminals can be used to provide 
emergency fuel and material support for the PLAN� Accepting that commercial 
piers and refueling facilities typically are not built to military standards, they 
address the complex protocol that would be required to conduct refueling safely 
using local power, fuel supplies, and military refueling vehicles that can provide 
the correct types and quantities of petroleum, oil, and lubricants for the varied 
classes of PLAN ships� In modeling processes for emergency wartime refueling 
at civilian piers, the paper tries to “accurately predict the emergency fuel support 
process that is in line with wartime naval vessels using civil port cargo terminals, 
fuel-equipment types, and quantity requirements to meet the number of ships 
and refueling flow requirements�”33 This effort seeks only to model one replen-
ishment prior to the arrival of supply ships and tankers, not the sustained access 
to secure fuel and supplies that would be required in a protracted conflict� The 
degree of difficulty here should be taken as evidence of a recognition within the 
PLAN that the service requires a more reliable way to ensure adequate support 
for combat vessels than emergency use of nonspecialized commercial ports�
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The transaction for sourcing and procuring materials also is at issue� Authors 
from the Naval University of Engineering in Wuhan note that “since central 
state–owned enterprises’ main responsibility is certainly not replenishing the 
Chinese military overseas, procurement channels are limited,” which will lead to 
high costs and unsteady supply� They argue that options should be explored such 
that adequate “wartime pre-positioned materials” can be brought to the fight� 
They propose three such options: (1) the PLA operating overseas bases directly, 
(2) the PLA cooperating with Chinese companies already engaged commercially 
in the local economy, and (3) the PLA dealing directly with local governments to 
rent space and procure necessary supplies�34
However desirable such an extensive network of bases might be to PLA opera-
tors, one is not going to materialize in the near future�35 Therefore, the practical 
questions concern how to get the right supplies on time and at manageable prices� 
One article in the PLAN’s official newspaper estimated that it took over twenty 
days to execute a purchase of supplies overseas, giving rise to an “emergency 
foreign purchase plan” that permitted the task force commander to make the pur-
chase directly from a Chinese firm within two days�36 PLA logistics officers argue 
that civilian firms’ organic capabilities far exceed the PLA’s own, and that port calls 
to their facilities “provide a platform for the military to rely on corporate strengths, 
� � � use market economic means, and adopt commercial contract entrustment 
methods to give full play to the advantages of enterprises and realize resource 
sharing�”37 Whether these savings will be achieved because of “sweetheart” deals, 
longer-term wholesale contracts, or outright expropriation is unclear�
From an operational effectiveness standpoint, the PLA would much prefer to 
operate its own dedicated facilities� For broader political reasons, however, the 
opportunity costs of overtly militarizing facilities likely will continue to make this 
option less attractive to civilian leadership—especially when commercial firms 
can service the PLA’s various functional needs adequately�38 The military-civilian 
fusion program reflects and advances a clear leadership preference for leveraging 
growing overseas PRC commercial capacity�
Given the expected costs of militarizing commercial facilities, Chinese strate-
gists have debated actively the highest-value locations for establishing access 
points for the PLAN� While the host country certainly gets a vote, prior to that 
Beijing must prioritize certain projects� These considerations lead to the next 
question�
What does China regard as the most important criteria for selecting future bases 
and access points for the PLA?
A burgeoning literature by Chinese military and civilian analysts on securing 
access to overseas bases and places provides insight into the several criteria that 
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make for desirable overseas bases and access points� Most of these criteria are 
intuitive and of long standing: geographic proximity to perceived security threats; 
hosting by friendly, stable countries; suitable natural conditions at the port (e�g�, 
wide approach channels, deep harbors, unthreatening climate); and capability for 
adequate force protection�39 An additional, more recent factor, based on the com-
mercial developments addressed above, is the advantage offered by the presence 
of Chinese enterprises on or near the site�40
Naturally, geostrategic considerations are paramount� China’s armed forces 
seek to build the capability to defend vulnerable SLOCs, especially at key choke 
points�41 The authoritative PLA Academy of Military Science’s 2013 Science of 
Military Strategy states as follows:
[W]e must build overseas strategic strongpoints that depend on the homeland, 
radiate into the periphery, and move us in the direction of the two oceans [i�e�, the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans]� These sites are to provide support for overseas military 
operations or act as a forward base for deploying military forces overseas, exerting 
political and military influence in relevant regions� We should form a posture with 
the homeland strategic layout that takes account of both the interior and the exterior, 
connects the near with the far, and provides mutual support�42
A staff officer and an academic from the PLA Navy Submarine Academy in Qing-
dao further posit that “[t]he line stretching from the Taiwan Strait through the 
South China Sea, Malacca Strait, Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Sea is China’s 
‘maritime lifeline�’”43 Most analysts focus on this vulnerable lifeline and propose 
strategic strongpoints stretching across the Indian Ocean region, such that supply 
intervals between them are short enough to make one or more ports redundant 
in a crisis�44
Some analysts are willing to make concrete recommendations about preferred 
locations� Academics at the Army Transportation Academy propose that “to 
protect our ever-growing overseas interests, we will progressively establish a lo-
gistics network in Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, Sri Lanka, Burma, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Kenya, and other countries based on various means—buying, renting, 
cooperating—to construct our overseas bases or overseas support strongpoints�”45 
A group of researchers from the PLA Naval Research Institute propose that China 
needs to establish at least one strategic strongpoint in the Bay of Bengal, one in 
the Persian Gulf region, and one in the Suez–Red Sea–Gulf of Aden region� They 
suggest Sittwe in Burma, Gwadar in Pakistan, and Djibouti or the Seychelles, 
respectively�46 They argue that these are defensive positions to check India, but 
that a way to “further influence the entire Indian Ocean route and the African 
continent” would be to establish locations at Hambantota in Sri Lanka or Dar 
es Salaam in Tanzania� An Academy of Military Science analyst also is specific 
about locations, but strikes a more cautious note� “India is extremely sensitive 
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about China-Pakistan cooperation� Despite the fact that China has repeatedly 
emphasized that Gwadar port is a civilian project, India has long suspected that 
China will someday build Gwadar port into a military base�”47 Other proposed 
locations surrounding India (e�g�, the Maldives, the Seychelles, Bangladesh) pose 
similar geopolitical problems for China in terms of balancing responses from 
India, Japan, and the United States�48
Some analysts argue that military access should adhere more closely to eco-
nomic development–focused PRC foreign policy� The “key nodes” should be 
“places where the flows of people, logistics, capital, and information are highly 
concentrated� � � � Reasonably determining and accelerating the construction of 
key nodes along strategic channels is of great practical significance � � � for im-
proving our military’s strategic delivery capability�”49 Authoritative sources fur-
ther stress the importance of noncombat military operations to protect Chinese 
citizens from terrorism, unrest, and natural disasters�50 This logic puts “trade be-
fore the flag” in suggesting that points suitable for military support should be de-
termined by first-order considerations of securing China’s commercial interests�
Still, both a geoeconomic and a geostrategic set of criteria dictate that various 
ports between Suez and the South China Sea should be priorities for military 
access; points farther afield are less attractive from either standpoint� Yet oppor-
tunism is a powerful motivation, and the chance to establish more-substantial 
military access to a commercial port off the major strategic SLOCs—in, say, the 
Gulf of Guinea or the South Pacific—also yields a certain operational logic� In 
addition to providing capacity to operate in distant theaters, such off-center sites 
might trigger less-aggressive balancing from the United States, India, and Japan 
than would a Chinese base in Sri Lanka or Pakistan�
How does China use military diplomacy, foreign assistance, military training, and 
military sales to secure agreements with other countries to provide the PLA with 
basing and other access rights?
PLA interactions with foreign governments and militaries are an important 
component of China’s overall foreign policy�51 China’s military diplomacy has 
provided ample opportunities for PLAN units to call at ports owned or operated 
by PRC firms� PLAN vessels (including the hospital ship Peace Ark) have visited 
at least thirty-one of those ninety-five sites�52 Such visits are likely a prerequisite 
to more-significant military use, and might be used to familiarize PLAN of-
ficers and crews with the facilities and firm personnel operating the Chinese 
terminals�
Notably, though, at fifty-seven of the ninety-five PRC ports overseas, the 
PLAN has called at a different port in the same country, forgoing the oppor-
tunity to call at a terminal owned and operated by a PRC firm� In thirty-six 
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of those fifty-seven forgone port calls, PRC firms held a majority share in a 
terminal operation� While some of those facilities are not ideally suited for a 
PLAN call, virtually any facility has at least rudimentary capacity to support a 
naval ship� If the facility were being prepared for more-substantial naval use, 
the PLAN likely would have opted to visit the Chinese-owned and -operated 
terminal� This observation implies that diplomatic rather than operational 
factors are determinative� China either defers to the host country’s preferences 
or seeks to downplay the military implications of its commercial enterprises’ 
presence in the country, or both� That being the case, the data do not establish a 
definite link between PLA visits and the establishment of bases or access points� 
Conversely, bases and access points cannot be reliably established in advance of 
a PLA visit to the site� Therefore, while observing and analyzing such visits is 
a valuable exercise, it cannot predict definitively an intent to militarize a com-
mercial facility�
Other components of military diplomacy, such as foreign assistance, military 
sales, and military training or education, are consequential for forging relation-
ships conducive to allowing Chinese military access to ports on foreign shores� 
Increasingly, senior-level leadership interactions and training are undertaken 
“off-site,” in mainland China�53 Although foreign students report having very lit-
tle interaction with their PLA counterparts (except with instructors in the class-
room), this combined educational programming establishes personal ties among 
senior officers and forges institutional links between militaries�54 Functional 
exchanges on specialized subjects such as logistics and military medicine also are 
a part of the PLA’s outreach package to foreign militaries� These opportunities, 
like training and education, allow China to showcase its growing capabilities, 
confidence, and professionalism—a valuable impression to leave with foreign 
militaries that may consider affording greater access to a powerful PLA deemed 
capable of benefiting their own national security�
Arms sales, typically paired with other military diplomacy, offer material ben-
efits that can serve as further inducement for a foreign country to be receptive to 
PLA access� Such sales are concentrated disproportionately among South Asian 
states; Pakistan, Burma, and Bangladesh were the top three recipients of Chinese 
arms in the period 2008–18, together accounting for 61 percent of PRC arms 
transfers�55 Given the growing sophistication of some of these exports (such as 
submarines, surface combatants, and unmanned aerial vehicles), they also invite 
ongoing Chinese technical assistance�56 China’s sale of two Ming-class Type 035B 
diesel-electric submarines to Bangladesh illustrates this process� While these 
affordable but obsolete submarines were not capable platforms, they came pack-
aged with Chinese personnel to “supervise the construction” as well as PLAN 
crews to train the Bangladeshi submariners�57 PLAN vessels began calling in 
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Bangladesh in 2016 once the submarines were delivered, and by 2019 Bangladesh 
was negotiating with China to build it a submarine base—although it expressly 
denied that the PLA would use the facility�58
China’s military diplomacy repertoire has grown, and the PLA’s increasing 
capability presents China as a more attractive partner to many states� Yet to date, 
only Djibouti has provided anything recognizable as a secure basing arrange-
ment� This is not necessarily a sign of the failure of the program but rather an 
indicator of its more incremental and unpublicized nature� According to one re-
searcher at the Academy of Military Science’s Foreign Military Studies Institute, it 
may be the establishment of commercial access that leads to military diplomacy� 
“Military diplomacy must obey and serve overall national diplomacy� Therefore, 
in the process of building strategic strongpoints China should not overemphasize 
the role of military diplomacy� Military diplomacy should play a supporting role� 
Moreover, it should place civil affairs and economics front and center� It should 
mix the military among the civilians to conceal the military�”59 Observation of 
military diplomacy, especially PLAN port calls, may then be a lagging indicator 
of the practical military support afforded by China’s growing portfolio of overseas 
ports�
A final consideration concerns Chinese firms’ holdings in the United States�
Please describe Chinese state-owned enterprises’ investments in U.S. ports; the ratio-
nale behind choosing those particular ports; and how U.S. policy makers can assess 
whether Chinese investments in such ports pose security risks to the United States.
Chinese state-owned enterprises hold ownership stakes in terminals at five 
U�S� ports� COSCO has established joint ventures at Long Beach, Los Angeles, 
and Seattle, and CMPort holds a minority stake in a French firm’s terminals 
at Miami and Houston� Neither PRC firm wholly owns or directly operates an 
American terminal� In contrast to the strategic strongpoint approach to develop-
ing dual-use port facilities in the Indian Ocean, Chinese port investment in the 
United States appears to be commercially driven� Augmented U�S� restrictions 
on foreign investment in critical infrastructure diminish plausible risks posed 
by such investment� In particular, robust enforcement of the new Foreign Invest-
ment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) by the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) will diminish further the control a Chi-
nese firm can have over a U�S� port asset, and thus limit such investments from 
posing acute national-security risks�
COSCO
COSCO was the earliest Chinese SOE player in the U�S� maritime sector, begin-
ning cargo shipments shortly after normalization in 1979 and gradually establish-
ing a shipping presence at West Coast ports�60 As the scale of U�S�-China trade 
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increased in the 1990s, COSCO sought a commercial foothold in its biggest 
market, in part by establishing its own terminal� In November 1996, the City of 
Long Beach and COSCO signed a lease for the abandoned Long Beach Naval Sta-
tion to develop and operate it as a cargo port� After public objections, including 
from Congress, the city canceled the lease in April 1997� A subsequent CFIUS 
review of the deal did not find national-security risks, but further congressional 
action ensured that COSCO would not be eligible to use any closed U�S� military 
facilities�61 COSCO subsequently established joint ventures to operate at three 
terminals on the West Coast�
COSCO at Long Beach, Pier J (Pacific Container Terminal). By 2001, COSCO 
had moved on to form a joint venture with Seattle-based Stevedoring Services of 
America (SSA)� Together they took over a lease vacated by the Danish shipping 
and logistics firm Maersk� Their joint venture, Pacific Maritime Services LLC, is a 
private, Delaware-registered corporation that operates the Pacific Container Ter-
minal at Pier J in Long Beach� COSCO is the majority shareholder (51 percent, 
through its New Jersey–based subsidiary COSCO Terminals America, Inc�), but 
decisions by the corporate board require an “affirmative vote of at least 70 per-
cent of the ownership shares of the members,” meaning COSCO does not have 
an effective majority� SSA operates the terminal itself, with COSCO providing 
cargo and shipping services�62 COSCO’s huge volumes of cargo and aggressively 
low pricing tend to distinguish it from rival firms, and make it a valued tenant at 
Long Beach�63
COSCO at Los Angeles, West Basin Container Terminal. Also in 2001, China 
Shipping Group (which merged with COSCO in 2016) entered a joint venture 
with the Taiwanese shipping and logistics firm Yang Ming�64 China Shipping /
COSCO owns 40 percent of the joint venture to operate the West Basin Container 
Terminal (Yang Ming owns 40 percent and Ports America later bought the other 
20 percent)� China Shipping operates three of the fourteen berths at the terminal; 
Yang Ming operates the rest, with Ports America providing stevedoring servic-
es�65 Xi Jinping visited a China Shipping berth (number 100) at the terminal in 
February 2012 (when he was PRC vice president), accompanied by California 
governor Jerry Brown and Los Angeles mayor Antonio Villaraigosa� On site, Xi 
praised the terminal’s role in facilitating huge volumes of Sino-U�S� trade, lauded 
the contributions of Chinese firms to U�S� employment and tax revenues, and 
called attention to the terminal’s use of clean energy�66 At the time, an expansion 
of the terminal was entering its final stages after encountering lawsuits over its 
environmental impact and practices� The terminal was built, but controversy per-
sists today, with new mitigation measures demanded owing to the Chinese firm’s 
“languishing compliance” with emissions regulations�67
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COSCO at Seattle, Terminal 30. Two COSCO subsidiaries hold a collective 33�33 
percent stake in Terminal 30 at the Port of Seattle in a joint venture in place since 
2007�68 As in Long Beach, SSA is the operator, and COSCO’s role as a minority 
shareholder is to drive cargo traffic through the terminal� Officials at the North-
west Seaport Alliance (the port authority for Seattle and Tacoma ports) describe 
COSCO’s massive cargo volumes in glowing terms, viewing the firm as a reliable 
and influential client�69
China Merchants Port
China Merchants Port arrived in the U�S� market considerably later, in 2013 ac-
quiring 49 percent of the public shares in Terminal Link, the terminal-operating 
subsidiary of the French firm CMA CGM�70 According to industry profession-
als, CMA CGM was cash poor and cargo rich, while CMPort was the reverse 
and looking to diversify away from squeezed margins resulting from increasing 
labor costs at its Chinese terminals�71 CMPort in 2013 had substantial cash 
holdings and cash flow from its port operations in China�72 CMPort thus was 
able to offer CMA CGM much-needed capital, as well as favorable financing for 
shipbuilding, distinguishing its bid from that of a Japanese consortium also in-
terested in acquiring stakes in Terminal Link�73 CMPort sought access to global 
markets and made a portfolio investment in a firm that held stakes (mostly 
Xi Jinping visits COSCO’s West Basin Container Terminal, in Los Angeles.
Source: David Starkopf / Office of Mayor Antonio R. Villaraigosa, Xi Jinping Visit–1, https://www.flickr.com/photos/37176081@N02/6922069517/, 
licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0, creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/.
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minority) in fifteen terminals scattered around Europe, Africa, North America, 
and Asia�74 This same commercial logic drove an additional CMPort investment, 
in the form of a one-billion-dollar loan to CMA CGM that secured 49 percent 
ownership of Terminal Link’s stakes in an additional ten ports across the globe 
in December 2019�75
Under the terms of the share acquisition, Terminal Link remains in charge of 
management and operations and appoints four of the seven board members�76 
With a minority position on the board and no CMPort managers involved in the 
terminals, the firm is an equity investor—an associate, not an operating part-
ner—at the two U�S� ports in the Terminal Link portfolio� One industry execu-
tive described the Chinese role in Terminal Link as being contentious at first, as 
CMPort sought more say in corporate governance, but indicated that the firm’s 
presence now is limited to “a couple of China Merchants marketing executives in 
Marseille” (the Terminal Link headquarters)�77
CMPort at Houston (Bayport). The Bayport terminal is a joint venture between 
Terminal Link Texas (51 percent) and Ports America (49 percent), meaning that 
the CMPort equity stake in the entity is 25 percent� The facility handles tankers 
and a large portion of the containerized cargo in the Gulf of Mexico�78
CMPort at Miami (South Florida Container Terminal). This terminal is a joint 
venture between Terminal Link (51 percent) and A�P� Moller–Maersk Terminals 
(49 percent), again giving CMPort a roughly 25 percent equity stake in the rev-
enues from the terminal� As in Houston, this is a modern, upgraded facility with 
access to major U�S� and Latin American markets�
The Wider Context
The commercial motivations underlying these two firms’ entry into the U�S� 
market are not difficult to grasp� The potential security externalities from the 
presence of Chinese SOEs at critical U�S� infrastructure, however, are worth con-
sidering—and indeed, senior U�S� policy makers have considered them, through 
the CFIUS mechanism� While there is not public reporting on each deal that 
this interagency body reviews, parties involved with submitting CFIUS briefs for 
COSCO and CMPort confirm that all their transactions concerning U�S� port 
terminals have been reviewed and conditions have been placed on the terms of 
their ownership�79 The CMPort disclosure on its 2013 share acquisition noted 
that CFIUS approval was still in question, but that contingency agreements had 
been reached to remove the Houston and Miami terminals from the agreement 
if CFIUS was not satisfied by the closing date�80
Since its failed 1996 bid to lease the former Navy facility at Long Beach, 
COSCO has been chastened in its approach to the U�S� market�81 Beginning in 
2017, COSCO sought to acquire the Hong Kong shipping firm Orient Overseas 
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(International) Limited, whose assets included a wholly owned terminal at Long 
Beach�82 COSCO submitted the transaction for antimonopoly review in China 
and the United States, and also filed with CFIUS� In its consultations with CFIUS 
COSCO was conciliatory, offering to place the Long Beach Container Terminal 
(Pier E) at the Port of Long Beach into a U�S� trust pending final sale�83 This facil-
ity was a rare prize: fully automated, with extraordinary efficiency in use, zero 
emissions, and 100 percent ownership by a foreign firm on a long-term lease�84 
COSCO completed the sale in 2019 to an Australian firm, Macquarie, for $1�78 
billion, exceeding the expected sale price of $1�5 billion�85
Moving forward, any further Chinese interest in U�S� terminals will face an 
even more stringent regulatory environment� The CFIUS mechanism has been 
strengthened considerably, with new FIRRMA regulations entering into ef-
fect in 2020�86 They bring about a significant expansion of CFIUS jurisdiction 
over real estate transactions, detailed in section 802� In addition to covering all 
real estate transactions that involve property in proximity to military facilities, 
the new regulations cover real estate transactions at any of the top twenty-five 
ports in the United States and those designated “commercial strategic seaport[s] 
within the National Port Readiness Network” (as defined by the Department 
of Transportation)�87 The regulations also establish a lower threshold to trigger 
CFIUS scrutiny when a foreign entity is judged to “control” a U�S� business�88 Ac-
cording to Proskauer Rose LLP, a U�S� law firm, special attention must be paid 
in structuring joint ventures such that foreign partners do not receive “control” 
rights that will trigger CFIUS review�89 Given these expanded authorities and the 
increased political sensitivity to Chinese investment in the United States, it is 
highly unlikely that a Chinese firm will win a concession to operate a U�S� port in 
the foreseeable future, thus mitigating most (if not all) the risks analyzed earlier 
in this testimony�
While it is premature to claim that PLA logistics arrangements overseas rely on 
PRC firms, there is a growing body of evidence that the commercial facilities 
owned or operated by those firms are a key component of Chinese efforts to 
project power abroad� A few further implications and recommendations flow 
from this conclusion�
Over the long term, PLA planners believe they will require a network of 
overseas bases�90 For the short to medium term, however, the dual-use strategic 
strongpoint model is ascendant� This model provides significant peacetime logis-
tics capability and intelligence value� However, unless and until China establishes 
alliances or security agreements that ensure reliable military access in a conflict, 
the wartime utility of these facilities will be limited�
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Properly equipped and used, commercial ports may perform valuable military 
functions—not only for logistics, but for intelligence and communications—that 
do not require establishment of formal PLA facilities and permissions� Further 
research and analysis of the characteristics of China’s commercial port facilities 
and activities is necessary�
Economic influence is the leading instrument of Chinese efforts to achieve se-
curity abroad� The Chinese firms building and operating infrastructure overseas 
are on the front lines of the nascent great-power competition� There is no viable 
method of preventing their commercial entry into most foreign markets� U�S� 
failure to roll back the concession won by Shanghai International Port Group at 
the Port of Haifa in Israel should be a cautionary tale�91 If a close security partner 
such as Israel is not persuaded that the security risks outweigh the commercial 
benefits, it is highly improbable that other states will forgo Chinese involvement 
in their critical infrastructure�92
Neither U�S� firms nor the U�S� government is prepared to offer direct substi-
tutes for Chinese firms building, financing, or operating ports and other trans-
port infrastructure� More useful than insisting that other states refuse Chinese 
largesse is empowering them to exploit it� U�S� firms and government agencies 
could provide anticipatory consultation with governments and businesses engag-
ing with PRC firms on port projects, providing legal and managerial advice on 
how best to retain control over important operational elements and rights to their 
infrastructure� Helping other states maintain open bidding and nondiscrimina-
tory commercial access to Chinese projects will limit prospective harms to U�S� 
national security�
Given the number and geographic distribution of ports under full or partial 
PRC ownership and operational control, all regional combatant commanders 
should be tasked to specify to the Secretary of Defense which ports are essential 
to U�S� joint forces in carrying out assigned missions in their areas of respon-
sibility� When there are Chinese facilities at these ports, robust risk-mitigation 
measures must be adopted�
N O T E S
  All views expressed in written and spoken 
testimony are those of the author alone and 
not of the U�S� Naval War College, U�S� Navy, 
or U�S� government�
 1� Hearing on China’s Military Power Projec-
tion and U.S. National Interests: Hearing 
before the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, 116th Cong� (2020), 
available at www�uscc�gov/� The author’s 
submitted testimony is on pages 132–51, 
216–20� This piece reproduces that written 
testimony, with slight amendments, edits, 
and data updates�
 2� The facility is sometimes called a 后勤补给
基地 (logistics and supply base), a 保障基地
(support base), or simply a 军事基地 (mili-
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sources�
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 3� See Conor Kennedy, “Strategic Strong Points 
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Foundation China Brief 19, no� 6 (22 March 
2019), available at jamestown�org/� PLA 
scholars from the Academy of Military Sci-
ence have written on the subject; for a good 
example of civilian writing on the subject, see 
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cil’s State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission� See 企业名录 
[“Central SOE Directory”], SASAC, 5 June 
2020, www�sasac�gov�cn/�
 8� China Merchants Port Holdings Com-
pany Limited, “Preliminary Offering 
Memorandum,” fundsupermart�com, 24 July 
2018, secure�fundsupermart�com/�
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ments with Beijing� See, for example, Eddie 
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against Hong Kong Tycoon Li Ka-shing in 
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$1�78bn,” Seatrade Maritime News, 30 April 
2019, www�seatrade-maritime�com/�
 86� Provisions Pertaining to Certain Investments 
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Fed� Reg� 3158 (17 January 2020) (to be codi-
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§ 802�210(a)(4)–(5) (2020)�
 88� Ibid�, § 802�208�
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LLP, 5 February 2020, www�jdsupra�com/�
 90� 刘嘉生 [Liu Jiasheng], 孙大同 [Sun Datong], 
and 彭富兵 [Peng Fubing], 基于国家安全
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交通学院学报 [Journal of Military Transpor-
tation Academy], no� 2 (2019), pp� 9–13�
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Privatization,” Container Management, 27 
January 2020, container-mag�com/; Ron 
Kampeas and Michael Wilner, “Treasury 
Joins White House, Pentagon in Warning 
Israel over Chinese Encroachment,” Jerusalem 
Post, 16 January 2019, www�jpost�com/; “US 
Senate Warns Israel against Letting China 
Run Haifa Port,” Times of Israel, 19 June 2019, 
www�timesofisrael�com/�
 92� For analysis of this issue by retired senior 
U�S� and Israeli military and defense leaders, 
see Shaul Chorev [Adm�] et al�, The Eastern 
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Institute, September 2019), pp� 20–24, hms 
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Small Boats and Daring Men: Maritime Raiding, Irregular Warfare, and the Early American Navy,  
by Benjamin Armstrong� Norman: Univ� of Oklahoma Press, 2019� 280 pages� $34�95�
Naval warfare long has been classified 
into two broad schools� One approach, 
resting largely on the works of Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, has been classified as 
the “blue water,” or guerre d’escadre, 
school, and focuses on open-ocean 
battle-fleet operations� The competing 
theory emphasizes guerre de course, or 
attacks on enemy commerce, and the use 
of what today would be termed asym-
metric warfare at sea� Both terms were 
a product of the Jeune École, a group 
of French writers in the late nineteenth 
century who applied land-warfare 
theories to operations at sea� These 
theorists concluded that technological 
advances had made fleet engagements 
less relevant� Commander Benjamin 
Armstrong, a permanent military 
professor at the U�S� Naval Academy, has 
offered a new approach to examining 
naval warfare by exploring an older and 
often-neglected aspect of maritime con-
flict, guerre de razzia, or war by raiding�
Armstrong draws the idea of guerre 
de razzia from a 2003 essay by noted 
naval historian James Bradford� The 
term guerre de razzia is French and 
derives from the “colonial school” of 
land warfare advocated by Marshals 
Bugeaud, Gallieni, and Lyautey� Bradford 
laid the groundwork for navalizing 
this concept by examining the impact 
of operations conducted by John Paul 
Jones during the American War of 
Independence� Armstrong has expanded 
both the breadth of historical examples 
supporting the idea and the scope of 
what might constitute guerre de razzia.
Small Boats and Daring Men proceeds 
from the original premise of the 
Bradford essay, that naval warfare 
encompasses more than the dichotomy 
of the fleet action versus guerre de 
course orthodoxy� Whereas Bradford 
confined his definition to the temporary 
landing of forces on enemy shores, 
Armstrong adds an array of activities, 
each explored through a separate case 
study� A different conflict or unique 
theater of specific conflicts serves as 
the vehicle to explore each aspect of 
this new school of naval strategy� The 
common thread running through these 
cases is the emphasis on what would 
be termed today irregular warfare.
Armstrong addresses a range of naval 
missions that were common during 
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the age of sail� Descents on enemy 
coasts were common practice in the 
era� “Cutting out” expeditions designed 
to capture, or in some cases recapture, 
vessels in enemy hands also were typical� 
Armstrong adds some unique wrinkles 
to these regular features of warfare in 
the age of sail� In particular, one chapter 
deals not with the projection of power 
from naval vessels against objectives 
ashore or close inshore, but rather the 
reverse� He focuses on methods using 
innovative technology against a superior 
blockading force to allow a weaker 
maritime power to deter invaders� 
This chapter strikes a somewhat 
dissonant note, but the broader themes 
resonate in it as well� It also focuses 
attention on a significant subtheme—
specifically, the role of equipment 
and technological innovation�
Armstrong weaves two additional 
themes throughout his work: the focus 
on unique skill sets in addition to 
specialized equipment, and the impor-
tance of upper-level leadership� Many 
senior leaders saw these operations, 
to use modern terminology, as lesser 
included operations that were inherent 
in the normal conduct of naval warfare; 
such opinions were not well-founded� 
Further, Armstrong emphasizes 
intersectional leadership, both at the 
senior level, where empowering junior 
officers was essential, and at the junior-
officer level, where the mission-critical 
decisions were made� These operations 
served as a nursery for future suc-
cessful leaders of the U�S� Navy�
If there is a weakness in this volume, it is 
the absence of maps� The book provides 
only a single, global chart with general 
locations corresponding to the various 
chapters� As most of the narrative is tac-
tical, more and detailed maps depicting 
the individual operations would have 
been useful for readers unfamiliar 
with the geography of these events�
Perhaps the strongest part of the book 
is the conclusion, which serves to 
acknowledge that this work is a brief 
survey of an understudied aspect of 
America’s naval heritage� While Geoffrey 
Till described naval irregular warfare as 
“postmodern,” Armstrong raises the idea 
that ideas perceived as new and innova-
tive often are reinventions of ideas from 
the past� As Harry Truman was reported 
to have said, “The only thing new in this 
world is the history you don’t know�” 
Professor Armstrong offers a unique 
view of the early American navy� For 
the casual reader, it is an engaging series 
of stories� While histories generally are 
filled with the great battles, the actions 
covered in this book represent smaller, 
more frequent applications of naval 
power� For specialists, this is a frame-
work and an important call to study 
events that do not fit neatly into the 
acknowledged schools of naval strategy�
K� J� DELAMER
Our Man: Richard Holbrooke and the End of the 
American Century, by George Packer� New York: 
Knopf, 2019� 608 pages� $30�
The field of diplomatic history lends 
itself to biographies of diplomats such as 
Secretaries of State or other high-level 
officials as a means of understanding 
policies and the policy makers� Going 
through the shelves of our university 
library, one can chart the history of 
American twentieth-century foreign 
policy through the biographies on the 
shelves� These books, along with works 
such as The Best and the Brightest, tell 
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the story of the rise of Pax Americana 
in the post–World War II world�
However, George Packer’s Our Man: 
Richard Holbrooke and the End of 
the American Century offers another 
narrative by chronicling the career of 
this important American diplomat� 
Using this flawed individual, Packer tells 
the story of America’s flawed foreign 
policy from Vietnam through Bosnia 
to Afghanistan and Iraq, using the 
conflicts as the setting for the narrative 
and Holbrooke as the centerpiece� In 
addition to the chronicling of American 
foreign policy, this biography of Richard 
Holbrooke shows the personal side of 
the man, from his affair with Anthony 
Lake’s wife that ruined his friendship 
with Lake and affected his future 
career, to his dating of Diane Sawyer�
My first memory of Holbrooke is as the 
architect of the Dayton Accords, but it 
was not until reading this heavy tome 
that I discovered that his foreign affairs 
career started during the early years of 
Vietnam, which would influence his 
later views on intervention� Packer high-
lights Holbrooke’s early years, including 
his family’s hiding of his Jewish heritage, 
his ambition to become a journalist 
for the New York Times, and his desire 
to one day become Secretary of State� 
During Vietnam, Holbrooke volunteered 
for a post in the Mekong Delta, where he 
practiced counterinsurgency methods to 
win the hearts and minds of the people� 
However, like so many young bureau-
crats and military officers in Vietnam, 
Holbrooke soon realized the problems 
with the war, and befriended David 
Halberstam and Neil Sheehan, both 
journalistic critics of the war� Packer also 
depicts the friendship and subsequent 
falling-out between Holbrooke and Lake, 
another young Foreign Service officer, 
that would affect Holbrooke’s life greatly�
During the 1970s, Holbrooke left 
government during the Nixon and Ford 
administrations, edited Foreign Affairs, 
and served in the Carter administration� 
During his time in and out of govern-
ment, Holbrooke’s brash attitude made 
enemies among Democratic members 
of the national security community, 
including Zbigniew Brzezinski� During 
the Reagan years, Holbrooke tried a 
career in investment banking, with 
some success; yet, with the election of 
Clinton, Holbrooke saw his opportunity 
for (or destiny of) a top diplomatic 
spot in the administration� However, 
Anthony Lake’s appointment as national 
security advisor stalled that hope for 
Holbrooke� It was not until Holbrooke 
had toured Bosnia as a private citizen 
and began discussing the crisis in the 
media that he received his ambassador-
ship to Germany, and then his role 
as negotiator of the peace accords in 
Dayton� The sections of the book that 
explore the diplomacy of this period are 
excellent and breathe life into an aspect 
of recent history that I feel has been 
ignored� Packer depicts Holbrooke as the 
right man for the right time; the same 
elements of Holbrooke’s personality 
that caused problems with his peers 
allowed him to be successful in working 
with the Serbian and Bosnian leaders�
The success at Dayton marked the 
high point of Holbrooke’s career (and, 
one could argue, the high point of the 
American post–Cold War diplomatic 
era as well)� As with so many officials, 
the changing of administrations pushed 
Holbrooke out of government and back 
into the private sector, until the next 
round of presidential campaigns began 
looking for foreign policy advisers, first 
Kerry in 2004, then Clinton in 2008� 
Packer shows how Holbrooke’s personal-
ity and ambition turned off President 
161
Naval War College: Winter 2021 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 1 5 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Obama, and his only role in the new 
administration was as a special adviser 
for Afghanistan and Pakistan to Hillary 
Clinton, the new Secretary of State—the 
job Holbrooke really wanted� Packer 
chronicles Holbrooke’s failing health and 
his tragic death after having a coronary 
incident in the Secretary of State’s office�
While we only are starting to put 
America’s post–Vietnam War foreign 
policy into context, Richard Holbrooke 
and his story provide one narrative 
looking at a flawed policy through the 
prism of a flawed, but great, man�
EDWARD SALO
The Annotated Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant, ed� 
Elizabeth D� Samet� New York: Liveright, 2019� 
1,068 pages� $45�
Arguably, the editor of an anno-
tated work of significant size has one 
of the more difficult jobs in the field 
of literature, especially when the work 
being annotated is well-known, such as 
the Bible, the collected Sherlock Holmes 
stories, or the complete works of William 
Shakespeare� The editor needs to provide 
historical background; increase the 
reader’s understanding of the author’s 
personal and professional motivations 
and influences; and provide definitions 
of words, phrases, and concepts that are 
now forgotten, out of fashion, or greatly 
changed in meaning� Finding appropriate 
maps, illustrations, and the like also is a 
requirement� Despite these challenges, 
Dr� Elizabeth Samet, a professor of 
English at the U�S� Military Academy, 
has created a welcome addition to the 
field of military history and biography�
Samet’s introduction to this volume is 
worth reading in itself� She freely admits 
her profound admiration for Grant 
since first encountering his Memoirs 
as a graduate student, and credits him 
with having as significant an influence 
on her life as “Virgil, Plutarch, Li Po, 
Montaigne, Shakespeare, Lincoln, 
Frederick Douglass, Herman Melville, 
Leo Tolstoy, Virginia Woolf, and Joan 
Didion” (p� xx)� This is high praise from 
an English professor� She notes that 
Grant’s other admirers are as varied 
as Theodore Roosevelt and Ta-Nehisi 
Coates� For Samet, annotating this work 
clearly was a labor of love, as well as a 
chance to rehabilitate Grant’s image, 
which, she points out, long has been 
intentionally tarnished by political 
opponents, jealous military contempo-
raries, and Southern leaders building 
the myth of the “Lost Cause�” Taking on 
Grant also means taking on the questions 
whether he was an alcoholic, drunk 
and disoriented at Shiloh, and a brutal, 
unimaginative general who defeated 
the Confederacy with tactics that boiled 
down simply to killing more Confederate 
soldiers than the South could replace�
While Samet does much that is 
praiseworthy, there are not enough 
maps, although the majority used are 
from the Army’s exceptional West 
Point Atlas of the Mexican War and its 
counterpart the West Point Atlas of the 
Civil War. Other illustrations include 
photos of notable figures, scenes of 
the war, and contemporary political 
cartoons; readers wishing to take a hard 
look at the latter are advised to have a 
powerful magnifying glass close to hand�
Samet is not afraid to take a stand on 
issues on which the Army and the U�S� 
military at large traditionally have 
displayed a studied neutrality� She 
views Confederate civil-military 
leaders as traitors� She holds no truck 
with the stainless reputation of the 
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reinvented Robert E� Lee� She clearly 
disapproves of the reconciliation efforts 
that saw U�S� military installations 
named for Confederate generals�
Samet does have a tendency to focus on 
the human condition as revealed through 
Grant’s writing, rather than staying 
focused solely on the Civil War� She in-
cludes observations from Stephen Crane, 
Ambrose Bierce, and even Henry Morton 
Stanley� When Grant discusses the 
Navy’s running of Confederate batteries 
at Vicksburg, Samet supplies a lengthy 
account of a sea battle from Frederick 
Marryat, a once-noted nautical writer 
and author of Mr. Midshipman Easy. The 
siege of Vicksburg is illuminated with an 
account of the Roman siege of Jerusalem 
in AD 70� There are descriptions by sol-
diers of being under fire in the Hürtgen 
Forest, and stories penned by Marines in 
World War II� The inner workings and 
dangers associated with Colt’s revolving 
rifle are not discussed, but the impact of 
technology as expressed in John Milton’s 
Paradise Lost is included� While these 
insights are interesting and at times mov-
ing, their utility in helping to understand 
Grant seems, at times, limited� This is 
not to imply that an annotated Memoirs 
dedicated to technical detail or uniform 
minutiae would be superior; it would 
not, by a long shot� The challenge 
is in finding the correct balance�
Surprisingly, Samet’s annotated Memoirs 
does not open a door into Grant’s private 
life to any great degree� In a day when 
the importance of family influences on a 
leader’s personality, style, and emotional 
intelligence is understood to be signifi-
cant, there is relatively little information 
provided in this annotated volume� Such 
information would need to be brought 
to the reader by the editor, for Grant 
himself rarely spoke of such matters�
Another area Samet could have explored 
in greater detail is the degree to which 
Grant the general was aware of and acted 
to influence civil-military relations� 
The Memoirs indicates that Grant was 
well aware of the political currents 
sweeping the country, and at times acted 
in accordance with that knowledge� 
Additionally, there were episodes Grant 
does not bring up in his memoirs that an 
editor could have explored� To her credit, 
Samet looks at some of these, including 
Grant’s General Order 11, which expelled 
Jews suspected of war profiteering from 
portions of Kentucky, Mississippi, and 
Tennessee� Grant himself did not discuss 
this event, just as he did not address 
accusations that he was drunk at Shiloh, 
and the volume is improved by Samet’s 
editorial contribution on this subject�
As it should be—indeed, as it must 
be—Grant’s remains the primary voice 
in this volume� Readers who have not 
read his Memoirs will find a very pleasant 
discovery waiting for them� Those for 
whom this will not be a first encounter 
will find that the book’s reputation as 
perhaps the best military memoir ever 
published still has merit� It is easy to see 
why Samet listed Grant among those 
writers who exercised a profound influ-
ence on her� In turn she has, when all is 
said and done, done her subject justice�
RICHARD NORTON
War and Political Theory, by Brian Orend� Cam-
bridge, U�K�: Polity, 2019� 211 pages� $22�95�
In the latest of his contributions to 
scholarship on warfare, Brian Orend, 
professor of philosophy at the University 
of Waterloo (Ontario, Canada), has 
published War and Political Theory, 
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a volume drawn from the fields of 
applied ethics and international affairs� 
It provides a descriptive and prescrip-
tive analysis of armed conflict that is 
bound to inform and challenge his 
readership with profound insights�
Orend admits that the purpose of his 
book is not so much to champion a 
particular theory but rather to craft an 
“excellent, detached understanding of 
the pros and cons of the most important 
theories, and the most meaningful 
factual contexts which make the theories 
come alive” (p� 2), drawing on the 
interdisciplinary resources of political 
theory, military strategy, applied ethics, 
philosophy, international law, etc� 
Regardless of whether the reader judges 
that Orend has completed his task sat-
isfactorily, the fair reader undoubtedly 
will conclude that War and Political 
Theory exhibits relative impartiality, 
in-depth subject-matter expertise, and 
a daring spirit of discovery that make 
reading the book a worthwhile invest-
ment of time and inquiry� Adopting 
the latest political analysis of respected 
theorists, citing the traditional wisdom 
of ancient philosophers and theologians, 
illustrating germane principles with 
historical cases—all these and more are 
just a few reasons why War and Political 
Theory is as poignant as it is persuasive 
and why Orend is one of the leading 
authorities on the ethics of war today�
For example, in his evaluation of jus 
post bellum, Orend assimilates the 
virtues of the three major theories of 
war (realism, pacifism, and the just-war 
tradition [JWT]) to forge a win-win 
consensus that achieves success consis-
tent with some core values from each 
of the different philosophies, under the 
auspices of revisionist JWT� (1) Orend 
includes as part of jus post bellum the 
important role of international authority 
in occupation laws and war-crime trials, 
meeting the benchmarks of the laws of 
armed conflict� (2) Orend compares and 
contrasts the thick theories of retribu-
tion and rehabilitation but proposes a 
thin theory of five common elements 
(cease-fire, exchange of prisoners of war, 
public proclamation of war’s conclusion, 
accountability in war trials, and pro-
portionality with regard to war’s cause 
and the terms of peace on issues such as 
border disputes) that bridge the chasm 
between the two clashing perspectives 
on justice� (3) A victor’s well-intentioned 
efforts to increase the odds of preventing 
future wars (rebuilding a defeated power 
with investments, demilitarization, 
security, and democratization) fulfill the 
predominant objective of pacifists� (4) 
Orend cautions that a greatly anticipated 
and planned postwar reconstruction, 
stabilization, and conflict-transition 
phase is the best way to secure the hard-
won victories of any war, forging new 
alliances and deterring future aggres-
sion� This point incorporates the priority 
of a realist agenda, which is all about 
winning� If jus post bellum fails, then 
victors may have won the war tactically 
but lost the peace strategically� (5) Orend 
disputes the “mere adjunct thesis” that 
traditional JWT proponents maintain� 
Classic JWT argues that jus post bellum 
is unnecessary because the final phase is 
implicit in jus ad bellum, as the vindica-
tion of a just cause� Yet Orend rightfully 
points out that what is potentially im-
plicit must be made practically explicit, 
because traditional JWT construals 
have overlooked pressing questions 
essential to any long-lasting peace�
Faithful to his task of furnishing a 
detached analysis of the three major 
theories and to supplying a descriptive 
and prescriptive evaluation of war, 
Orend writes his book on the basis of a 
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sympathetic engagement with divergent 
philosophies� He initiates a productive 
conversation among three theoretical 
adversaries, and in so doing points to 
the revisionist JWT position as one that 
effectively applies the most important 
tenets to the changing landscape of war� 
Equally important, Orend maintains the 
distinct criteria of jus ad bellum, jus in 
bello, and jus post bellum but asserts the 
interdependence of each for its logic and 
coherence� The inseparable connection 
of the different phases of war indicates 
the necessity of consistency between 
means and ends� Failure at any stage 
sabotages and undermines the validity of 
the jus pax (just peace) continuum: (1) 
an unjust cause, regardless of how nobly 
executed, will not culminate in a justly 
ordered peace after the war; (2) a war 
fought wrongly can bring into question 
the supposed just nature of its cause; 
and (3) a failed end state dishonors 
the service and sacrifices of those who 
died fighting for a virtuous cause�
As one of the leading voices who has 
defended jus post bellum as an authentic 
part of the JWT, Orend provides 
scholarship that is an interdisciplinary 
storehouse of knowledge filled with 
philosophical, political, and theological 
concepts and practices that enlighten 
both student and scholar with an astute 
reading of history and current affairs� 
In a word, Orend presents a promising 
revision of JWT via jus post bellum for 
international relations that liaises with 
the best of the three major theories 
of war and advocates a reinvigorated 
ethical viewpoint that synergizes clas-
sical and contemporary thoughts 
in a cohesive framework crucial for 
the twenty-first-century struggles 
of war fighting and peacemaking�
EDWARD ERWIN
Burn In: A Novel of the Real Robotic Revolution, by 
P� W� Singer and August Cole� New York: Hough-
ton Mifflin Harcourt, 2020� 432 pages� $28�
Already well-known for his 2009 
book Wired for War, P� W� Singer in 
2016 collaborated with August Cole 
to write Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the 
Next World War. Burn In is their most 
recent collaboration� In this extensively 
researched novel, we follow FBI agent 
Lara Keegan as she trains with a robotic 
partner, TAMS, in a futuristic context 
in which machine/human interface 
is commonplace, but in which this 
integration also is the subject of political 
and social resistance and unrest� Her 
task is the “burn in”: testing the limits 
of such a partner for police and agency 
work� Part buddy film, part political 
thriller/mystery, and part science-fiction 
dystopic reflection on humanity, 
machines, and society, Burn In is truly 
engaging and “a good ride,” as great 
fiction can be� On a more philosophical 
level, it also is thought provoking and 
engaging on a multitude of contem-
porary issues, including personhood 
and personal identity, as well as trust�
First the novel engages the issues of 
personhood and personal identity across 
time, as discussed by philosophers John 
Locke and David Hume� Is TAMS a 
person? When TAMS is decommis-
sioned at a certain point in the novel and 
another TAMS with the same memories 
and programming is brought back, is 
it the same TAMS? Through Keegan’s 
character, the decommissioning feels 
like a death, even a murder; in addition, 
something seems to be missing from 
the second TAMS, even as it offers 
increased capacities, such as deception�
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Personhood is important for ethics and 
moral agency, and ultimately for moral 
responsibility� The machines in the 
novel know humans’ psychological and 
other tendencies and preferences and 
can respond to appropriate, inappropri-
ate, and manipulative ways of achieving 
mission success� Who really is making 
decisions and who has agency here—
the machines or the humans? Keegan 
notes, “Machines don’t have ethics� 
They can be programmed to lie and 
not even know it” (p� 92), supporting 
the classical view that machines are 
instruments, while humans retain 
agency and judgment� For instance, 
TAMS can sift quickly through data 
and analyze them as instructed, but 
it does not know what questions to 
ask or how to weight the data given� 
Agent Keegan, however, can deliver 
meaning, follow her experience-based 
intuition, and render judgments about 
the data and what to do with them�
Second, the issue of trust in many guises 
is woven throughout: trust between 
humans and machines, between 
humans, between citizens and their 
government, and within organizations� 
Whom can one trust, and what is the 
basis of this trust? Philosopher Annette 
C� Baier thinks of trust in terms of 
goodwill and vulnerability; we trust 
those we think have our best interests in 
mind around issues with which we need 
help (“Trust and Antitrust,” Ethics 96, 
no� 2 [January 1986], pp� 234–35)� This 
is quite different from trust in a context 
of military and technology discussions, 
where trust is about predictability and 
reliability� Can machines such as TAMS 
be trusted to exercise judgment and 
discretion relative to their expertise, as 
humans can? Or must humans maintain 
control of these kinds of judgments, 
since machines cannot be moral agents?
What kind of partner can TAMS be for 
Agent Keegan: a good partner, like a hu-
man partner—one that can be trusted? 
The novel tends to focus on trust as 
predictability—that is, the machine will 
not do anything unexpected; except 
that, by the end of the narrative, TAMS 
can engage in deception� At that point, 
Keegan muses about another option� “It 
didn’t have to be a binary choice if she 
was willing to give a machine the most 
human gift of all� Not trust that TAMS 
would do what she expected, but trust 
that it would do the right thing on its 
own” (p� 370)� Right is, of course, a load-
ed term, suggesting a definition of either 
“appropriate to the context” or “moral�”
Personhood and trust highlight 
another theme in the novel: how we 
ought to approach society, in which 
the machine-human interface is but 
one aspect to consider� The high-tech-
guru character Shaw views society as a 
problem to be solved and fixed rather 
than as an ongoing dynamic process� 
Keegan resists this view, as problem 
solving highlights control and predict-
ability, while ongoing engagement and 
relationships of all kinds require Baier’s 
more robust sense of trust, and perhaps 
an expanded notion of personhood�
PAULINE SHANKS KAURIN
Sailing True North: Ten Admirals and the Voy-
age of Character, by James Stavridis [Adm�, USN 
(Ret�)]� New York: Penguin, 2019� 312 pages� $28�
We are witnessing the slow death of 
character, postulates Admiral Stavridis 
in his new book� Using sea stories from 
a colorful group of admirals stretching 
across 2,500 years of history, Stavridis 
illuminates the most essential qualities 
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of character, showing how these qualities 
can be used as sea buoys—marking 
big rocks and shoal water—to help 
us navigate more effectively across 
the inner sea we all must sail�
At first glance, the book seems to fall 
into a long line of heroic leadership 
books that often trot out the same 
decorated military leaders and identify 
the same admirable character traits� 
But Sailing True North is different in 
significant ways� Some of the admirals 
Stavridis discusses were not heroic� 
Some are phantoms of history—names 
that so few people know that they 
might seem mythical, such as Chinese 
admiral Zheng He� Born to a Muslim 
family in 1371, Zheng was ten years 
old when he was taken prisoner and 
castrated� Despite being a eunuch, he 
became a fierce warrior and built China’s 
first deep-ocean fleet� The nine other 
illustrious naval commanders whose 
stories Stavridis tells are Themistocles, 
Francis Drake, Horatio Nelson, Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, John Fisher, Chester 
Nimitz, Hyman Rickover, Elmo 
Zumwalt Jr�, and Grace Hopper�
But ultimately the book is about 
leadership and how character influences 
it� Stavridis sees leadership not as a 
quality but as a tool to influence others 
to accomplish a specific purpose� Both 
good and evil people can be influential 
leaders� Character is the inner quality 
that enables leaders to steer the right 
course� Leadership without character is 
like a ship under way without a rudder, 
sailing toward bad ends� If character as a 
virtue continues to die, throughout our 
life’s voyage we are going to encounter 
more and more rudderless ships�
Stavridis distinguishes between what 
he calls “résumé virtues”—schools 
attended, prizes won—and “eulogy 
virtues”—the character values that 
we hope people attribute to us at our 
funerals, such as honesty and courage� 
Admittedly, he has not unearthed any 
new character attributes, but it is how 
he links them—through the lens of 
a senior warfighter and a disruptive 
innovator—that is new and intriguing�
The narrative is structured like the 
double helix of a DNA molecule; 
one strand consists of the stories of 
the ten admirals, the other of lessons 
that Stavridis learned during his own 
naval career� The two strands wind 
around each other like a twisted ladder, 
connected through the interactions 
of the ten character qualities� This 
structure enables the author to discuss 
both the good and the bad traits of 
these ten admirals, juxtaposed with 
his own career experience of wrestling 
with the challenges of character�
A great strength of Stavridis and his 
insightful book lies in his vulner-
ability and its openness� He does not 
pull his punches—including the ones 
he throws at himself—in discussing 
both the strengths and weaknesses of 
each admiral� This is rare; few, if any, 
senior military leaders are so frank 
about their own shortcomings� It is his 
discussion of his own character flaws 
and how he worked to fix them that 
makes this book truly remarkable�
Stavridis argues that if we are going 
to change our moral compass, we 
must have the desire and ability to 
innovate� Character innovation re-
quires both creativity and courage, 
especially moral courage� Both Drake 
and Fisher—Stavridis’s least and most 
favorite subjects, respectively—high-
light boldness and creativity�
Drake was dark and hot-blooded, a 
brutal tactician who did whatever it 
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took to succeed� Stavridis sees the Drake 
story as a cautionary tale of a swash-
buckling pirate who led by bullying 
and terrifying his men� “Not everyone 
has the bold personality of Drake but 
building the habit of courage—no 
matter the venue—is within everyone’s 
reach and is part of the voyage of 
character” (p� 67)� Drake’s brand of 
boldness is necessary for achieving 
disruptive innovations� Stavridis tells 
the story of how he himself survived the 
antibodies of a rigid bureaucracy that 
wanted to end his career as a one-star 
admiral for his role in leading the Navy’s 
successfully disruptive think tank, 
Deep Blue� To his credit, he also draws 
lessons from his innovation failures 
while leading Southern Command�
Fisher, Stavridis’s favorite, was extraor-
dinarily creative� An undiplomatic 
leader possessing a bitter bark, “Fisher 
never saw a windmill at which he could 
resist tilting” (p� 121)� He championed 
gunnery and advanced submarine 
innovations� As most disrupters do 
in their professions, Fisher created 
plenty of enemies in the Royal Navy� “If 
I could pick only one admiral to spend 
a long evening with,” Stavridis states, “it 
would be Jacky Fisher� That combina-
tion of relentless perseverance and an 
unbounded desire to ‘seize the new’ is 
very, very rare in leaders” (p� 142)�
Stavridis then recounts his own attempts 
to tilt at his share of windmills, includ-
ing his experiences, both good and 
bad, in wrestling with the challenges of 
character� He ends with this question to 
help us judge our own moral compass: 
Who are our heroes? Do we admire 
them because they have a superb list 
of résumé-virtue accomplishments? 
Or do we admire them for their eulogy 
virtues, the character values for which 
people are remembered kindly, such 
as empathy and resilience? If our 
résumé virtues overshadow our eulogy 
virtues, we may need to innovate and 
disrupt, recalibrating our moral 
compass to avoid the big rocks and 
shoals toward which we are headed�
TERRY PIERCE
The Ambassadors: America’s Diplomats on the 
Front Lines, by Paul Richter� New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2019� 352 pages� $28�
Over the past several years, politicians 
and pundits regularly have attacked 
members of the American Foreign 
Service as being part of a “deep state” 
that has some nefarious agenda against 
certain elected leaders� Members of 
the American diplomatic corps are 
portrayed as either elites or partisan 
supporters of political rivals and 
previous administrations� Such would 
run totally counter to the way the 
Foreign Service was envisioned when 
Congress established it in 1924 to be 
a professional, nonpartisan group in 
which an individual’s success would 
be based on ability and merit�
In The Ambassadors: America’s Diplo-
mats on the Front Lines, Paul Richter, a 
former journalist who covered the State 
Department and foreign policy and the 
Pentagon for the Los Angeles Times out 
of its Washington bureau, surveys the 
careers of Ryan Crocker, Robert Ford, 
Anne Patterson, and J� Christopher 
Stevens� These four members of the 
Foreign Service held a combined 
fourteen ambassadorships and deputy 
chief of mission posts in the greater 
Middle East, and played critical roles in 
efforts to stabilize the region� Richter 
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uses them to tell the story of how the 
members of the State Department’s 
Foreign Service worked hand in hand 
with the military in efforts to combat 
terrorism and build a lasting peace�
While a plethora of books has explored 
the U�S� military leaders of the wars in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, Richter 
frames the wars through a different 
prism as he depicts the unflagging 
efforts of the members of the diplomatic 
corps to implement American foreign 
policy in the Middle East and to use 
that foreign policy to bring peace and 
stability to the region� Rather than 
seeing these diplomats as political actors 
trying to subvert the administration’s 
policy, Richter portrays them as tireless 
workers who sometimes are given 
impossible jobs but still execute them, 
even in the harshest of circumstances�
To tell the story of America’s diplomatic 
efforts in the Middle East as part of 
the global war on terror, Richter 
examines the efforts of all members 
of the Department of State’s Bureau of 
Near Eastern Affairs, whom Richter 
describes as “proud, loyal to each 
other, and a bit insular” (p� 9)� Richter 
focuses on Ryan Crocker, the six-time 
ambassador who represented both the 
Bush and Obama administrations in the 
region; Robert Ford, who worked as a 
one-man government in Iraq, and later 
as ambassador in lawless Syria; Anne 
Patterson, ambassador to Pakistan; and J� 
Christopher Stevens, the ambassador to 
Libya who dealt with the violence of the 
land and was later killed in a terrorist 
attack� While Richter tells the stories 
of all four, Crocker and Stevens receive 
more attention for their successes, 
and for Stevens’s courage to conduct 
his diplomacy person to person, no 
matter the personal risk (pp� 216–17)�
To assist the reader in understanding 
the complex web of persons and 
time, the author provides both a 
cast of characters and a time line of 
events—very useful to the reader, who 
otherwise could get lost in the details�
The Ambassadors celebrates those in the 
Foreign Service, who are ignored at the 
best of times and attacked at the worst of 
times� While many books, movies, and 
television shows celebrate the members 
of the military who have been fighting 
in the Middle East since September 11, 
this book offers another view of the 
conflict, seen here through the eyes 
of the nonpartisan members of the 
Foreign Service who also risk their lives 
to further the nation’s policy and bring 
peace� As Ambassador Ryan Crocker 
stated to students at Stanford University, 
“Do you really want to spend your 
career in Brussels, Paris, or Berlin? Or 
do you want to be out where the action 
is?” (p� 285)� While these members of 
the diplomatic corps are not adrenaline 
junkies looking for the excitement of a 
post in a war zone, Richter shows us how 
they want to be where they can make a 
difference in the safety of the nation—no 
matter the personal risk� This book 
should be read by those who feel that we 
can operate with a weakened State De-
partment and those who work with our 
diplomats overseas, as well as those who 
are thinking about a career in diplomacy�
EDWARD SALO
Special Duty: A History of the Japanese Intelligence 
Community, by Richard J� Samuels� Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell Univ� Press, 2019� 355 pages� $32�95�
Former U�S� Director of Central 
Intelligence Robert Gates once said that 
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“the most difficult task that falls to us 
in intelligence is to see the world as it 
is, not as we—or others—would wish 
it to be�” In essence, he was describ-
ing one of the great conundrums of 
the intelligence world: how to find, 
identify, and illuminate facts within 
the darkness, without tainting those 
facts via influence or misperception 
from our own cultural milieu�
Arguably, in the case of Japan, culture 
and tradition have played an oversize 
role in the history of the country’s intel-
ligence trajectory� As a result, according 
to Richard Samuels, “intelligence failure 
has nowhere been more plentiful or 
storied than in Japan” (p� xvii)� Thus, the 
need for Special Duty—to explain Japan’s 
strategic intelligence system relative to 
those of other modern powers, and to 
do so within the context of the nation’s 
complex cultural and historical setting�
Samuels is well positioned to explain 
what sets Japan’s intelligence history 
apart from that of other states� He is the 
Ford International Professor of Political 
Science and director of the Center 
for International Studies at the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, and 
a longtime Asia—and more specifically 
Japan—specialist� Over the course of 
Special Duty’s 350-plus pages, Samuels 
explores Japan’s strategic intelligence 
system and its history, focusing on 
structure, reform, and oversight issues� 
To accomplish this, he reviews Japanese 
intelligence from the late nineteenth 
century to the present, via public 
records and open-source material�
Samuels contends that three drivers 
marked the speed of the community’s 
reform over time: strategic change, 
technological development, and failure� 
But to highlight what sets the nature of 
intelligence in Japan apart from that of 
other systems, Samuels examines six 
elements of the intelligence function: 
“collection, analysis, communication, 
protection, covert action, and oversight�”
Special Duty’s chapter 7 provides a 
clear, organized summary of Samuels’s 
argument, as well as a survey of the 
ebb and flow of Japan’s intelligence 
community from the Meiji period to 
the fluid and increasingly worrisome 
environment that is today’s western 
Pacific� The discussion of Japanese 
intelligence within this new environ-
ment of superpower rivalry and the 
distinct nature of the Trump admin-
istration’s engagement with the region 
quickly reveals the issues that face not 
only Japan but Japan’s long and close 
“unequal relationship” with its victorious 
adversary from the Second World War�
Among the many examples of military 
and intelligence-system failures that 
Samuels highlights is a phenomenon 
that seems never to be absent from 
national bureaucracies: information 
“silos,” or “stovepiping and jurisdic-
tional competition�” A glaring example 
provided is the Imperial Japanese Navy’s 
failure to inform the Japanese public and 
army fully about the disaster it suffered 
at Midway in 1942, which clearly would 
impact strategic planning and interser-
vice trust as the war continued� Samuels 
relates that one Japanese general noted 
that “the extreme sectionalism within 
the military, driven by a competition 
to claim credit for battlefield achieve-
ments, prevented the service branches 
from sharing realistic assessments of 
operational developments” (p� 70)�
Another long-lasting and negative 
trend in much of Japan’s intelligence 
history concerns oversight—or 
the lack thereof; as Samuels notes, 
“formal intelligence oversight never 
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existed in authoritarian Japan�” This 
clearly had a deleterious effect on the 
services’ ability to protect state secrets 
and maximize resources via interservice 
operational deconfliction, and thereby 
to provide quality, focused intelligence 
to the nation’s decision makers�
Special Duty is recommended for the 
serious academic or intelligence practi-
tioner, as it is not a light romp through 
the stirring escapades and game-
changing events of global espionage 
and counterintelligence� Rather, it is a 
thoughtful book by a true academic who 
works to explain the complexities of the 
modern world of intelligence, within the 
even more complex world of Japanese 
culture and history� Besides providing 
the reader a look into the world of 
intelligence, Samuels offers the student 
of contemporary history and strategic 
intrigue a glimpse into the bureaucratic 
realities within which today’s intel-
ligence services must operate—making 
their seldom-known “wins” even more 
impressive, and their usually very public 
failures all the more understandable�
ANDREW G� WILSON
Victory without Peace: The United States Navy in 
European Waters, 1919–1924, by William N� Still 
Jr� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018� 
392 pages� $68�
This title is the third volume in the 
author’s well-known series covering 
the U�S� Navy’s operations in European 
waters from the end of the American 
Civil War until the Navy closed the 
European station in 1929� The volume 
under review covers the uncertain 
period immediately after the First World 
War, when stability in Europe was by 
no means certain and rival powers still 
were jockeying for positions of influence 
in areas that long had been in dispute� 
In particular, the demise of the Austro-
Hungarian and Ottoman empires, 
together with the Bolshevik Revolution 
in Russia, had released long-suppressed 
tensions that were threatening the peace 
process in a number of regions� Still 
vividly describes the stress this created 
for the great powers, which, after years 
of awful conflict, were understandably 
intent on a rapid demobilization and 
a return to “normalcy�” Instead, navies 
of the former Allies found themselves 
embroiled in a wide range of missions 
short of conflict—missions that required 
specialized skills, and for which they 
were, for the most part, poorly prepared�
Still is an accomplished historian 
whose research is always of the highest 
standard, and this volume continues 
that tradition� The work is split 
thematically, and to some extent 
geographically, into ten chapters, each 
of which covers a given mission� The 
first three chapters look at the role 
that naval officers played in the Paris 
peace negotiations, demobilization, and 
the uniquely naval challenge that the 
removal of the North Sea Mine Barrage 
presented� Seven further chapters follow, 
each focusing on a specific mission 
within a particular trouble spot�
Organizationally, this may be as good 
a way as any to present the material� 
However, the combination of Still’s 
focusing on the personal contributions 
of only a few key individuals whose 
responsibilities necessarily transcended 
many of the individual chapters with 
the fact that these events all were 
happening concurrently creates some 
challenges� For example, the Chief of 
Naval Operations and the notable naval 
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personalities in each station changed, 
sometimes more than once, over the five 
years under review� Yet with the start 
of each successive chapter Still takes us 
back in time through many of the earlier 
incumbents’ thinking and interactions, 
albeit from a different angle� This makes 
everything hard to follow, to the point 
where I found myself crying out for a 
chart depicting who relieved whom in 
each of the key naval positions over the 
years in question� Therefore, a good 
prior working knowledge of the key 
naval personalities of the 1920s and 
where and when they served would 
enhance the reader’s experience greatly�
Similarly, when it came to the geograph-
ic regions depicted in chapter 4 and be-
yond, it would have been useful to have 
included a map of some sort in each 
chapter, depicting each of the key places 
mentioned in the text� This would have 
allowed the reader to tie things together 
in terms of time and space and to ap-
preciate better the enormous challenges 
posed by the shortages of platforms and 
the multiplicity of taskings� Although I 
am of European descent and spent most 
of my naval career in these waters, I 
was forced on many occasions to resort 
to online maps to appreciate better 
the author’s points—something that 
perhaps should not have been necessary�
Finally, it also might have been worth 
including a little more detail on what 
became known as the “Naval Battle of 
Paris” in the first chapter� After all, the 
U�S� decision to build a “navy second to 
none”—and the obvious impact this was 
going to have on a close ally, Great Brit-
ain—constituted a monumental policy 
decision for the United States, with 
ramifications to the present day� Such an 
enhanced discussion would have been 
of abiding interest to most naval officers 
and the readership of this journal�
These comments notwithstanding, this 
book still is a very worthwhile addition 
to the library of anyone with a passing 
interest in the development of U�S� naval 
policy� It covers a rarely addressed and 
largely unsung part of naval responsibili-
ties: providing naval support to foreign 
policy in its widest sense; this makes it 
valuable in and of itself� Even though 
general readers may get a little lost in the 
minutiae, Still’s attention to detail and 
his intimate knowledge of the key naval 
personalities of the era give the book a 
wide application within the academic 
field, particularly for established naval 
historians of the period� The eighty-odd 
pages of endnotes alone are a rich source 
of material that can inspire any number 
of supporting studies and additional 
work� Finally, it should not be over-
looked that this glimpse into how the 
U�S� Navy responded in a previous era 
of great-power maneuvering could have 
renewed relevance in today’s uncertain 
times vis-à-vis China and Russia�
ANGUS ROSS
Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges 
for the United States, by Mara E� Karlin� Phila-
delphia: Univ� of Pennsylvania Press, 2018� 296 
pages� $79�95�
Building Militaries in Fragile States is 
a classic example of a doctoral dis-
sertation transformed into a book� The 
author seeks to find the reason that 
U�S� efforts to create strong militaries 
in weaker countries are successful—or 
not� Her answer highlights the role of 
external actors, as well as the degree 
to which the host nation is willing to 
allow the United States to get involved 
in deep and sensitive matters of state 
(e�g�, the assignment of personnel, 
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the creation of national strategy)� The 
author details these conclusions in the 
book’s first three pages� The majority of 
the rest of the book is a tour of care-
fully selected cases, each adding to the 
evidence supporting Karlin’s conclusion�
This journey includes transit through 
an academically obligatory chapter on 
theory, which in this case anchors the 
subject in the discipline of security 
studies and international relations� This 
is followed by a central hypothesis, 
an equally detailed explanation and 
discussion of methodology, and a 
conclusion� Karlin has done her work 
well in this regard; if her dissertation 
committee was not impressed with 
her efforts, it should have been� As her 
evidence and analyses build, nearly 
250 pages later, the reader is likely to 
throw in the intellectual towel and agree 
that an excellent job has been done�
If this were all there was to Building 
Militaries in Fragile States, from the 
position of the lay reader or even the 
security practitioner it would constitute 
a lot of squeeze for a fairly small amount 
of juice� The exceptional attention to 
detail, the comprehensive analysis, and 
the reasoning that are essential to a 
successful dissertation do not always 
make for the most-entertaining reading� 
Thankfully, there is more to this book�
For example, the case studies are 
interesting in and of themselves� 
Accounts of the efforts made to keep 
Greece in the Western sphere of influ-
ence following World War II make for 
fascinating reading� The fact that this 
story is not part of common knowledge 
makes Karlin’s presentation all the 
more interesting� Although the level of 
American and allied effort involved may 
seem small—even quaint—in the cur-
rent environment, the strategic conse-
quences reverberate to the current day�
The case of Vietnam makes for equally 
compelling reading—and Karlin’s 
analysis reveals that America’s failure in 
its attempts to build the South Vietnam-
ese army was even more spectacular 
than commonly is acknowledged� 
Given the enormous sacrifice that 
South Vietnamese soldiers made, the 
price of failure was exceptionally high� 
Karlin’s work, at least by implication, 
adds to the ethical questions pertaining 
to the implementation of U�S� strate-
gies� She is not afraid to name names, 
identifying Lieutenant General Samuel 
T� “Hanging Sam” Williams as one of 
the principal architects of failure�
The final two case studies both involve 
Lebanon� The first examines U�S� 
efforts to strengthen the Lebanese 
national army in the early 1980s; the 
second looks at similar efforts under-
taken approximately twenty years later� 
Although it can be debated whether 
the lack of success in creating a strong 
Lebanese national army was the single 
most critical failure of U�S� policy and 
strategy, Karlin leaves no doubt that 
her hypothesis accounts for the failure 
of that portion of the U�S� effort�
In her first chapter, Karlin identifies 
many cases that do not fit within her 
construct� On page 1 she identifies the 
effort to strengthen other militaries as 
predominantly a post–World War II 
phenomenon� However, the historical 
record suggests that similar efforts were 
made much earlier, in places such as 
Haiti, Nicaragua, and the prewar Philip-
pines� She also, for reasons that are 
obvious, does not include more-recent 
cases, such as that of Mali, that may 
lack accessible, nonclassified research 
material to perform proper analysis, 
or where conditions on the ground are 
simply too dangerous to allow research, 
as in Yemen� This observation neither 
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negates nor even seriously calls into 
question Dr� Karlin’s conclusion, but it 
does suggest that additional opportuni-
ties to test her hypothesis are available�
However, it is in the concluding chapter 
of her work, “Findings and Implica-
tions,” that Dr� Karlin best engages those 
readers concerned with the current state 
of the U�S� national-security enterprise� 
In these pages, her role as scholar shares 
ground with, or even gives way to, her 
experience as a practitioner� Her voice 
becomes more distinct and personal� 
Her questions and recommendations 
for current and future strategists and 
implementers of policy are pertinent 
and sharp edged—as they should be� 
One hopes that this chapter points 
toward Karlin’s intentions regarding 
future writings and research, and if 
these future works include more of 
her personal experiences, backed 
with her academic bona fides, they 
promise to be of immense interest�
RICHARD NORTON
Empire of the Winds: The Global Role of Asia’s 
Great Archipelago, by Philip Bowring� New York: 
I� B� Tauris, 2018� 336 pages� $31�50�
At a recent conference, I overheard 
several participants discussing 
the best terminology for maritime 
Southeast Asia� While South China 
Sea is partly applicable, this term not 
only fails to include the entirety of 
the region (particularly the Indonesia 
archipelago) but also provides titular 
deference to disputed Chinese claims 
in the region� In his book Empire of 
the Winds Philip Bowring solves this 
quandary by resurrecting an ancient 
term to define the region: Nusantaria.
Bowring, a journalist with over forty 
years of experience in Southeast Asia, 
makes a convincing case for Nusantar- 
ia as a coherent historical entity� He 
includes therein the modern-day 
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Vietnam, and impressively stretches his 
argument back fifteen thousand years� 
Evidence from the fields of linguistics, 
genetics, archaeology, and anthropol-
ogy works together to form an image 
of a vibrant web of maritime culture 
and commerce� Bowring certainly 
acknowledges the impact of India and 
China on the early history of the region, 
as well as the later impact of Europe, but 
remains anchored throughout the text to 
Nusantaria� This is especially refreshing 
in his treatments of the spread of Islam 
and Christianity to the region, and the 
more recent spread of nationalism� In 
each case, he appropriately traces the 
origins of these ideologies to external 
forces, all the while remaining focused 
on their integration and syncretization 
into Nusantarian culture and society�
Not only does Bowring convincingly 
argue for the existence of Nusantaria 
as a region or geographical category of 
analysis; he also convincingly argues 
that for the majority of the past it 
was Nusantaria—not China—that 
dominated the region� China is not 
ignored but rather is relegated to being 
a marginal actor—which is a welcome 
and powerful orientation� An example 
of this is chapter 9, which tells the 
story of Champa from a Nusantarian, 
sea-facing perspective, rather than 
emphasizing the Vietnamese and 
Chinese overland connection� Bowring 
makes this theme explicit: “Today, the 
history of the Cham, and before that 
of Sa Huynh, and their presence in 
the Spratly Islands provides historical 
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counters to Chinese claims in the South 
China Sea” (p� 87)� China does have its 
place in the narrative, with chapter 13 
in particular providing keen insight into 
the “treasure voyages” of Zheng He, and 
later a brief but appropriate foray into 
the present and future challenges of 
China’s extension into the region� But for 
Bowring, Nusantaria is not defined by its 
relationship to any outside force, includ-
ing China, but rather stands on its own, 
and will continue to do so in the future�
Writing the entire history of a region 
while also reframing our conceptions of 
that region is no small task, but Bowring 
manages to pack an incredible amount 
of detail into 271 pages of text� This 
does leave a dense, sometimes dry litany 
of unfamiliar names and places, and 
Bowring offers little hand-holding to 
guide the nonexpert� Even so, the narra-
tive never slides too far into reference-
style regurgitation, and Bowring’s 
background as a journalist is evident in 
his prose style� The book is organized 
into twenty-seven mostly chrono-
logical chapters, with two sections 
of high-quality images� Each chapter 
has multiple subheadings to aid in 
categorizing the wealth of information� 
Bowring’s sense of humor is evident 
in some of these titles, with a personal 
favorite being “Friars Tuck In” (p� 210)�
Overall, Empire of the Winds is Braudel-
ian in ambition, taking as its subject a 
sea that is intuitively understood but  
difficult to define precisely� Bowring 
even mirrors Fernand Braudel in his 
insistence on the importance of environ-
ment for Nusantaria, from its origins 
and into its future (one subheading 
is unambiguously titled “Geography 
as Destiny” [p� 265])� There is a level 
of inconsistency here as well, though, 
with more textual weight given to the 
“Empire” part of the title than that of 
the “Winds�” Politics and culture—or 
what Braudel derisively referred to as 
histoire événementielle—form the core 
of Bowring’s narrative as he seeks to 
carve out a Nusantarian history� Then 
he emphasizes economics, establish-
ing the independence, and indeed 
the preeminence, of Nusantaria’s 
commercial web� Environment and 
geography are incorporated in a 
supplemental rather than foundational 
fashion� This is the inverse of Braudel’s 
understanding of how history works, 
with environment creating economic 
conditions, which in turn create politics�
This divergence is not inherently prob-
lematic, and indeed works to the benefit 
of Bowring� Braudel, while brilliant, is 
not a foolproof model for understanding 
the historical weft and weave of mari-
time regions� Bowring’s keen and layered 
recounting of Nusantarian history 
avoids determinism, instead offering 
a deep, refreshing dive into one of the 
most important and contested maritime 
regions in the contemporary world�
JOSHUA MEEKS
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
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Commander, Navy Region Mid-Atlantic�
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Among the global impacts of the onset of the coronavirus pandemic for many 
resident-education institutions was a rapid shift of their operations to an ex-
clusively virtual environment� While online education has existed for decades 
and collaborative tools have matured greatly over that time, the massive scope 
and compressed timeline of this endeavor created significant challenges—and 
opportunities—for educators of all types and at all levels� This included those 
at U�S� Department of Defense (DoD) professional military education (PME) 
institutions�
One course with unique characteristics that adapted rapidly to this new 
paradigm was the spring 2020 International Maritime Staff Operators Course 
(IMSOC) at the Naval War College (NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island� In doing 
so, it provided lessons for PME at all levels, especially with regard to courses on 
planning�
IMSOC itself was designed jointly by NWC’s International Programs Depart-
ment and College of Maritime Operational Warfare� Its purpose is to prepare 
midgrade international naval officers to support the planning and execution 
of complex maritime operations in a coalition environment� It originated in 
response to U�S� maritime partners’ demands for 
a course similar to the U�S�-only Maritime Staff 
Operators Course (MSOC)� The twelve-week un-
classified IMSOC course is taught at NWC, and 
uses the U�S� Navy Planning Process (NPP) and 
the maritime operations center (MOC) construct� 
Objectives include understanding the art and 
science of multinational maritime, operations, 
REPORTS & STUDIES
MAKING THE VIRTUAL INTERNATIONAL MARITIME STAFF  
OPERATORS COURSE A REALITY
Kenneth M. Sandler
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operational-level planning processes, and the organization and functions of an 
operational-level-of-war maritime headquarters, as typified by the MOC, as well 
as building enduring professional and personal relationships within the interna-
tional community�
In response to the heightened threat situation caused by COVID-19, the Presi-
dent of NWC ordered that starting on 16 March 2020 all resident courses had to 
be held online; any courses for which this was not possible were to be terminated� 
This coincided with the start date of IMSOC, which was scheduled for 16 March 
to 5 June� Nine students from six countries arrived from their home countries 
and U�S� locations on some of the last flights completed before tighter restrictions 
were put in place�
THE COURSE—OLD AND NEW
A key element of the DoD PME system is the integration of international of-
ficers into each class, which broadens perspectives and builds relationships� 
What made transitioning IMSOC to the virtual environment compelling 
was that the curriculum consists predominantly of team-based practical-
application exercises conducted with an exclusively international student 
body—from diverse backgrounds, languages, and cultures� Normally, in-
struction is accomplished via seminar format, augmented by team planning 
exercises, tabletop discussions, case studies, and site visits� Faculty tradition-
ally deliver lessons during seminars, mentor students and facilitate during 
practical-application sessions, and serve as role players during the capstone 
planning exercise�
However, there were significant doubts whether course objectives could be 
achieved in a remote environment� The first question was whether the collab-
orative technology would support team practical-application exercises and the 
NPP� Second, how would students and faculty build relationships and trust, given 
minimal social interaction? This concern was amplified because several students 
were visiting the United States for the first time� So staff members worked over-
time surmounting these hurdles, including coordinating basic subsistence� The 
staff established assumptions that not all objectives would be accomplished to 
the same standard, and therefore expectations should be lowered� The revised 
standards, however, still would have to meet all the criteria necessary to graduate 
from the course�
While significant challenges had to be overcome, ironically they also aided in 
unifying everyone toward the common objective of making the course a worth-
while endeavor and completing it successfully� Our strength was motivated, 
“digital-native” students; they were key to overcoming technical obstacles� Re-
viewing how the curriculum evolved over the course of the three progressively 
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complex segments (the foundational portion, the NPP, and the command-post 
exercise [CPX]) serves to highlight how adaptation and innovation were key to 
enabling success without overly diluting the desired end state� The course still 
produced graduates able to perform as staff officers on a national or multina-
tional maritime staff�
Blackboard Collaborate Ultra (BCU) was the primary software infrastructure 
used for distance learning, since it had been available for all faculty and students 
as an online course-management tool long before the pandemic� However, vari-
ous other software infrastructures could have served as long as they provided the 
essential elements, such as a virtual classroom with breakout rooms, presentation 
tools, a whiteboard, and audio and video communication channels� Later, some 
faculty and staff additionally implemented the use of Zoom, focusing primarily 
on video chats to support academic discussions�
The networked environment represented both a critical capability and a vul-
nerability, both enabling and limiting our freedom of action�1 Early business rules 
and lessons learned included the following:
• Limited video: using video clips for various lectures (but not cameras, owing 
to bandwidth limitations)
• Radio discipline: using standard naval communications (e�g�, saying “Over” 
when done talking)
• Moderator role: conducting roll call, with audio and chat communication 
checks on a daily basis; having faculty and students “raise hands” and the 
moderator granting permission to speak
• Faculty coordination: using the moderator chat room widely during class 
to coordinate among staff members; WhatsApp groups were an alternative 
means for faculty and students to communicate
• Nonverbal communication: enhancing student interactions via use of emoji
• Silence in the classroom: striking the correct balance between interjecting 
when there was a lack of engagement and practicing patience to allow stu-
dents to formulate responses to sometimes abstract issues; this is a necessary 
skill for instructors to cultivate in any educational setting, and even more so 
when the discomfort that silence can bring is exacerbated in an online setting 
by an inability to read body language
On a daily basis, various technical glitches impacted students and faculty alike, 
becoming an expected nuisance� An accepted part of the staff ’s daily routine 
was responding to these glitches with a wide range of mitigating actions� Issues 
included the following:
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• Intermittent Wi-Fi: Students living in the bachelor officer quarters (BOQ) 
routinely were dropped, albeit briefly, out of classes before rejoining� On one 
occasion, a BOQ outage caused class to end two hours early� When a wind-
storm impacted a faculty member’s power supply, he tethered to his phone, a 
method that worked adequately but suboptimally� Having a plan in place for 
veteran instructors to back up the primary instructors proved useful, even 
though it was employed only rarely�
• Equipment limitations: Initially, students who used iPads faced equipment 
limitations, producing limited functionality� This was rectified midway 
through the course by a rapid procurement of Chromebooks�
• Microphone issues: One faculty member needed to “warm up” his mic before 
the audio would function; another’s mic kept fading out� The solution was to 
connect to the room on a separate cell phone solely to provide audio�
GETTING STARTED
During the foundational portion, faculty and students adapted to the new way 
of teaching and learning� This phase consisted of approximately forty-five 
lectures; these ranged from “Introduction to Combined Maritime Operations” 
to “Operational Law�” For the first three weeks, sessions routinely took longer 
than anticipated, but by week 4 that became the exception rather than the rule� 
Each day the previous day’s instructor conducted a five-minute review of that 
session to gauge how well the material had been retained� Translating these 
class recaps for the virtual environment was accomplished effectively� Various 
means were used to ensure interaction and interest, including having students 
type their answers in chat or respond via voice, conducting multiple-choice 
polls, and even using the Jeopardy! game-show format� However, recaps using 
these methodologies often exceeded the five minutes allotted per class, with 
cascading effects on the entire day’s schedule, so this too was adjusted, with 
questions limited to four�
Practical-application exercises exceeded expectations� They were accom-
plished using breakout groups; such subgroups followed the same business rules 
as the main room� Trial and error could be a painful teacher, at times; for ex-
ample, a dean’s virtual visit did not go smoothly because placing students in the 
correct groups took an inordinate amount of time� However, once such mechan-
ics were ironed out the methodology saved substantial time and worked well� 
Lessons learned included the following:
• Moderator role: Until students are familiar with moving among breakout 
groups, assign one person to manipulate students in and out of rooms�
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• Prestaging students: Blackboard permits the queuing of students in their 
selected breakout rooms before moving them, which speeds up the process�
• Breakout group leads: Assign a lead and recorder for each subgroup� Students 
became adept at combining the use of chat and audio, while the recorder 
shared Word documents and PowerPoint slides to assist participants in build-
ing their products “in stride�”
BCU’s whiteboard function was rudimentary, and regrettably its shortcomings 
made it easy for students to lose their work� This hindered brainstorming by mul-
tiple students, traditionally done using sticky notes on a whiteboard� So instruc-
tors encouraged and empowered students to experiment with several alternative 
online whiteboard tools and provide feedback� Incorporating students as part of 
the solution demonstrated a shared commitment to replicating the classroom 
environment as closely as possible� An effective approach at this point was to 
have faculty members assist as recorders, including by capturing students’ input� 
Although the students’ English was excellent, this capitalized on limited time and 
made it easier to combine group efforts onto the same slide during outbriefs to 
compare and contrast solutions� During some of these initial, intensive practical-
application exercises, faculty members also acted as the operational planning 
team (OPT) lead, helping to move the process along�
The ability to overcome impediments had been successful to this point� But 
would it prove to be enough to enable the teaching and learning of each step of 
the collaboration-intensive Navy Planning Process?
THE NAVY PLANNING PROCESS,  
FROM MISSION ANALYSIS TO EXECUTION
On top of the increased workload that normally accompanies the transition to 
the NPP, the virtual OPT environment imposed additional demands whose reso-
lution required creativity, persistence, and patience� Beginning in the mission-
analysis phase, the control cell played a central role in answering student-planner 
questions in a timely manner� Traditionally, Collaboration at Sea on a closed 
network is the tool used to establish a common operating picture, simulate MOC 
processes, and access scenario-related documents� Since this was not available, 
organizers set up—on a compressed timeline—a new BCU room, with a similar 
file structure� In addition, the curriculum was retailored to function for the ma-
jority of the steps with only one OPT, with the control cell simulating another 
team� Instruction of the NPP required an exponential increase in parallel break-
out sessions, to divide up work� Multiple breakout rooms were created, along with 
a separate, persistently manned control-cell room to conduct internal discussions 
and respond to student questions� At this stage, the function of moving students 
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between rooms transitioned from being faculty to student managed, and eventu-
ally this became second nature�
Even though being reliant on the online environment slowed progress, stu-
dents exceeded expectations during mission analysis� Granted, there was a signif-
icantly higher demand for the lead faculty member to intervene and give detailed 
advice, compared with the equivalent experience in the classroom environment� 
The increased self-reliance of students during the planning phases also raised 
the likelihood of introverted students remaining in the background; however, 
faculty members ensured that all students were placed in leadership roles—and 
all rose to the occasion� Running several concurrent breakout groups—some with 
as few as two students—allowed more participants to shine, enabling the spring 
2020 officers to produce a product and briefing comparable to those of previous 
course convenings�
The ultimate potential and limitations of this approach were tested severely 
during Course of Action (COA) Development, arguably the most complicated 
step of the NPP� War on the Map is the foundational exercise for this step� It fo-
cuses students’ attention on a map of the area of operations by encouraging them 
to identify where capabilities are needed, with sticky notes placed in suggested lo-
cations� These inputs then are translated into actual forces, which facilitates task-
force organization and a description of actions� While there was nothing new 
about using PowerPoint to develop the resultant slide, this function normally was 
performed after all the pieces were on the physical map� Now, prior to the OPT 
taking the reins, the instructor methodically demonstrated how the forces would 
be moved and control measures emplaced, with the recorder moving them� Do-
ing this online in real time placed the burden and stress on a single person who 
manipulated the map, forces, and control measures, while every faculty member 
and student closely monitored progress and provided verbal and nonverbal guid-
ance� This exaggerated every second of delay and any perceived “mistake�” Since 
students needed to maximize their screen to see the crowded map, they could 
not monitor the chat function, but they devised a clever work-around by using 
the speaker’s notes to communicate� The OPT lead navigated the process master-
fully, while the recorder served as the linchpin; both demonstrated grace under 
pressure, thereby proving that the NPP could be taught even in a distributed and 
degraded environment�
Three main trends became more visible as the NPP progressed� The first was 
that by its nature the virtual environment yielded decreased one-on-one inter-
action between individual faculty members and student OPT leads� The COA 
Analysis and Wargaming step reinforced the need for extra attention and time 
set aside for informal coaching, mentoring, and back briefs prior to each step� 
The second trend was OPT leads spending significant time outside class—in the 
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evenings and on weekends—preparing work� This helped keep the course on 
timelines and provided a “running start” each day; however, it also negated some 
of the benefits of teamwork, and more than once proved counterproductive� The 
third trend was recognition of the limitations of the collaboration tool, with its 
constraints of sharing only one application and product at a time� An online en-
vironment in which students individually could reference multiple products—as 
they are developed, and without relying on the recorder or having to toggle to 
other tabs on their laptops—could collaborate simultaneously, and could com-
municate with audio and chat would have improved the process� Numerous 
products are available along this line, with one experiment during the assessment 
phase producing positive results by involving everyone in brainstorming through 
placing virtual sticky notes to identify measures of performance and effectiveness 
for each of the essential tasks� This closely simulated the classroom environment, 
with student feedback stating overwhelmingly that it significantly improved 
their ability to collaborate, understand, and apply how assessment measures and 
indicators help recognize performance and achieve progress toward objectives�
The added complexity of planning for multiple time horizons during the 
CPX provided invaluable experience, yet it also exposed limitations of the vir-
tual environment and the collaboration tool� The CPX normally is conducted 
with three planning cells (Current Operations [COPS], Future Operations, and 
Plans) running concurrently� Instead, owing to the smaller class size and techni-
cal constraints, the cells ran sequentially, with students beginning in COPS and 
then rotating to the other cells� This provided the students effective experience 
working within each cell; however, the normal student-driven exchange of in-
formation among cells was absent� The extended time in front of screens during 
this phase added to the cumulative online fatigue and was draining for students 
and faculty members alike; guarding against this well-known phenomenon via 
frequent breaks is essential to avoiding burnout�
Regardless of the drawbacks, students’ positive attitude, strong work ethic, and 
ability to deliver high-quality products exceeded faculty expectations and en-
abled the course objectives to be met� Students’ feedback stated that they found 
the experience challenging but that they were confident they had gained the 
ability to apply the NPP� It might have been easy for the students to lose motiva-
tion while attending remote classes eight hours a day for three months, yet the 
students maintained focus throughout� They built rapport and—of their own 
volition, even though they were peers—instituted the naval tradition of adding 
“Mr�” before their names when addressing each other� This small gesture had the 
intangible effect of maintaining a degree of decorum and professionalism when 
complacency easily could have taken hold� The faculty unanimously agreed that 
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the products met the standard, and while instructors could not see the light bulb 
go on, they could hear that it had�
Students did express disappointment about having traveled to the United 
States only to attend a virtual course, and there was consensus across the faculty 
and students that face-to-face teaching remains the preferred method for this 
type of course� General observations about the online offering include the fol-
lowing: class times were longer, and faculty involvement was greater—sometimes 
too much so; product quality was commensurate with that achieved by previous 
classes; there were limitations to the tool used itself, although promising alterna-
tives are available; and the valuable student interaction that normally occurs on 
a daily basis was irreplaceable� The inability to travel within the United States 
limited professional development and personal enrichment, and made building 
camaraderie difficult�
Even given these limitations, boundaries were pushed and the art of the pos-
sible was demonstrated� Even after IMSOC transitions back to the physical class-
room, elements of the online curriculum will be retained�
The coronavirus pandemic has impacted educators across the world� But they 
have demonstrated remarkable dedication to their students, and they have deliv-
ered—when it was needed most� Lessons learned abound for transitioning to the 
virtual environment, and many of those shared here are similar to what thousands 
of others have experienced� The added, noteworthy circumstances that character-
ize IMSOC make this experiment widely relevant to PME institutions, and it is 
especially applicable to courses on planning at all levels� With distributed-
planning tools widely used, the students learning this “harder” way will be better 
prepared in some ways to conduct planning functions in coalition operations, 
especially in a degraded collaborative environment�
N O T E S
  In addition to Lieutenant Colonel Sandler, the 
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Self-Defense Force; Capt� Germán Michelis, 
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hill� Conducting the online course convening 
that is the subject of this report would not 
have been possible without the assistance 
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ing Blackboard, including Amanda M� Rosen 
from the Writing and Teaching Excellence 
Center; Lt� Col� Alexander B� Fafinski, USAF, 
from the National Security Affairs Depart-
ment; and Natalie Parece from the College of 
Distance Education�
 1� U�S� Navy Dept�, Navy Planning, NWP 5-01 
(Norfolk, VA: Navy Warfare Development 
Command, December 2013), annex C, pp� 
C-3 to C-4�
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program  
Manager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading  
Program.
 Late in calendar year 2020, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Michael M� Gilday, USN, approved aspects of a new revision to his office’s Professional 
Reading Program (CNO-PRP), referred to as CNO-PRP 5�0� The specific read-
ing categories and book titles still were being finalized as this issue of the Review 
went to press, so details will be provided in a follow-on Reflections on Reading 
column�
In the interim, it is interesting to look at the issue of reading from a broader 
perspective�
• The ubiquitous Google search engine estimates that 130 million different 
books have been published in modern history� This certainly provides ample 
content from which to choose!
• According to a Pew Research survey conducted in 2019, Americans on aver-
age read twelve books per year� However, since 27 percent of the respondents 
reported reading no books during the previous year, the more voracious 
readers tend to skew the data�
• The Pew survey also found that printed books remain the preferred format, 
used by 65 percent of the respondents� In the past twelve months, only 25 
percent had read an e-book and 20 percent had listened to an audiobook�
With these data nuggets in mind, how should you decide which of the 
130 million books out there you should target if you set an ambitious goal of 
reading a dozen books a year? The answer, of course, is very personal for each 
individual� Many experts divide reading into two categories: reading done 
strictly for pleasure and reading done for enrichment or professional growth� 
Science fiction, westerns, historical fiction, and romance are all genres that 
can fill the pure-entertainment bill effectively� The CNO-PRP, however, seeks 
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to assist sailors in focusing their reading on books that contribute to master-
ing their profession and improving their abilities to serve with honor, courage, 
and commitment�
To arrive at the list of books recommended for inclusion in the new CNO-PRP, 
a Reading Program Advisory Group was established, consisting of representa-
tives from the Naval Academy, Naval Postgraduate School, Naval War College, 
and 21st Century Sailor Office� Collectively, these advisers created a slate of 
nearly four hundred books they considered to be particularly valuable for the 
development of the women and men of the U�S� Navy� From there, using an 
iterative process of review and consultation, they reduced the slate to approxi-
mately seventy-five titles� The CNO and the Master Chief Petty Officer of the 
Navy finalized the list from these recommendations� We now await official 
approval�
In addition to categorization by specific lines of effort that support the Navy 
vision for the future, the list has been divided into subcategories according to 
Navy professionals’ level of experience� Books in the Foundational category may 
be most appropriate for sailors (officer and enlisted) at all grades and ranks dur-
ing their first seven years of service; books identified as Advanced are suggested 
for midcareer sailors, in the eight-to-fifteen-year range; and the Capstone books 
are suggested for reading by those with sixteen or more years of service� These 
subcategories are advisory in nature; Navy professionals can read anything that 
appeals to them�
Once the final program details have been solidified, an updated CNO-PRP 
website will provide all the titles, as well as thumbnail sketches of each book� In 
most cases, a link will be provided to allow readers to access the books as digital 
files from the Navy MWR Digital Library at http://navy�lib�overdrive�com� Once 
you establish a Navy MWR Digital Library borrower’s account, e-books, and in 
some cases audiobooks, can be borrowed for up to thirty days, after which the 
content will be deleted from your device so it can be loaned to another user�
Future Reflections on Reading columns here in the Review will highlight vari-
ous titles from the CNO-PRP version 5�0� The CNO has stated, “Learning is the 
ultimate warfare enabler, and the intellectual development of our sailors provides 
our most critical war-fighting capabilities�” His Professional Reading Program is 
a great way for sailors to develop their intellects on a continuing basis�
JOHN E� JACKSON
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